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General Introduction
”Social science should be at the heart of policy making. We need a revolution in rela-
tions between government and the social research community – we need social scien-
tists to help to determine what works and why, and what types of policy initiatives
are likely to be most effective.” (Blunkett, 2000)
Evidence-based economic policy rests on the idea that the best available evidence should be at
the heart of policy development and implementation. Evidence-based policy is – in contrast to
opinion-based policy – understood as an approach that helps people make well informed deci-
sions about policies and programs using systematic empirical evidence. Successful economic
policy requires a solid understanding of the causal effects of a policy intervention. Over the past
two decades, improvements in data quality, development of more robust estimation methods
and better research designs have helped to develop a large toolkit of new instruments to iden-
tify causal effects of policies. These tools include laboratory experiments, field experiments, or
quasi-natural experiments which can be analyzed using various identification strategies.
Although randomized experiments or quasi-natural experiment can be extremely helpful in
analyzing policy questions, their results have to be interpreted with caution (Leamer, 2010;
Manski, 2013). First, findings from randomized and natural experiments cannot be easily
transferred into other contexts. Analyses that are based on randomized or natural experi-
ments often rely on specific, non-representative samples or certain restrictive assumptions,
which makes extrapolations to other domains often difficult. Second, credible policy analysis
should stress the assumptions that are needed for identification. Policy conclusions are of lim-
ited usefulness if they rest on strong or unsupported assumptions. It is therefore important to
acknowledge not only the benefits, but also the limits and uncertainty of policy analyses that
rest on evaluations of randomized and natural experiments. Not a single analysis, but rather
the conclusions reached by a systematic body of research on specific policy questions should
be the basis of policy development. The objective of this dissertation is thus not to provide a
direct basis for specific policy recommendations, but should rather be viewed as a first step
towards a better understanding of certain aspects of a policy question.
Evidence-based policy is a universal approach. The use of causal identification approaches
and empirical evidence to assess the effects of a policy and to identify the underlying behav-
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ioral margins is not confined to specific policy areas. This thesis consists of three independent
chapters in applied microeconometrics. The first two chapters discuss related topics in applied
labor economics. Both chapters rely on large administrative databases and use quasi-natural
experiments to identify the causal effects of policy interventions using two distinct method-
ologies. While the first chapter focuses on a discussion of the empirical findings of reducing
potential unemployment benefit duration on post-unemployment outcomes, the second chap-
ter develops – inspired by job search theory – a new approach to learn about the relative
importance of reservation wages for non-employment duration and survival probabilities. The
third chapter is in the field of behavioral environmental economics and discusses the role of
information for electricity consumption. This chapter is based on a randomized controlled field
experiment and comes next to a purely randomized experiment situation. While the third chap-
ter is not thematically linked to the first two chapters, all three chapters answer policy-relevant
questions and contribute to a better understanding of the causal effects of policy interventions.
The first chapter is jointly written with Rafael Lalive and makes use of a policy reform that
changed the entitlement rules for the maximum unemployment benefit duration in Switzerland.
From policy-perspective, knowing about the medium-run effects of such a policy change on
post-unemployment outcomes is of direct importance: If a reduction of potential unemployment
benefit duration affects post-unemployment outcomes, then a policy assessment that focuses
only on its impacts on the government budget is too narrow. The fiscal benefit of reducing
benefit durations comes at a potentially large cost if reductions to benefit durations deteriorate
post unemployment job quality. Conversely, reducing benefit durations might carry a double
dividend if it improves labor market chances.
The policy reform reduced the maximum potential benefit duration from 24 months to 18
months for job seekers younger than 55 years in Switzerland in 2003. Because the policy
change was not applied to all job seekers, we can adopt a difference-in-differences framework
to identify the effects of this reduction on medium-run earnings and employment. We find
that this reduction in potential benefit duration increases earnings of job seekers aged 50 to
54 years not only in the first 24 months but also up to 50 months after entering unemploy-
ment. Effects on employment are also positive but weaker than earnings effects. The positive
medium-run effects are concentrated among job seekers who were previously employed in
R&D intensive industries and whose previous occupation consisted mainly of manual tasks.
Unemployment insurance can affect medium-run labor market outcomes via its effects on skill
depreciation or unemployment stigma among older job seekers.
While the first chapter provides only indirect evidence on the underlying behavioral channels,
in the second chapter I develop a novel approach that allows to learn about the relative impor-
tance of the two key margins of job search – reservation wage choice and search effort. Knowing
more about these two margins is important form a policy-perspective: On the one hand, if re-
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duced search effort is the main driving force for prolonged unemployment spells, increases
in unemployment insurance generosity could be coupled with stricter search requirement to
curtail unwanted disincentive and moral hazard effects. On the other hand, increasing unem-
ployment benefit duration could be welfare improving, if prolonged unemployment spells are
mainly driven by reservation wage effects and allow job seekers to accept better job-matches.
This paper develops a new strategy designed to analyze the relative importance of the two
margins for the duration of unemployment. To this end, I separately study exits to wage-
improving jobs and exits to wage-declining jobs. Unemployment exit hazards to wage-improving
jobs are solely determined by search effort, whereas the exit rate to wage-declining jobs is
jointly determined by search effort and reservation wages. I test this in the context of a sharp
discontinuity in potential benefit duration from 30 to 39 weeks in the unemployment insurance
system of Austria using a regression-discontinuity approach. I provide causal estimates for the
effects of prolonged benefits on unemployment duration and survival probabilities. Consistent
with reservation wage movements, exits to wage-declining jobs account for around 80 % of
the overall unemployment effect. Moreover, analyzing treatment effects on survivor functions
highlights that the largest contributions are observed in the time period from 30 to 39 weeks.
These results suggest an important role of the reservation wage channel in shaping job search
behavior.
The third chapter is jointly written with Rafael Lalive and Lorenz Goette and – while not the-
matically linked to the two other chapters – provides a nice complement from a methodological
point of view. The third chapter describes a randomized field experiment which analyzes the
electricity saving potentials of information. Tackling climate change has been identified as one
of the most important economic policy challenges of the 21st century and fostering residen-
tial energy-efficiency has been identified as a promising avenue. In the past, researchers and
policymakers have focused on relative prices as main driving force of energy usage. However,
pricing instruments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often been found to be short-
lived and difficult to enforce politically. This is why recently the focus of energy conservation
programs has shifted towards behavioral approaches – such as the provision of information
or social norm feedback – which are widely viewed as an effective and relatively cheap tool to
increase energy efficiency. Financed by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy and implemented by
Zurich’s energy supplier ewz, this field experiment is a first class example of evidence-based
policy analysis: While of great scientific interest in itself, the study design is closely interlinked
with the interests and needs of energy providers and policy makers.
In the field experiment we consider three types of information: (i) real-time feedback on
one’s own current and past electricity consumption using smart metering technology, (ii) per-
sonalized electricity savings tips through expert advice, and (iii) social information about one’s
own and a peer households’ electricity consumption. Real-time feedback through smart me-
ters reduces electricity consumption by 3 to 5 % of daily electricity consumption. This roughly
3
corresponds to turning-off four light bulbs for an hour or turning off television for 1 hour and
45 minutes per day. Effects are detected shortly after installation of the in-home displays and
persist over the study period. Moreover, we find that the largest savings are realized in peak
hours. At the same time, households substitute part of their electricity consumption towards
low-tariff hours. Social information reduces electricity consumption by around 1.5 % of daily
consumption as long as feedback is frequent enough. Expert advice improves the perception of
how easy it would be to improve energy-efficient behavior, but fails to translate into electricity
savings. Utility is unaffected by the treatments indicating that the social benefits of improved
information may be offset by negative social pressure effects or the costs of behavioral changes.
4


Chapter 1
How Does a Reduction in Potential Benefit
Duration Affect Medium-Run Earnings and
Employment?∗
Abstract
We study how a reduction of the potential duration of unemployment benefit receipt (PBD) affects medium-run
earnings and employment of job seekers. The analysis is based on a reform that reduced PBD from 24 months
to 18 months for job seekers younger than 55 years in Switzerland in 2003. Adopting a difference-in-differences
framework, we find that this reduction in PBD increases earnings of job seekers aged 50 to 54 years not only in
the first 24 months after entering unemployment but also up to 50 months after entering. Effects on employment
are also positive but weaker than earnings effects. The positive medium-run effects are concentrated among
job seekers who were previously employed in R&D intensive industries and whose previous occupation consisted
mainly of manual tasks. Unemployment insurance can affect medium-run labor market outcomes via its effects
on skill depreciation or unemployment stigma among older job seekers.
JEL Classification: C41, J64, J65
Keywords: potential benefit duration, unemployment duration, earnings, employment, policy change
∗This chapter is jointly written with Rafael Lalive. Contribution: Data preparation, empirical analysis, writing (jointly
with Rafael Lalive). Financial support from the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the Swiss National
Science Foundation (SNF-Project No. 100018-146090) is gratefully acknowledged.
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1.1 Introduction
The global crisis that erupted in 2008 put around 25 million worker out of a job (ILO, 2012).
Unemployment insurance (UI) is the key first safety net to workers and probably the most
important program to feather the effects of crises. All OECD member countries currently have
a system of unemployment insurance. Yet the details of the unemployment insurance system
vary tremendously across the OECD.1
This paper studies whether PBD affects earnings and employment of job seekers in the
period of four years after entering unemployment. Understanding whether PBD matters for
medium-run earnings and employment is important for at least two reasons. First, a policy
assessment of changes to PBD that focuses only on its impacts on the government budget is
too narrow if PBD also affects job quality. The fiscal benefit of reducing PBD comes at a poten-
tially large cost if reductions to PBD deteriorate post unemployment job quality. Conversely,
reducing PBD might carry a double dividend if reduced PBD improves labor market chances. A
pure policy assessment therefore requires more information on the post unemployment effects
of PBD. Second, existing discussions of the optimality of unemployment insurance ignore its
potential effects on post unemployment jobs (Chetty, 2008; Schmieder et al., 2012a). These
formulas need to be adapted if PBD affects job quality.
On a theoretical level, it is not clear how longer benefit duration affects post-unemploy-
ment outcomes. Standard job search theory predicts that shorter PBD forces job seekers to be
less selective and prevents them from waiting for better job offers (Mortensen, 1977; van den
Berg, 1990a). This is likely to decrease reemployment wages. Also, job match quality might
be reduced and subsequent jobs would then end earlier. In contrast, shortening PBD might
even improve wages and earnings in a context where skill depreciation is important. Reduc-
tions in PBD improve labor market chances by shortening unemployment duration (Shimer
and Werning, 2006). Alternatively, firms may use unemployment duration as a screening de-
vice (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). Evidence indicates that prolonged unemployment duration is
detrimental to the hiring chances of job seekers (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Kroft et al., 2013).
This paper analyzes a reform to Swiss unemployment insurance that reduced PBD from
24 months to about 18 months for job seekers who were younger than 55. This reform, en-
acted in July 2003, can be used to measure the role of shorter PBD for older workers in a
differences-in-differences design. As expected, we find that the reform significantly reduced
monthly unemployment benefit receipt by 6.5 percentage points in the period 18 to 24 months
after entering unemployment. Job seekers compensate this reduction in benefits by leaving
unemployment for jobs thus increasing employment by 3.3 percentage points (pctp) and labor
earnings by 3.7 percent. Interestingly, we find that the positive effects of the benefit reduction
1For instance, the net replacement rate for a family earning the average production worker wage with two children
ranges from 55 percent in New Zealand to 92 percent in Luxembourg in the initial phase of unemployment in 2011.
The picture is different for the long-term unemployed (4 to 5 years into the unemployment spell). A two children family
earning the average production worker wage sees 41 percent of that wage replaced in Greece but up to 72 percent in
Denmark. This shows that both the benefit level and the degree to which benefits are maintained in the course of the
spell varies tremendously across OECD members.
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persists beyond the period that is insured by UI. Specifically, employment remains 1.5 pctp
higher and earnings stay 3.3 percent higher compared to the situation without the reduction
in PBD. Subsample analyses indicate that the post-UI effects are especially important for job
seekers coming from R&D intensive industries and for individuals whose previous occupation
required manual skills. These analyses suggest that the beneficial effects of reduced depre-
ciation of human capital or improvements in non-employment stigma outweigh the negative
effects of reduced reservation wages.
This paper is related to at least three strands of literature. The first strand discusses
reduced form evidence on the effects of PBD on unemployment duration.2 Several US stud-
ies estimate the effects on the exit rate from unemployment of variations in PBD that take
place during recessions.3 Early studies, including Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985),
and Grossman (1989) find significantly negative incentive effects. Meyer (1990) and Katz and
Meyer (1990) show that the exit rate from unemployment rises sharply just before benefits
are exhausted. Such spikes are absent for non-recipients. More recent work by Addison and
Portugal (2004) confirms these findings. In contrast, Card et al. (2007b) show that the spike
at benefit exhaustion has been over-stated in analyses that focus on registered unemployment
duration. Evidence on the effect of PBD in European studies also finds strong effects.4 A com-
mon objection against these studies is policy endogeneity. Benefits are typically extended in
anticipation of a worse labor market for the eligible workers. Card and Levine (2000) exploit
variation in benefit duration that occurred independently of labor market condition and show
that policy bias is substantial. Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a,b) show similar evidence for the
Austrian labor market.
The second strand of the literature discusses whether changes to PBD affect post unem-
ployment job quality. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the first to look at the effect of
unemployment insurance on post unemployment outcomes and find positive effects of unem-
ployment benefits on post unemployment wages for different age groups and gender. A number
of more recent studies find positive effects of increased UI generosity on post-unemployment
wages: Addison and Blackburn (2000) provide evidence for a weakly positive effect of unem-
ployment benefits on post unemployment wages in the US. Centeno and Novo (2006) analyze
the relationship between the unemployment insurance system and the quality of subsequent
wages and tenure over the whole support of the wage and tenure distributions. They find a
2The survey of the literature on the effects of PBD on unemployment duration borrows heavily from a similar section
in Lalive et al. (2006).
3Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) give a recent overview of empirical research related to incentives in unemploy-
ment insurance. See Green and Riddell (1997, 1993), and Ham and Rea (1987) for studies that focus on Canada.
4Hunt (1995) finds substantial disincentive effects of extended benefit entitlement periods for Germany. Carling
et al. (1996) find a big increase in the outflow from unemployment to labor market programs whereas the increase in
the exit rate to employment is substantially smaller. Winter-Ebmer (1998) uses Austrian data and finds significant
benefit duration effects for males but not for females. Roed and Zhang (2003) find for Norwegian unemployed that the
exit rate out of unemployment increases sharply in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion where the effect is larger
for females than for males. Puhani (2000) finds that reductions in PBD in Poland did not have a significant effect on
the duration of unemployment whereas Adamchik (1999) finds a strong increase in reemployment probabilities around
benefit expiration. van Ours and Vodopivec (2006a) studying PBD reductions in Slovenia find both strong effects on
the exit rate out of unemployment and substantial spikes around benefit exhaustion.
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positive impact of unemployment benefits on each quantile of the wage and tenure distribu-
tion. Caliendo et al. (2013a) exploit discontinuities in benefit entitlement to identify the causal
effect of an extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and on post unemployment
outcomes using German data. They find that the unemployed who obtain a new job close to
benefit exhaustion are more likely to leave subsequent employment and receive lower wages
than than their counterparts with extended benefit duration. Centeno and Novo (2009) iden-
tify a liquidity effect of the unemployment insurance system and detect a positive impact on
job match quality for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution. A number of recent
papers find virtually no or only small effects on job-match quality: Card et al. (2007a) analyze
the effects of cash-on hand and extended unemployment benefit duration on unemployment
duration and job-match quality. They find significantly lower job finding rates with extended
benefits, but no effects on job-match quality. van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) analyze how a
change in Slovenia’s unemployment insurance law affected the quality of post-unemployment
jobs. They find that reducing potential benefit duration has only small effects on wages, on
the duration of subsequent employment and on the probability of securing a permanent rather
than a temporary job. Schmieder et al. (2012c) analyze the long-term effects of extensions in
UI durations taking into account not only the initial, but also all recurrent non-employment
spells. They find significant long-run effects of an extension in UI duration on the duration of
non-employment up to three years after the start of the initial spell. Schmieder et al. (2013)
show that longer potential benefit durations sharply increase in non-employment duration but
lower post-unemployment wages. They explain the wage drops through shifting wage offer dis-
tributions, possibly due to skill depreciation or stigmatization. Finally, Le Barbanchon (2012)
finds a significant and large effect of benefit duration on unemployment exits to work but no
effects on wages or employment in France.
The third strand of the literature discusses policy design. Starting from the original insight
of Baily (1978), Chetty (2008) uses reduced form evidence to discuss whether the level of
unemployment benefits is set so as to maximize welfare.5 Schmieder et al. (2012a) discuss
optimal potential benefit duration over the business cycle. Haan and Prowse (2010) discuss
the employment, fiscal and welfare effects of unemployment insurance using a structural life-
cycle model allowing for endogenous accumulation of experience. They conclude that from a
welfare point of view, reductions of benefit entitlement should be favored over replacement rate
reductions.
This paper complements existing studies on the job quality effects of PBD in at least three
respects. First, we focus on employment and earnings, outcomes that can be observed for
all job seekers. In contrast, by focusing on wages and subsequent job tenure, the existing
literature analyzes outcomes that are only observed for job seekers who find employment.
Interpreting effects on job finders is challenging due to selection into employment. Second, we
adopt a longer time window that allows estimating not only short-term immediate effects but
5Also, see Chetty (2009) for a general description of the sufficient statistics approach.
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also effects that build up over time. For instance, if shortening PBD reduced the depreciation
of job seekers’ leadership skills, labor market outcomes will improve only in the medium-run
when job seekers had time to demonstrate those better leadership skills. Finally, we perform
subgroup analyses by industry and occupation of previous job to shed light on the role of
reduced human capital and skill depreciation as a potential explanation for positive medium-
run effects.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the institutional
background. Section 1.3 provides information on the data sources and a set of key descrip-
tive statistics. Section 1.4 discusses the econometric framework and our main identification
strategies. Section 1.5 presents the main results, and section 1.6 provides a summary and
implications of our findings.
1.2 Institutional background
This section discusses the relevant background on unemployment insurance, earnings, and
employment in Switzerland.6 Job seekers are entitled to unemployment benefits if they meet
two requirements. First, they must have paid unemployment insurance taxes for at least
six months in the two years prior to registering at the public employment service (PES). The
contribution period is extended to 12 months for those individuals who have been registered
at least once in the three previous years. Job seekers entering the labor market are exempted
from the contribution requirement if they have been in school, in prison, employed outside
of Switzerland or have been taking care of children. Second, job seekers must possess the
capability to fulfill the requirements of a regular job - they must be "employable". During the
unemployment spell, job seekers have to fulfill certain job search requirements and participate
in active labor market programs in order to remain eligible for benefits.7 Job seekers who are
ineligible for unemployment insurance can claim social assistance. Social assistance is means
tested and replaces roughly 76 % of unemployment benefits for a single job seeker with no
other sources of earnings (OECD, 1999).
Prior to July 1, 2003, job seekers were eligible for 520 daily benefit payments during a
two year framework period. Those 520 benefit days are equivalent to two years of potential
benefit duration since a calendar year has 260 work days. The replacement ratio is 80 % for
workers earning less than 3,536 CHF.8 prior to unemployment and not caring for children.
The replacement rate decreases gradually to 70 % for job seekers who earned between 3,536
CHF and CHF 4,030 and it stays at 70 % thereafter. Benefits insure monthly earnings up
to a top cap.9 Job seekers have to pay all earnings and social insurance taxes except the
unemployment insurance tax rate (which stands at about 2 %). This means that the gross
6This section borrows from a similar section in Arni et al. (2013).
7See Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Lalive et al. (2008) for detailed background information on and an evaluation
of the active labor market programs.
81 CHF = 0.83 EUR.
9The cap is currently at 10,500 CHF per month and stood at 8,900 CHF before the reform.
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replacement rate is similar to the net replacement rate. Job seekers keep these entitlements
during a framework period of two years. For instance, a job seeker who leaves unemployment
after 3 months remains eligible for the remaining months of unemployment benefits during the
two year framework period.
The July 2003 reform changed a range of aspects of the benefit system. First, the reform
now requires everyone to have contributed for at least 12 out of the 24 months prior to regis-
tering for unemployment benefits. Second, the reform reduced PBD for individuals below the
age of 55 years to 400 daily benefit payments, or to 18.5 months.10 Job seekers aged 55 years
or older who had contributed for at least 18 months prior to entering unemployment remained
unaffected by the reform. Yet job seekers aged 55 years or older who had only contributed
between 12 and 17 months to UI also experienced a cut in PBD. Third, the reform increased
benefit levels somewhat for low to medium earners to reflect inflation adjustment. In order
to achieve this objective, the replacement rate was kept at 80 % for job seekers with insured
earnings of up to 3,797 CHF and then gradually reduced over the earnings bracket 3’797 to
4,340 CHF.
From an identification point of view, the following issues are crucial. First, there were no
concurrent changes to other social insurance programs in the period around the 2003 reform.
This ensures that our estimates pick up the specific consequences of the reform rather than
changes to other social programs. Second, benefit rules depend on current age of individuals
rather than on age at registration. Also, reforms to the UI system apply to all job seekers, not
just to those who register after the reform. We will discuss below how we take this into account
in our estimation framework. Third, the reform was signed into force around a time when
the Swiss labor market situation was deteriorating. The unemployment rate reached a low of
slightly over 1.5 % in the first quarter of 2001 and it increased considerably after the bursting
of the "dot.com" bubble to a high of 4 % in the last quarter of 2003. Unemployment decreased
first slightly then more rapidly to reach a trough of 2.5 % in the second quarter of 2008. The
changing macroeconomic environment will not introduce a bias into our estimates if aggregate
demand for work varies similarly for the treatment and control groups in our analysis. We
assess this key condition further below.11
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
This section discusses the data and provides first descriptive information about treatment and
control groups.
10A year counts 260 benefit days. A job seeker who is eligible for 400 benefit payments can therefore claim benefits
for 18.46 (=400/260 * 12) months.
11Note that our analysis identifies a lower bound on the positive effects. As younger worker’s unemployment is
more sensitive to the cycle than older workers’ unemployment (Clark and Summers, 1981) and the average quality of
younger unemployed is likely to be lower, the effects on earnings and employment are likely to be negatively biased.
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1.3.1 Data
The study is based on two data sources. The first concerns administrative records of the unem-
ployment insurance register (UIR) database covering information on all individuals registering
with the public employment service (PES) between 1999 and 2007. This can be job seekers who
are eligible for unemployment benefits, but also individuals who ask the public employment
service for assistance. The UIR contains the exact date when a job seeker can start a new job
– the unemployment start-date.12 The UIR also contains information on the date when the job
seeker starts her or his new job – the job start date. We measure the duration of unemployment
as the number of days elapsed between the unemployment start-date and the job start-date if
those two pieces of information are available. We use the de-registration date, the date when
the file of a job seeker was closed, as a proxy for the unemployment end-date for individuals
who do not start a new job. The database also contains socio-demographic characteristics such
as gender, age, education, and marital status.
The second data source contains information on unemployment benefit payments, employ-
ment and earnings from the Social Security Administration (SSA). This data covers the universe
of all individuals who have contributed to the mandatory first pillar retirement pension system
between the period between 1982 and 2010. The social security database can be merged to
the unemployment insurance register data through a unique person identifier. The data pro-
vides monthly information about earnings from employment and some information on transfer
income (e.g. unemployment benefits are included but not social assistance). Moreover, for
a subsample of around 35 % of the universe of spells we also observe disability and old-age
retirement pensions. For each unemployment spell, we extract a history of 50 months before
and 50 months after registration from the SSA database.
We impose a number of additional sampling restrictions on the merged database. First, we
only consider individuals aged between 50 and 59 years at the start of the spell of unemploy-
ment, in order to avoid confounding effects because of early retirement considerations. Second,
the sample contains only individuals who contributed to the unemployment insurance for at
least 18 of the last 24 months before getting unemployed. This ensures that all job seekers aged
55 or older kept eligibility to two years of benefits. Third, the reform was applied to in-progress
spells. This implies that some individuals in the before-treatment regime could actually have
experienced a reduction in PBD while unemployed. In order to reduce this potential source
of bias, we exclude job seekers who enter unemployment up to 12 months before the reform
in July 2003. Fourth, we only consider individuals who are full-time unemployed in the first
month of unemployment.13 The final sample contains 62,563 spells.
12The data also contains date of registration and de-registration. The registration date does not correspond to the
start date of the unemployment spell because job seekers need to register with the PES the moment they know they
will lose a job. This is typically a quarter before they actually lose their job.
13Workers who lose one of two part-time jobs are eligible for UI on the job they lost. These job seekers are part-time
unemployed. We focus on the full-time unemployed to achieve a homogeneous sample.
11
1.3.2 Treatment and control groups
Treatment assignment. Table 1.1 provides information on how we defined treatment and
control groups. We assign individuals aged below 55 at the start of their unemployment spell
to the treatment group, and individuals aged 55 or older to the control group. Because benefit
eligibility is based on current age, benefit eligibility is upgraded to 24 months after the 55th
birthday of a job seeker. The treatment group thus contains some job seekers who switch from
400 days to 520 days of benefits. Our estimates thus have to be interpreted as lower bounds.
Excluding job seekers who were employed for less than 18 months in the last 24 months prior
to the start of the unemployment spell ensures that only job seekers in the treatment group
are affected by the cut in PBD. Yet, a potential issue could be that the months employed within
a two year window prior to unemployment start do not necessarily perfectly coincide with the
two year framework period that determines eligibility for benefits. However, over 85 % of our
sample claimed unemployment benefits within 3 months after unemployment start. Eligibility
issues should therefore not play a major role.14
Table 1.1: Treatment assignment
Age Prior UI contributions Benefit entitlement Group
before after
< 55 ≥ 18 months 520 400 Treatment
≥ 55 ≥ 18 months 520 520 Control
Notes: This table shows the treatment assignment, which is based on the age at un-
employment start.
For each individual unemployment spell we observe a history of monthly unemployment
benefits, earnings from employment around unemployment start of up to 50 months before,
and up to 50 month after unemployment start.15 We construct a binary indicator on employ-
ment that takes the value 1 if the job seeker has generated positive earnings from employment,
and zero otherwise. Also, we define a binary variable for benefit receipt that takes the value
1 if unemployment benefits were positive in a month, and zero otherwise. We observe 22,170
spells of job seekers whose unemployment spell started before the reform was implemented on
July 1st, 2003 – 9,529 in the treatment group, and 12,641 in the control group (table 1.2). We
observe 40,393 unemployment spells starting after July 1st, 2003 – 17,307 spells belong to the
treatment group and 23,086 belong to the control group.
14One might think that the regression discontinuity (RD) design could also be implemented (Lee and Lemieux, 2010a).
Yet note that benefit eligibility does change discontinuously in age. A job seeker who enters unemployment at age
54 years and 11 months will initially be entitled to 18.5 months of benefits but rapidly up-grade to 24 months of
benefits once he or she has celebrated her or his 55th birthday. Alternatively, one could think of using the number
of contribution months as a running variable. This is challenging for two reasons. Our records indicate that prior
contribution months as measured in the SSA are an imperfect predictor of eligibility. We suspect measurement error
in prior contribution months. Second, prior contribution months are also unlikely to satisfy the requirement that the
running variable can not be manipulated. For these reasons we have adopted a difference-in-differences framework.
15Individuals can appear multiple times in our sample. We observe two or more spells for 8 % of the job seekers in
the sample.
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Descriptive statistics. Table 1.2 presents selected summary statistics for the treatment
(Di = 1) and control (Di = 0) group for spells that start before (columns 1 and 2) and after
(columns 3 and 4) the reform. The average employment share over the 50 months before
entering unemployment is 92 percent for job seekers who entered unemployment before the
reform. The employment probability does not differ across the treated and control groups. Em-
ployment prior to the unemployment spell was about 1 percentage point higher for job seekers
who start a new spell in the period after the reform. Results are similar for earnings. Job
seekers in the control group earn about 5,000 CHF per month (about 4,150 EUR) before the
reform, and monthly earnings are about the same for treated job seekers and for both groups
after the reform.
The table also presents information on two key pieces of information that we will use to
learn more about skill obsolescence and depreciation. The first information is R&D intensity
of the previous employer. We infer R&D intensity of an industry as the average expenditures
for R&D for the neighboring countries of Switzerland (Germany, Austria, France and Italy) over
the years 2005 to 2008 at the two digit NACE level. We merge this information to each job
seeker based on industry prior to losing job. R&D intensive industries are those that have
expenditures that exceed the median expenditure, the remaining industries representing the
low R&D industries.16 The share of job seekers from high R&D industries slightly exceeds 50 %
for treated and untreated before the reform. After the reform, the proportion of job seekers from
R&D intensive industries decreases slightly to around 49 % and 46 % respectively. The second
information is related to the task content of the occupation of job seeker. Cognitive refers to job
seekers whose previous occupation consisted mainly of cognitive tasks. For the classification
of occupations into cognitive and manual task content, we adopt an approximation suggested
in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The authors propose a simple classification of occupations
into four broad task dimensions: (1) abstract, non-routine cognitive tasks, (2) routine cognitive
tasks, (3) routine manual tasks, and (4) non-routine manual tasks. We further condense the
first and second category into a "cognitive tasks" group, and the third and fourth into a "manual
tasks" group.17 Before the reform, the proportion is 50 % for untreated and 49 % for treated
individuals respectively. After the reform, the proportion of mainly cognitive skilled job seekers
in the control and treatment groups decreases to 48 %.
Experience captures the proportion of job seekers with a continuous work experience of at
least 24 months prior to their unemployment spell. The proportion of job seekers with a long
work history is around three quarters for spells that started before the reform. After the reform,
this proportion slightly increases to 82 % for individuals in the control group, and to 78 % for
the treatment group. Around 74 % of the individuals in the control group, and roughly 72 %
16High R&D industries are for example manufacture of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, manufacture of computer,
electronic and optical products, manufacture of machinery, equipment and motor vehicles, or industries in profes-
sional, scientific and technical activities.
17The most important occupations requiring cognitive skills are engineers, clericals and occupations in adminis-
trative support, sales, and education. The most important occupations requiring manual skills are occupations in
construction, in production and manufacture of raw materials, and in services and housekeeping.
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of the individuals in the treatment group worked in a leader or expert position. The share of
female job seekers varies between 42 % and 45 %. The proportion of Swiss citizens is fairly
stable for unemployment spells starting before and after the reform, and amounts to 70 % in
the treatment group and around 72 % in the control group. There are no large differences
between the four groups relative to their marital status: Around two thirds of the individuals
are married, one fifth is divorced, roughly 10 % are singles, and around 4 % are widowed.
The largest differences between unemployment starts before and after the reform are found for
years of schooling: The share of individuals with less than 7 years of schooling, and between
10 and 11 years of schooling remains fairly stable over time and across treatment and control
groups, and increases slightly over time for job seekers with between 8 to 9 years of schooling
and with more than 14 years of schooling. The share of individuals with 12 to 13 years of
schooling, however, increases largely from around 24 to 26 % before to around 36 to 38 % after
the reform. At the same time the share of individuals for whom the attained education level is
unknown decreases from around 50 % to 30 % over time. Changes in data quality account for
this substantial shift in measured education levels. This shift affected treated and untreated
individuals in the same way and will not invalidate our identification strategy. Moreover, except
for job seekers with 14 years or more of schooling, education levels do not differ statistically
significantly between control and treatment groups before and after the reform.
Column 5 of table 1.2 presents difference-in-differences estimates on the control variables.
The null hypothesis that the composition of the treated group did not change can not be re-
jected for most of the variables. A few characteristics show significant differences between the
treatment and the control group before and after the reform. We reject the null hypothesis
of no change in the composition of the two groups for the share of job seekers in cognitive
occupations, prior work experience, Swiss nationality, marital status, and education. Yet note
that the resulting changes in sample composition are small. We find below that accounting for
these changes in sample composition does not affect results.
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Table 1.2: Selected descriptive statistics
Before reform After reform
Treatment status Di = 0 Di = 1 Di = 0 Di = 1 DiD
A. Dependent variables (prior to unemployment)
Employment 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.00
Earnings 5003.82 5075.77 5204.16 5252.01 -24.09
UE benefits 240.78 250.26 167.47 174.73 -2.21
B. Control variables
R&D intensity 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.00
Cognitive 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.02∗∗
Experience 0.75 0.73 0.82 0.78 -0.02∗∗
Leader position 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.01
Female 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46 -0.01
Swiss 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.71 -0.03∗∗∗
Marital status
Single 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.01
Married 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.02∗∗
Widow 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00
Divorced 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.21 -0.02∗∗∗
Years of schooling
≤ 7 years 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00
8-9 years 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.00
10-11 years 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00
12-13 years 0.26 0.24 0.38 0.36 0.00
≥ 14 years 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.01∗∗∗
Other 0.50 0.51 0.31 0.30 -0.01
Observations 475,900 631,589 865,350 1,154,300
No. of spells 9,529 12,641 17,307 23,086
Notes: This table shows means of selected variables for the treatment and control group for individuals
who registered before or after July 1, 2003 respectively. Column 5 shows the differences in differences.
*** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.4 Econometric framework
Empirical strategy. This section presents the empirical strategy we employ for the analysis
of the effects of PBD on employment and earnings and discusses the underlying identification
assumptions. The specific design of the reform creates a natural control group for which benefit
entitlement remained unchanged, and a treatment group for which the PBD was reduced from
24 months (520 days) to 18 months (400 days). In order to discuss estimation and identification
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assumption, let Y (1) be the treated outcome, and Y (0) the non-treated outcome. D ∈ {0, 1} is
a treatment indicator that is 1 if an individuals receives treatment, i.e. is below 55 years old
at unemployment start, and 0 else. Let Y0 denote the outcome prior to the reform, and Y1
the outcome after the reform. The observed outcome after the reform can then be written as
Y1 = DY1(1) + (1−D)Y1(0). The difference-in-differences estimator is then given by
DiD = [E(Y1 | D = 1)− E(Y1 | D = 0)]− [E(Y0 | D = 1)− E(Y0 | D = 0)]
The difference-in-differences estimator identifies the average treatment effect on the treated
by comparing differences in outcomes between the outcomes of the treated and the untreated
before and after the reform. The difference-in-differences estimator can be rewritten as
DiD = E(Y1(1)− Y1(0) | D = 1)
which corresponds to the average treatment effect on the treated.
The main assumption that has to hold for the difference-in-differences estimator to identify
the average treatment effect on the treated in repeated cross sections are parallel time trends
for the treatment and control group in absence of the treatment, i.e. E(Y1(0)− Y0(0) | D = 1) =
E(Y1(0) − Y0(0) | D = 0).18 This assumption could be violated for at least three reasons. First,
repeated cross sections could differ in terms of sample composition. Second, labor market
outcomes might evolve differently across treatment and control groups because their outcomes
differ with respect to sensitivity to the cycle. Third, the reform might also have changed the
incentives to become unemployed thereby changing the composition of the unemployment in-
flow.
Validity of the identifying assumptions. We now test each of these reasons for failure of the
identifying assumption. We have already presented a test for a change in sample composition
(see table 1.2, last column). We do find that the test rejects the null of no change in sample
composition for a range of background characteristics. But note that the changes in sam-
ple composition are fairly small in an economic sense. We further address changing sample
composition by discussing the sensitivity of our results to adding observed characteristics.
Second, we assess whether time trends evolve in a parallel fashion across treated and con-
trol groups. We focus on unemployment benefit receipt in 22 to 24 months after job seekers,
i.e. benefit receipt in the last quarter of a job seeker’s framework period of two years after un-
employment start. The last quarter of a job seeker’s framework period should be mechanically
affected by the reform in July 2003. Plotting benefit receipt by quarter of entry into unem-
ployment for groups that were not affected by the reform will provide a visual test of parallel
trends. We also visually inspect time trends after the reform was implemented to see whether
the effect of the reform is constant and time trends continue to evolve in a parallel fashion after
18See also Lee and Kang (2006) for a detailed discussion of the identification assumptions in repeated cross sections.
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the reform has been implemented.
Note that the reform was applied to in-progress spells. This means that treated job seekers
start to be affected by the cut in PBD even if their spell started before July 1, 2003. Figure
1.1 shows that the treatment group starts to be affected by the cut in PBD for spells that start
after July 1, 2001 because the reform gradually removes the final months of benefit eligibility.
For instance, a job seeker starting unemployment on January 1, 2002 will be fully affected by
the reform since her or his last 6 months of benefit eligibility will be cut by the reform in July
1, 2003. In other words, the effective PBD for the treatment group reduces gradually from 520
to 400 days for entries into unemployment between July 2001 to January 2002. Finally, for
spells that started after January 2002, the treated job seekers get a maximum number of 400
days, whereas untreated job seekers still get 520 days of unemployment benefits.
Figure 1.1: Timing of reform
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Notes: This figure shows the stylized pattern of effective PBD over the quarter of entry into unemployment for the
treatment and the control group respectively.
Figure 1.2 shows unemployment benefit receipt 22 to 24 months after unemployment start
of treated and control groups for every quarter between 1999 and 2007. The left hand axis
measures the share of job seekers who claim benefits. The right hand axis measures the
difference between treatment and control groups. The dashed vertical line in the third quarter
of 2001 depicts the first possible date for which effects of the reform are potentially observable.
The dashed horizontal line indicates the mean difference between the treated and control group
before the reform.
The figure highlights several interesting facts. First, the control group tends to have about
10 percentage points higher benefit receipt than the treated group before the reform because
the control group is older than the treated group. Second, benefit receipt varies quite strongly
over the period 1999 to 2007 – very much in line with the business cycle. Third, time trends
are roughly parallel in the period before the reform, especially so for job seekers entering
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unemployment between 2000 to the second quarter of 2001. Fourth, the reform led to a
substantial reduction in unemployment benefit receipt. This effect can be seen for job seekers
entering unemployment in the third quarter of 2001 and later. Finally, the difference in benefit
receipt remains approximately constant for all job seekers entering unemployment after the
reform. This evidence is therefore consistent with parallel trends in benefit receipt also after
the reform.
Figure 1.2: Time trends 22 to 24 months after unemployment start
(a) Benefit receipt
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Notes: This figure shows the time trends for benefit receipt together with the 95 % confidence interval. The solid line
at the bottom shows the difference between treatment and control group together with the 95 % confidence interval.
The dashed vertical line at 2001q3 depicts the first possible date for which treatment effects are detectable. The
dashed horizontal line shows the mean difference in benefit receipt between the treated and the control groups.
Shaded area indicates that no data is available for that time period (inflow between July 2002 and June 2003 was
omitted from the analysis).
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Are trends in employment and earnings also parallel? Figures 1.3a and 1.3b report a sim-
ilar analysis for employment and earnings. Results indicate that trends are parallel for both
outcomes for spells that start before the third quarter of 2001. This evidence suggests trends
in outcomes are similar. Moreover, both figures indicate that employment and earnings pat-
terns start to differ from the third quarter of 2001 onwards. These graphs suggest that the
assumption of parallel trends is plausible and that the reform effects build up over time as
would be expected also for employment and earnings.
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Figure 1.3: Time trends 22 to 24 months after unemployment start
(a) Employment
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(b) Earnings
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Notes: This figure shows the time trends for employment and earnings together with the 95 % confidence intervals.
The solid line at the bottom shows the difference between treatment and control group together with the 95 %
confidence interval. The dashed vertical line at 2001q3 depicts the first possible date for which treatment effects
are detectable. The dashed horizontal line shows the mean difference in employment and earnings respectively
between the treated and the control groups. Shaded area indicates that no data is available for that time period
(inflow between July 2002 and June 2003 was omitted from the analysis).
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
The third test we implement checks for endogenous entry into unemployment, i.e. if the
treated enter unemployment less frequently because they expect a lower benefit duration, this
assumption would be violated. Figure 1.4 shows the inflows into unemployment for the treat-
ment and control groups. The left hand axis measures the number of unemployment regis-
trations per quarter. The right hand axis measures the inflow ratio between treatment and
control group. If there was endogenous entry into unemployment, we would expect a drop in
the number of registrations in the treatment group after the reform relative to the control group.
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Graphical evidence however indicates that the inflow ratio does not drop after the reform, but
is relatively stable over time.
Figure 1.4: Unemployment inflows (number of registrations)
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
In
flo
w 
ra
tio
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
2100
N
um
be
r o
f r
eg
ist
ra
tio
ns
1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1
Quarter of entry into unemployment
Treatment Group Control Group
Inflow ratio Excluded inflows
Notes: This figure shows the time trends of the unemployment inflows for treatment and control group. On the
right hand axis, the solid line at the bottom shows the inflow ratio between treatment and control group. The
vertical line in 2003q3 depicts the date of the reform.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Table 1.3 presents a formal test of stability of the inflow. It presents a regression of the
treatment dummy Di, the interaction term DiAc and a set of quarterly time dummies on the
logarithm of the number of registrations per quarter. The reform does not significantly affect the
inflow into unemployment in the treated group. This confirms that the reform did not affect the
likelihood of entering unemployment. We conclude that the key assumption of parallel trends
is likely to be satisfied in the current context.
Table 1.3: DiD estimates for unemployment inflows
Log(# of registrations)
DiAc 0.033
(0.034)
Di 0.260***
(0.032)
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 64
R-squared 0.986
Notes: The table shows the difference-in-differences estimates for
the logarithm of the number of registrations. The regression in-
cludes quarterly time dummies. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
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1.5 Results
This section discusses the estimation results. Subsection 1.5.1 presents graphical evidence,
subsection 1.5.2 presents the main estimation, subsection 1.5.3 discusses some sensitivity
estimations, and subsection 1.5.4 analyses the issue of heterogeneity in treatment effects.
Subsection 1.5.5 relates our results to the existing literature on job-match quality.
1.5.1 Descriptive evidence
Figure 1.5 shows the structure of the data. We distinguish five periods: τ0 is the period before
unemployment start, i.e. 50 to 1 months before unemployment start. τ1 marks the period
1 to 12 months after unemployment start. In this period, treatment and control group are
both entitled to benefits. τ2 identifies the period 13 to 17 months after unemployment start,
where treated and untreated alike are still entitled to unemployment benefits. In this period,
anticipation effects start to play a role, because unemployment benefits of the treated will run
out soon. τ3 is the period 18 to 24 months after unemployment start. This is the period in
which treated are directly affected by the reform, while untreated are still eligible for benefits.
This period captures the direct effect of the reduced PBD. The effect on benefit receipt will
be negative and largely mechanic since the reform removes unemployment benefit payments
during that period.19 The effects on employment and earnings will show endogenous responses
to the removal of benefits during period τ3. Finally, τ4 captures the period 25 to 50 months
after unemployment start and allows to identify medium-run effects of the PBD. Period τ4 is our
primary focus since all job seekers have exhausted their framework period after two years. This
period allows detecting effects of PBD reductions on medium-run earnings and employment.
Figure 1.5: Data structure
Notes: This figure shows the data structure with its division into τ0 to τ4.
There are three issues with this data structure: First, we cannot observe the full history of
50 months after the beginning of unemployment for spells starting after November 2006 since
19Some job seekers will keep eligibility to benefits even during period τ3. These are the job seekers who re-enter after
a short employment spell or job seekers who re-establish eligibility to unemployment benefits.
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our observation period ends in December 2010 (13 % of all spells). This lack of observation
window should, however, not impair our identification strategy, because both treated and un-
treated groups are affected by this gradual sample reduction in the same way. Second, due
to the treatment assignment which is based on age at unemployment start, individuals in the
treatment group gradually "grow" into the control group over time. For example, an individual
who is 54 years old at the start of his unemployment spell will grow into the control group at
most 12 months after the start of unemployment. We therefore potentially underestimate the
true effects. Third, the 2003 reform affected both benefit duration and benefit level. However,
this fact is unlikely to affect our results because the change to benefit level affected a narrow
income bracket earning between 3,500 CHF and 4,300 CHF, and it targeted job seekers without
dependents, a minor fraction of our sample.
Unemployment benefit receipt. Figure 1.6 shows average benefit receipt of the treated (50
to 54 years old) and untreated (55 to 59 years old). Benefit receipt is a binary variable which
takes the value of one if a job seeker claimed unemployment benefits in a given month. Benefit
receipt is shown up to 50 months before and after unemployment start. The vertical line at time
0 identifies the start of unemployment. The vertical line at 18.5 months indicates the benefit
exhaustion for the treatment group after the reform, and the vertical line at 24 months marks
the old exhaustion date before the reform and the benefit exhaustion date for the control group
after the reform respectively. Figure 1.6a depicts benefit receipt for individuals who registered
before the policy change in July, 2003 and figure 1.6b shows the same for individuals who
registered after the reform in July, 2003.
Figure 1.6: Unemployment benefit receipt before and after the reform
(a) UE start before July 1, 2003
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(b) UE start after July 1, 2003
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Notes: This figure shows unemployment benefit receipt for treatment and control group 50 months before and 50 months
after unemployment start for spells that started before July 1, 2001 (1.6a) and for spells that started after July 1, 2003
(1.6b). The dotted lines around the benefit receipt of the control group indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Benefit receipt does not differ between the treated and the untreated before the start of the
unemployment spell. Unemployment benefit receipt prior to unemployment start amounts to
around 6 % on average. Pre-unemployment benefit receipt is not exactly zero, because there
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can be spells of unemployment before the one we analyze. After registering at the PES, job
seekers can claim unemployment benefits.20 This is observed in the data by a sharp increase
in average benefit receipt to around 80 % in the first month after unemployment start. The
share of job seekers claiming unemployment benefits drops as time passes because job seekers
gradually re-enter employment or exit the labor force through alternative pathways.
Benefit receipt of treated and untreated starts to diverge after the peak around unemploy-
ment start: Job seekers in the treatment group claim on average less unemployment benefits
than job seekers in the control group. 12 months after the start of a spell there is a kink for
both groups. The kink is due to the benefit exhaustion for job seekers who are exempted from
the contribution requirements. They can claim a maximum of 260 days of benefit payments,
which is equivalent to 12 months. For the treated group, there is another a kink after 18.5
months (equivalent to 400 days) after the beginning of unemployment: This marks the benefit
exhaustion date for the treated group after the reform. A small kink is also observed for job
seekers whose spells started before the UI policy change (Figure 1.6a). This is because the
reform was applied to in-progress spells: Some job seekers in the before-treatment regime are
affected by the reform even if their spells started before the 2003 reform. The kink is however
much more pronounced in the data covering job seekers who enter after the reform, consistent
with a larger treatment intensity among this group. After 24 months (equivalent to 520 days),
benefits also end for the control group. Benefit receipt sharply drops, and falls back to almost
its pre-unemployment level thereafter.
Figure 1.7 highlights the above observations. It shows the difference in differences between
the treated and the control group before and after the policy change. In the pre-unemployment
period τ0 (50 to 1 month before unemployment start), benefit receipt has evolved in the same
way for treated and control groups, the diff-in-diff estimates are close to zero and not signifi-
cantly different from zero (except for the period between 7 and 5 months before unemployment
start). Around 6 months after the beginning of a spell, the difference in differences starts to
turn negative, reaching its minimum in the treatment period τ3 (18 to 24 months after) where
benefit receipt of treated job seekers is on average around 8 percentage points lower compared
to the untreated individuals. This is the direct and purely mechanic effect of cutting PBD by 6
months for the below 55 years old job seekers. Beyond 24 months, benefit receipt is no longer
affected by the reform, the difference in differences turns not significantly different from zero.
20Note that the unemployment start date is defined as the potential entry date for the next job. According to our
sample definition, individuals thus fulfill the eligibility for daily benefit payments, conditional on being "employable".
Indeed, 85 % of the sample claims unemployment benefits within 3 months after unemployment start.
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Figure 1.7: Difference in differences in unemployment benefit receipt
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Notes: This figure shows the difference in differences for unemployment benefit receipt
for the 50 months before and 50 months after unemployment start. The dotted lines
around the difference in differences indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Employment. Figure 1.8 replicates the above graphical analysis for the employment rate.
Prior to the unemployment spell (50 to 1 months before unemployment) anywhere between
80 % and 98 % of all job seekers are employed. For both the treated and the untreated,
employment already starts to fall in the last 12 to 6 months before getting unemployed. In the
first month of unemployment, the employment ratio drops to zero. The unemployed start to
find new jobs, and the average employment share rises again to around 60 % in the control
group and to around 65 - 70 % in the treatment group. The employment patterns of the
treated and control groups start to diverge only after the start of the unemployment spell:
Average employment of the treated individuals increases more than the average employment
of the untreated individuals before (figure 1.8a) and after (figure 1.8b) the reform. This might
be due to the fact that the control group is older on average and faces more problems to find
a new job. Interestingly, however, the difference in average employment between treated and
control group is larger for unemployment spells that started after the change in PBD in July,
2003.
24
Figure 1.8: Employment before and after the reform
(a) UE start before July 1, 2003
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(b) UE start after July 1, 2003
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Notes: This figure shows aggregate employment for treatment and control group 50 months before and 50 months after
unemployment start for spells that started before July 1, 2001 (1.8a) and for spells that started after July 1, 2003 (1.8b).
The dotted lines around the employment share of the control group indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Figure 1.9 confirms this observation. In the period before unemployment start, no treat-
ment effect is detectable and the difference in differences is not statistically different from zero.
The employment effect rises up to around 3.5 percentage points 20 months after entering un-
employment and is statistically different from zero in the anticipation period τ2 and in the direct
treatment period τ3. In the medium-run period τ4, the positive employment effects gradually
taper off.
Figure 1.9: Difference in differences in employment
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Notes: This figure shows the difference in differences for employment for the 50 months
before and 50 months after entering unemployment. The dotted lines around the differ-
ence in differences indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Earnings. A similar, but more volatile pattern is also observed for earnings. Figure 1.10
shows that pre-unemployment earnings are around 5,000 CHF (about 4,150 EUR), and drop
25
to zero at unemployment start. Like the employment share, earnings rise again, but do no
longer reach the pre-unemployment level, and stay at a level of between 2,500 CHF for the
control group, and around 3,000 CHF for the treatment group after entering unemployment.
Again, although earnings are higher for the treatment group irrespective of whether the start
date of a spell was before (figure 1.10a) or after (figure 1.10b) the reform, earnings increase
more for the treated than for the untreated in the after reform period.
Figure 1.10: Earnings before and after the reform
(a) UE start before July 1, 2003
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(b) UE start after July 1, 2003
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Notes: This figure shows aggregate earnings for treatment and control group 50 months before and 50 months after
unemployment start for spells that started before July 1, 2001 (1.10a) and for spells that started after July 1, 2003
(1.10b). The dotted lines around earnings of the control group indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
The difference in differences graph for earnings completes the picture. Prior to entering
unemployment, earnings are balanced across the treatment and control groups (period τ0).
The earnings difference starts to rise significantly after the beginning of a spell to around 200
CHF in the beginning of the treatment period τ3 (18 to 24 months after unemployment start),
and it remains relatively stable and significantly different from zero also in the medium-run
period τ4 (25 to 50 months after unemployment start). In contrast to the result for employment,
shortened PBD therefore increases earnings permanently.
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Figure 1.11: Difference in differences in earnings
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Notes: This figure shows the difference in differences for earnings for the 50 months
before and 50 months after unemployment start. The dotted lines around the difference
in differences indicate the 95 % confidence interval.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.5.2 Main estimates
The difference-in-differences estimator is estimated by the following econometric specification
Yitc =α1 + α2τ2t + . . .+ α4τ4t + β1τ1tDi + . . .+ β4τ4tDi + γ1τ1tAc + . . .+ γ4τ4tAc+ (1.1)
+ δ1τ1tDiAc + . . .+ δ4τ4tDiAc +X
′
iη + εitc
where Yitc is the outcome variable, that is unemployment benefits, employment, or earnings
respectively. i is an indicator for the individual, t indicates the month after unemployment
start, and c denotes calendar time. Di is the treatment dummy which is equal to 1 if an in-
dividual belongs to the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Ac is a dummy for unemployment
starts after July 1, 2003. τ1t to τ4t are indicators for the different periods after unemployment
start, i.e. τ1t = 1(1 ≤ t < 13 months), τ2t = 1(13 ≤ t < 18 months), τ3t = 1(18 ≤ t < 24 months),
and τ4t = 1(24 ≤ t ≤ 50 months) respectively. δ1 to δ4 are the coefficients for the interaction
effects τ1tDiAc to τ4tDiAc, and identify the average treatment effect on the treated. Xi is a
vector of control characteristics, such as gender, nationality, marital status (4 categories), pro-
fessional status (leader/expert function versus non-leader function), and years of schooling (5
categories). As further controls we include a dummy for individuals with a high continuous
work experience prior to their unemployment spell, i.e. at least 24 months of continuous em-
ployment before their unemployment start, a dummy for individuals whose previous employer
is active in a R&D intensive industry, and a dummy for individuals whose task content of pre-
vious occupation was mainly cognitive, and all interactions. Finally, we also include the sums
of pre-unemployment earnings and benefits, as well as the total number of months spent in
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employment prior to unemployment start to address the significant difference-in-differences in
unemployment benefit receipt during months 7 to 5 prior to the spell we analyze (see figure
1.7). In order to adjust for potential correlation across spells and across time, standard errors
of this and all following tables are clustered by person.
Table 1.4 presents the baseline results. In columns 1, 3, and 5, we estimate the treatment
effects using equation (1.1) without controls. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the estimates of
δ1 to δ4 remain stable and precisely estimated after the inclusion of covariates. The estimates
for unemployment benefit receipt in column 2 indicate that already between 13 and 17 months
after unemployment start the treated claim less unemployment benefits than the control group.
The treatment effect on benefit receipt amounts to 1.7 percentage points. This treatment
effect is interpreted as an anticipation effect. In the period between 18 and 24 months after
unemployment start, benefit receipt is on average around 6.5 percentage points lower for the
treated. δ3 quantifies the mechanic effect of reducing benefits for the below 55 years old, but
not for the above 55 years old job seekers. In the medium-run, there is no longer any significant
difference between treated and untreated in terms of unemployment benefit receipt.
The estimates for employment in column 4 show that we observe an anticipation effect of 1.7
percentage points for the treatment group (13 to 17 months after unemployment start). Already
before the actual reform period, the treated re-enter employment more than the untreated. The
direct effect of the reform, δ3 amounts to 3.3 percentage points. This effect is not large enough
to compensate for the reduction in benefit receipt. Yet employment is also 1.5 percentage points
higher for the treated in the medium-run. This positive effect compensates somewhat for lost
benefit months among treated job seekers. We will explore below whether the compensation is
sufficient to undo the removal of benefits.
Earnings are normalized by average earnings 3 months prior to unemployment start. In
column 6, we observe a significant anticipation effect of around 2.2 percentage points. The
direct effect for earnings amounts to 3.7 percentage points, and the medium-run effect stays at
about the same magnitude with 3.3 percentage points. The significant medium-run coefficients
δ4 for employment and earnings show that reducing PBD does not have a purely mechanic
effect, but that the positive earnings effect and to some smaller extent the employment effect
persist in the medium-run.
These baseline findings suggest that the beneficial effects of a reduced human capital and
skill depreciation or improvements in the non-employment stigma seem to outweigh the neg-
ative effects of reduced reservation wages. Baseline results could, however, still be spurious.
We now turn to discussing the sensitivity of these baseline findings.
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Table 1.4: DiD estimates for unemployment benefit receipt, employment and earnings
Benefit receipt Employment Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
. . . 13-17 mths after -0.016** -0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.023** 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
. . . 18-24 mths after -0.064*** -0.065*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
. . . 25-50 mths after -0.005 -0.006 0.014* 0.015** 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Avg. of dep. var. 0.81 0.81 0.91 0.91 5’387.37 5’387.37
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.18
Observations 3,073,557 3,073,557 3,073,557 3,073,557 3,073,557 3,073,557
Clusters 57,429 57,429 57,429 57,429 57,429 57,429
Notes: This table shows the baseline difference-in-differences estimates for unemployment benefit receipt (columns 1
and 2), employment (columns 3 and 4) and earnings (columns 5 and 6). Regressions with controls include also the
interactions of all controls. Earnings are relative to average earnings 3 months prior to unemployment start. Standard
errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.5.3 Sensitivity analyses
We first implement a placebo analysis to check whether trends are indeed parallel before the
reform was implemented. To this end, we simulated a UI reform in July 2000 and used only
inflows before July 2001. If the treatment effects in the reform periods get significant although
there was no treatment in that period, this could be an indication for unequal time trends
for the treated and the untreated. Table 1.5 reports difference-in-differences estimates of the
treatment effects on this placebo reform. The estimated placebo treatment effects are not
significant with the exception of a marginally significant employment effect 1 to 12 months
after unemployment start (t-statistic of 1.68). In the actual reform period between 18 and 24
months all estimates are however non-significant. We therefore argue that the assumption of
equal time trends is not violated in July 2000.21
21Note that the power of the placebo analysis to detect departures from a null effect is smaller than in the main
analysis (since standard errors are two times larger). If we adopt the standard errors from the main analysis and
test for significance of the effects in the placebo analysis more placebo estimates are significant. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the effects are smaller than in the main analysis.
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Table 1.5: DiD estimates for a placebo reform in July 2000
Benefit receipt Employment Earnings
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after -0.004 0.021* 0.023
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
. . . 13-17 mths after 0.014 0.003 0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
. . . 18-24 mths after 0.009 -0.003 0.005
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020)
. . . 25-50 mths after 0.000 -0.017 -0.022
(0.009) (0.015) (0.019)
Avg. of dep. var. 0.78 0.91 5’136.36
R-squared 0.17 0.08 0.18
Observations 604,550 604,550 604,550
Clusters 11,681 11,681 11,681
Notes: This table shows the baseline difference-in-differences estimates for unem-
ployment benefit receipt (column 1), employment (column 2) and earnings (column 3)
for a placebo reform in July 2000. Earnings are normalized by the average earnings
3 months prior to unemployment start. Standard errors clustered by individual in
parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
A widely discussed potential concern when looking at a sample of older job seekers is that
the effects of reducing PBD could be biased because of early retirement considerations and/or
disability retirement as an alternative way to exit the labor force after unemployment.22
Table 1.6 discusses how the cut in PBD affected disability retirement pensions. A cut in
PBD could affect disability pensions in mainly two ways: First, reducing PBD could amplify the
adverse health effects of job-loss23 and thereby increase disability pensions, and second, reduc-
ing PBD could induce a substitution of unemployment benefits with disability pensions. Table
1.6 shows the effects of reducing PBD on disability retirement pensions.24 Point estimates are
negative and only marginally significant. Estimates suggest that the use of disability pensions
decreases between 20 and 30 % compared to average disability pension benefits before the un-
employment spell. In contrast to the concerns mentioned above, these results suggest that the
positive employment effects of reducing PBD also lower the need for disability pension claims.
Do reductions in PBD affect old-age pensions? Old-age retirement pensions are never ob-
served for the treated group, and we start to observe them for the control group 26 months
after unemployment start at the earliest for females, and 36 months after unemployment start
for males respectively. This is because women are eligible for early retirement at the age of 62
years and and men are eligible for old-age pensions at the age of 63 years. This suggests that
reductions in PBD do not affect the claiming of old-age pensions.
Nonetheless, age could be an issue because job seekers in the treatment group "grow" into
the control group. This will end up reducing our estimates of the treatment effects for the
22Inderbitzin et al. (2012) study a regional extended benefit program in Austria and find substantial early retirement
through disability insurance triggered by the unemployment benefit reform.
23Kuhn et al. (2009) find important health effects of job loss, particularly for men.
24Disability pension data is only available for a random subsample of around 35 % of job seekers.
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Table 1.6: DiD estimates for disability retirement
Disability pensions
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after -0.206*
(0.120)
. . . 13-17 mths after -0.185
(0.147)
. . . 18-24 mths after -0.163
(0.155)
. . . 25-50 mths after -0.293*
(0.166)
Avg. of dep. var. 93.59
R-squared 0.06
Observations 1,153,356
Clusters 21,463
Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates for
disability pensions normalized by the average disability pension 3
months prior to unemployment start. Standard errors clustered by
individual in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
periods τ2 to τ4. To address this concern, we estimate a model that excludes the oldest age
cohorts of the treatment and the control group. That is, we exclude the 54 years old individuals
in the treatment group, and the 59 years old individuals in the control group. Table 1.7 reports
the estimates for this restricted sample. Excluding the oldest age cohorts in each group does
not affect the estimates drastically: Compared to our main estimates, the treatment effects
are virtually unchanged for employment and earnings, and slightly stronger for unemployment
benefit receipt. Statistical significance decreases somewhat, because in the restricted sample
around one fifth of all observations is lost. The overall picture however is unchanged.25
25We have also explored whether our results are sensitive to how we define the start date of the unemployment spell.
Overall, results are similar to the baseline result when we use the date a job seeker registers at the employment center
as the start date of her or his unemployment spell. Registration dates are, however, not ideal as unemployment start
dates because job seekers need to register at the job center as soon as they are informed that their employment spell
ends. This leads to a situation where the effects on outcomes in different phases of the spell get blurred since the
timing is not quite correct. Results are available upon request.
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Table 1.7: DiD estimates by age
Baseline 50-53 vs. 55-58 years old
Benefit
receipt
Employ-
ment Earnings
Benefit
receipt
Employ-
ment Earnings
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after -0.002 0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
. . . 13-17 mths after -0.017** 0.017** 0.022** -0.018** 0.017** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
. . . 18-24 mths after -0.065*** 0.033*** 0.037*** -0.073*** 0.030*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
. . . 25-50 mths after -0.006 0.015** 0.033*** -0.008* 0.012 0.034***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
Avg. of dep. var. 0.81 0.91 5’387.37 0.81 0.91 5’419.94
R-squared 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.09 0.18
Observations 3,073,557 3,073,557 3,073,557 2,532,295 2,532,295 2,532,295
Clusters 57,429 57,429 57,429 47,919 47,919 47,919
Notes: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates for subsamples split by age. Columns 1 to 3 replicate the baseline
estimates, and columns 4 to 6 include only 50 to 53, and 55 to 58 years old individuals respectively. Earnings are normalized by
the average earnings 3 months prior to unemployment start. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** P<0.01
** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.5.4 Treatment effect heterogeneity
This section analyzes whether the effects of a reduction in potential benefit duration differ
between subgroups of job seekers with different previous industry and occupation.
A first sample split discusses the role of human capital depreciation due to skill obsoles-
cence as a possible driving force of the positive medium-run effects. We split the sample in
two groups which likely differ in terms of the speed at which industry specific skills become
obsolete: job seekers from industries with high R&D intensity versus job seekers from indus-
tries with low R&D intensity (see section 3 for a discussion of how we define R&D intensity
of the industry). Skill depreciation is assumed to play a more important role for individuals
working in fast-evolving, highly R&D intensive industries, because a job-loss disconnects the
unemployed faster from rapid technological change in those industries. An shortened period
of unemployment is therefore expected to be more beneficial for job seekers in highly R&D
intensive industries.
Table 1.8 presents estimates for the sample split by R&D intensity of previous industry.26
Columns 1 to 3 of these two tables reproduces the baseline estimates for the sake of compari-
son. Columns 4 to 6 report estimates for job seekers coming from above median R&D intensive
industries, and columns 7 to 9 for job seekers from industries with below median R&D inten-
sity respectively. For both subsamples we observe a negative effect on benefit receipt in the
reform period from 18 to 24 months after unemployment start. The effects on earnings and em-
ployment, however, differ considerably between the two groups. The effects are much stronger
26All sub-group regressions include the same list of control variables as the baseline regression analysis.
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for job seekers who left R&D intensive industries than for job seekers who left industries with
little expenditure on R&D. In the former group we observe strong and significant anticipation
effects in the period from 13 to 17 months after unemployment start. The direct effects of the
reform (18 to 24 months after unemployment start) lead to a 4.6 percentage points increase in
employment and to a earnings effect of around 6.8 percentage points. The effects persist also
in the medium-run (25 to 50 months after unemployment start): Reducing PBD by 6 months
leads to a 2.2 percentage points increase in terms of employment and it boosts earnings by
5.2 percentage points in the medium-run. In contrast, treatment effects for job seekers leaving
industries with low R&D intensity are mostly absent except for an employment effect in the
period from 18 to 24 months after unemployment start directly induced by the cut in benefits
over that period. Other point estimates are close to zero for employment, and even negative for
earnings, but none of them are statistically significant.27
A second subgroup analysis discusses the importance of job-specific human capital depreci-
ation due to lack of use of skills (atrophy). In this analysis, we assess whether the task content
of the previous occupation matters for the medium-run effect of benefit reductions on earnings
and employment. As above, we split the sample into two subgroups: One of them contains job
seekers who worked in occupations that use primarily cognitive skills, and the other subgroup
contains job seekers who worked in occupations that use mainly manual skills (see section 3
for the definition of these two groups). We expect that skill depreciation differs between the two
groups. However, whether skill depreciation would be stronger in mainly cognitive or mainly
manual occupations is not clear. One argument holds that cognitive skills depreciate faster
because extended periods of unemployment generate adverse effects on mental health. This
would indicate that occupations with cognitive tasks suffer more from job loss than occupa-
tions with manual tasks. Conversely, one might also argue that occupations with cognitive
skills might be insulated from atrophy because they are used to maintain those skills better
than occupations with manual skills.
Table 1.9 shows the estimates for this sample split by task content of previous occupation.
Columns 1 to 3 repeat the baseline estimates, columns 4 to 6 contains the subgroups of job
seekers with mainly cognitive skills and columns 7 to 9 the subgroups of job seekers with
mainly manual skills. The reform led to a decrease in benefit receipt of around 6.5 percentage
points for both groups in the reform period from 18 to 24 months after unemployment start
(and a small anticipation effect for job seekers with manual skills). Employment effects are also
quite similar between the two groups in the first 24 months (columns 5 and 8). Reductions in
PBD tend to increase employment in the reform period (and also a bit earlier for job seekers
with manual skills.) Employment effects over the medium-run period differ strongly between
the two groups. Employment is significantly higher for job seekers with manual skills 25 to 50
27Job seekers in industries with high R&D expenditure have higher mean earnings than job seekers in industries
with low R&D expenditure. Yet the difference in the effects of PBD is not simply related to the difference in earnings.
When we split the sample by previous earnings, we find positive medium-run effects for both subsamples (see table
1.A3).
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months after the start of the spell whereas employment is not affected among job seekers with
cognitive skills. Earnings patterns also differ strikingly between the two subgroups (columns
6 and 9). Job seekers from occupations with largely manual skill content enjoy significantly
higher earnings already from the start. The effect is small (1.6 percent) immediately after the
spell starts but it builds up to a sizable 5.1 percent differential in the medium-run period.
There is also a positive earnings effects for job seekers in manual occupations but this effect
is concentrated in the reform period and comparably small (2.8 percent). Taken at face value,
these results suggests that skill depreciation affects occupations with manual skill content
more strongly than occupations with cognitive skill content. This result is consistent with direct
evidence on skill atrophy. Li (2013), for instance, finds strong human capital depreciation
for some manual occupations such as sales and production workers, or, conversely, human
capital appreciation for cognitive occupations like education professionals. Görlich and de Grip
(2009) find that skill depreciation rates are higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled
workers.28
Finally, we take a closer look at post-unemployment earnings. Reduced PBD can increase
earnings either by increasing employment, or by increasing earnings of employed individuals,
or both. Table 1.10 presents estimates of earnings effects conditional on employment. These
results need to be interpreted with caution because earnings of employed individuals are only
observed for job seekers who have found employment. The causal effects of PBD may therefore
be masked by selection into employment effects.29
Results present a clear picture. Reductions in potential benefit duration increase earnings
of employed individuals from the first month of unemployment onwards (Table 1.10 column 1).
Earnings of treated job seekers are about 2 percent higher than they would have been without
the reduction of potential benefits. Earnings are particularly positively affected for job seekers
leaving industries that spend a lot on R&D (column 2) – earnings gains are between 4 to 5
percent of post-unemployment earnings. In contrast, job seekers who leave industries with low
R&D expenditure tend to have lower earnings when employed, particularly so in the period 18
to 24 months after the unemployment spell started.30 Interestingly, results by task-content
of the occupation display positive point estimates, both for occupations with mainly cognitive
task content as well as occupations with mainly manual task content. Point estimates are on
the order of 2 percent of post-unemployment earnings, and significant in 4 out of 8 cases. In
sum, results in table 1.10 suggest that reductions in PBD have a positive effect on medium-run
earnings because of both, somewhat higher employment and higher earnings while employed.
28Table 1.A2 presents subgroup estimations split by gender. We find that the effects are very similar among male
and female job seekers. We have also investigated results by the extent of routine or non-routine tasks involved.
These estimates (not shown) indicate that occupations with a routine tasks have higher medium-run earnings and
employment with reduced PBD. No such effect is present for occupations involving non-routine tasks.
29Note, however, our results give a lower bound on the earnings effects if job seekers select into employment based
on ability or earnings potential. Reductions in PBD lead job seekers to accept jobs earlier, so more job seekers are
observed with reduced PBD than with extended PBD.
30Note that this negative effect has been documented also by Caliendo et al. (2013a).
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Table 1.10: DiD estimates for employed individuals
All R&D intensity Task content
High Low Cognitive Manual
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after 0.019** 0.042*** -0.006 0.014 0.028**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
. . . 13-17 mths after 0.023** 0.056*** -0.016 0.025* 0.022*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
. . . 18-24 mths after 0.014 0.048*** -0.025* 0.018 0.011
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
. . . 25-50 mths after 0.022** 0.045*** -0.007 0.025** 0.018
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Avg. of dep. var. 5’916.48 6’705.41 5’148.71 6’861.50 5’015.72
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31
Obs. 1’702’374 822’642 879’732 861’405 840’957
Clusters 48’188 24’139 24’918 24’682 24’549
Notes: This table illustrates the difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of reduced unemploy-
ment benefit duration on earnings for individuals conditional on employment. The effects are shown for
the baseline specification in column 1, for the sample splits by R&D intensity in columns 2 and 3, and for
the sample splits by task content of previous occupation in columns 4 and 5. Earnings are normalized
by the average earnings 3 months prior to unemployment start. Standard errors clustered by individual
in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.5.5 Relation to existing literature
The existing literature mainly focuses on outcomes that capture job-match quality for job seek-
ers who find jobs after their unemployment spell. We now discuss what happens if we analyze
the effects of the PBD reduction on these direct measures of job-match quality.
Panel A of table 1.11 reports the effects of reducing the PBD on unemployment duration.
Unemployment duration is defined as the number of months spent in unemployment until
the next job. If there is no next job observed in the data, unemployment duration is right
censored by the last observed date. On average job seekers spent around 14.6 months in un-
employment.31 Reducing the PBD by 6 months lowers the time spent in unemployment for
the treatment group by about 1 month for the entire sample. The effect of benefit reductions
is considerably larger in the subgroup of job seekers from R&D intensive industries: treated
job seekers leave unemployment about 1.7 months earlier than they would have without a cut
in benefits. Interestingly, there is a negative yet insignificant effect on the duration of unem-
ployment of job seekers in industries with low R&D intensity. The effect is less strong on job
seekers who leave R&D industries because they do not exhibit an anticipation effect in the pe-
riod 13 to 17 months after the start of the unemployment spell (see table 1.8). When looking at
the subgroup analysis that splits job seekers into cognitive and manual skilled groups respec-
31The average duration spent in unemployment for individuals who actually found a job within the observed time
period is almost cut by half, with around 8.4 months.
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tively, we find that treated job seekers with mainly cognitive skills are on average 0.88 months
less unemployed than their counterparts in the control group. Job seekers whose occupation
predominantly require manual skills leave unemployment about 1.16 months earlier than they
would without the benefit reduction. Effects are similar across the two groups of job seekers.
Panel B presents the difference-in-differences estimates for post-unemployment earnings
measured in the second month after reemployment. This analysis is based on all spells where
job seekers left unemployment and stayed in their job for at least two months.32 Results
indicate no significant effect in the overall sample. Interestingly, point estimates are positive
for the subgroups with large skill depreciation. The effects are significant for job seekers
in occupations with high manual task content, and positive but insignificant for job seekers
leaving R&D intensive industries. Point estimates are negative for job seekers with low skill
depreciation. The effect is significant for job seekers leaving industries with low R&D intensity
and insignificant for job seekers in occupations with cognitive task content. These results
reinforce the interpretation that reductions in PBD may improve the lot of job seekers who
face rapid skill depreciation or skill obsolescence. In contrast, reducing PBD tends to hurt job
seekers who do not face human capital depreciation.
32We focus on earnings in the second month after reemployment because the first month after reemployment is the
month when job seekers leave unemployment. If a job seeker starts her job in the middle of this month, earnings do
not reflect full-time monthly earnings. (We do not observe number of days worked on the job so we can not adjust for
this.)
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Table 1.11: Effects on unemployment duration, subsequent earnings, and job loss
All R&D intensity Task content
High Low Cognitive Manual
A. Unemployment duration (months)
DiAc -1.022*** -1.737*** -0.374 -0.882** -1.160***
(0.287) (0.402) (0.410) (0.391) (0.418)
Avg. of dep. var. 14.61 15.35 13.90 14.22 14.98
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.10
Obs. 3,073,557 1,503,425 1,570,132 1,494,298 1,579,259
Clusters 57,429 28,927 29,473 28,631 29,956
B. Monthly earnings (CHF)
DiAc -21.121 115.620 -138.611** -131.590 104.986*
(52.225) (81.413) (65.243) (84.173) (60.302)
Avg. of dep. var. 3’777.91 4’041.25 3’529.98 4’071.17 3’484.18
R-squared 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.26
Obs. 2,399,823 1,163,748 1,236,075 1,200,875 1,198,948
Clusters 44,763 22,395 23,123 23,008 22,672
C. Job loss within 12 months
DiAc 0.003 0.010 -0.007 -0.004 0.010
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. of dep. var. 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.45
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Obs. 2,555,279 1,238,717 1,316,562 1,272,023 1,283,256
Clusters 47,507 23,777 24,562 24,326 24,200
D. Job loss within 24 months
DiAc -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.006
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. of dep. var. 0.53 0.51 0.56 0.50 0.57
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Obs. 2,555,279 1,238,717 1,316,562 1,272,023 1,283,256
Clusters 47,507 23,777 24,562 24,326 24,200
Notes: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates for unemployment duration and a number of job-
match quality measures together with their means. Panel A shows the estimates for number of months spent
in unemployment. Panel B illustrates the estimates for earnings in the second month of re-employment.
Panels C and D focus on job loss within 12 and 24 months.Standard errors clustered by individual in
parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
Table 1.11 also looks at the job loss probabilities 12 (Panel C) and 24 months (Panel D)
after reemployment respectively. Estimations include only observations which we observe for
at least 24 months after reemployment.33 The probability of losing the job after reemployment
varies between roughly 37 % for a job loss within 12 months and 57 % for a job loss within
24 months after reemployment. Overall, reducing the PBD does not affect the duration of
33A total of 52,795 of all job seekers leave unemployment for a job. Out of those, 47,507 job seekers start their new
jobs at least two years before the end of the observation period. We exclude about 10 % of re-employed job seekers
whose employment durations are observed for less than two years.
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employment spells.
All in all, results in table 1.11 confirm the general pattern of findings of the existing lit-
erature, which finds only small or no effects of UI policy changes on job-match quality. The
findings however also support the view that the beneficial effects of reduced human capital
depreciation and improvements in non-employment stigma outweigh the negative effects of re-
duced reservation wages, leading to positive overall effects on earnings and employment in the
medium-run.
1.5.6 Effects on income
We have documented that a reduction in PBD reduces benefit receipt but increases employ-
ment and earnings of job seekers. We now assess the effects on income. Income is the sum of
labor earnings and unemployment benefits, i.e. income from social assistance or other trans-
fer programs is not counted. Effects on total income provide information on how disposable
income – a key component of individual welfare – is affected by reductions of PBD.34
Results in table 1.12 indicate that reductions in PBD do not lower total income, not even
in the period when benefits are cut (18 to 24 months after the start of the unemployment
spell). This is surprising considering that benefit receipt goes down considerably in the reform
period. Yet loss of benefits is more than compensated by increased earnings. The effect of PBD
once the framework period has ended is even positive with income increasing by 2.9 percent.
The average effect of reducing PBD on income remains positive and amounts to 1.7 percent of
income. Thus, reducing PBD tends to increase income on average.
How does this look in subsamples? Results by R&D intensity of the previous industry
indicate that reductions in PBD lower income during the period when benefits are withheld
only for job seekers in low R&D industries (income drops by 3.9 percent). The effect is positive
and even significant for job seekers in high R&D industries. Income of job seekers leaving
industries with high R&D expenditure increases considerably, by 4.7 percent, in the medium-
run period. No corresponding effect can be detected for job seekers leaving low R&D industries.
As a result, job seekers from high R&D industries on net enjoy a 3.6 percent higher income in
the system with reduced PBD on average. There is no effect of reduced PBD on average income
for job seekers from low R&D industries.
Results by task content of the previous occupation also indicate important differences. In-
terestingly, none of the two occupation groups suffers a significant reduction in income in the
reform period when benefits are removed. Job seekers with manual occupations benefit from
a significant increase in income in the medium-run (income increases by 4.8 percent); there is
no corresponding effect for job seekers with cognitive tasks. On net, job seekers with manual
occupations have a 2.6 percentage points higher net income in a system with lower PBD. Job
seekers whose occupations entail mainly cognitive tasks do not fare worse in a system with
reduced PBD.
34Note, however, that assessing individual welfare would imply accounting for a number of additional aspects (leisure,
discounting, general equilibrium effects). Assessing these aspects is beyond the scope of the current analysis.
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Table 1.12: DiD estimates for total income
All R&D intensity Task Content
High Low Cognitive Manual
Treatment effect in the period . . .
. . . 1-12 mths after 0.013* 0.025*** -0.003 0.014 0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
. . . 13-17 mths after 0.012 0.037*** -0.019 0.012 0.010
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
. . . 18-24 mths after -0.007 0.018* -0.039*** -0.006 -0.010
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
. . . 25-50 mths after 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.010 0.015 0.048***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Total 0.017** 0.036*** -0.004 0.010 0.026***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Avg. of dep. var. 5,453.29 6,238.86 4,703.92 6,338.44 4,615.68
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24
Obs. 3,073,557 1,503,425 1,570,132 1,494,298 1,579,209
Clusters 57,429 28,927 29,473 28,631 29,955
Notes: This table illustrates the difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of reduced unem-
ployment benefit duration on total income. The effects are shown for the baseline specification in
column 1, for the sample splits by R&D intensity in columns 2 and 3, and for the sample splits by
task content of previous occupation in columns 4 and 5. Income is the sum of labor earnings and
unemployment benefits relative to its mean three months before the unemployment spell starts.
Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
1.6 Conclusions
We discuss the effects of shortening potential benefit duration (PBD) for job seekers aged 50
to 54 years. Shortening PBD pushes job seekers into jobs during the period when benefit
payments are cut. But these jobs may be of lower quality than the jobs that job seekers would
have found with longer PBD. Conversely, inciting job seekers to leave unemployment more
quickly help them find jobs before their human capital depreciates or before they acquire the
stigma of long-term unemployment.
We find strong evidence for the job push effect. Interestingly, we also find that the initial
push into jobs carries longer lasting benefits. Job seekers who find employment more quickly
because of a reduction in PBD tend to earn more not only during the period when benefits
are removed but up to 2 years later on. The medium-run benefits are especially strong for job
seekers who left R&D intensive industries and basically absent for job seekers in low R&D in-
tensive industries. We find similar discrepancies for job seekers whose occupation necessitate
manual skills and no medium-run benefits for job seekers with occupations rich in cognitive
skills. Moreover, when we assess the effects on total income, we find that reduced PBD raises
total income of job seekers who enjoy medium-run benefits and has no effect on income of job
seekers where such medium-run effects are absent.
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The evidence we find is consistent with unemployment insurance having an important role
in human capital depreciation, especially for subgroups that face rapid skill depreciation. Re-
ductions in PBD can improve earnings and employment of job seekers in these subgroups
whereas extensions of PBD could probably also lead to reductions in labor market outcomes.
Should benefit duration be reduced across the board? We believe this conclusion is premature
for a number of reasons. First, we have seen that the effects of reducing PBD differ by task
content and previous industry. Second, reducing PBD carries a cost in terms of reduced pro-
tection against economic shocks. This cost should be weighed against the potential benefits we
have isolated. Third, reducing PBD to zero will, arguably, have more detrimental effects than
removing 6 months out of 24 months. Fourth, human capital depreciation and long-term un-
employment stigma might be more important for old job seekers than for younger ones. These
issues should be explored in further research.
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1.A Additional tables
Table 1.A1: DiD estimates for unemployment benefits, employment and earnings
Benefit receipt Employment Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τ1DiAc (1-12 mths after) -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
τ2DiAc (13-17 mths after) -0.016** -0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.023** 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
τ3DiAc (18-24 mths after) -0.064*** -0.065*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
τ4DiAc (25-50 mths after) -0.005 -0.006 0.014* 0.015** 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
τ2 -0.175*** -0.175*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.131*** 0.131***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
τ3 -0.244*** -0.244*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
τ4 -0.466*** -0.466*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
τ1Di -0.048*** -0.049*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
τ2Di -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
τ3Di -0.084*** -0.085*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
τ4Di -0.007** -0.008** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.131*** 0.131***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
τ1Ac 0.055*** 0.053*** -0.054*** -0.060*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
τ2Ac 0.074*** 0.072*** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
τ3Ac 0.054*** 0.052*** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
τ4Ac -0.024*** -0.026*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Sum of pre-reg. benefits 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sum of pre-reg. earnings -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mths employed before reg. -0.000 0.007*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
≥ 24 mths of work exp. 0.016*** -0.094*** -0.079***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
R&D intensive industry 0.018*** -0.030*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Cognitive task 0.022*** -0.001 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Female 0.001 0.009*** -0.066***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Swiss -0.022*** 0.095*** 0.066***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Leader position 0.002 0.046*** 0.081***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Marital status (reference group are singles)
Married -0.025*** 0.027*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Widowed -0.020*** 0.006 -0.017
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Divorced -0.015*** 0.027*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Education (reference group is "8-9 years of schooling")
≤ 7 years 0.010 -0.067*** -0.034**
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Table 1.A1 – continued
Benefit receipt Employment Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
10-11 years -0.002 0.013 0.015*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
12-13 years -0.018*** 0.058*** 0.067***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
≥ 14 years -0.017*** 0.051*** 0.165***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
Other -0.044*** 0.050*** 0.086***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Avg. of dep. var. 0.81 0.81 0.91 0.91 5’387.37 5’387.37
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.18
Obs. 3’073’557 3’073’557 3’073’557 3’073’557 3’073’557 3’073’557
Clusters 57’429 57’429 57’429 57’429 57’429 57’429
Notes: This table shows the baseline difference-in-differences estimates for unemployment benefit receipt (columns 1 and
2), employment (columns 3 and 4) and earnings (columns 5 and 6). Regressions with controls include also the interactions
of all controls. Earnings are normalized by the average earnings 3 months prior to unemployment start. Standard errors
clustered by individual in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own estimations based on merged UIR-SSA database.
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Chapter 2
Winning versus Losing: How Important are
Reservation Wages for Non-employment Duration?
Abstract
Standard job search theory predicts that extending unemployment benefit durations prolongs non-employment,
an effect that has been confirmed empirically in numerous studies. However, little is known about the empirical
relevance of the two key margins - reservation wages and search effort - in determining job seekers optimal
response to changes in unemployment benefit duration. This paper develops a new strategy designed to analyze
the relative importance of the two margins for the duration of non-employment. To this end, I separately study
exits to wage-improving jobs and exits to wage-declining jobs. Exit hazards to wage-improving jobs are solely
determined by search effort, whereas the exit rate to wage-declining jobs is jointly determined by search effort
and reservation wages. I test this in the context of a sharp discontinuity in potential benefit duration from 30 to 39
weeks and provide causal estimates for the effects of prolonged benefits on non-employment duration and survival
probabilities. Consistent with reservation wage movements, exits to wage-declining jobs account for virtually all
of the overall non-employment effect. Moreover, analyzing treatment effects on survivor functions highlights that
the largest contributions to the overall unemployment effect are observed in the time period from 30 to 39 weeks.
These results suggest an important role of the reservation wage channel in shaping job search behavior.
JEL Classification: J64, J65, C41
Keywords: potential benefit duration, unemployment duration, reservation wage, search effort
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2.1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance is the most important policy tool to feather the negative effects of un-
employment and to provide income replacement during job search. Around 25 million worker
lost their job in the global crisis that erupted in 2008 (ILO, 2012). Unemployment insurance
(UI) is the key first safety net to workers and probably the most important program to feather
the effects of crises. Not surprisingly, a country’s UI generosity plays an important role for
the job search behavior of the unemployed. While designed to ease liquidity constraints of the
unemployed during job search, UI can also generate reemployment disincentives. A standard
prediction of job search theory asserts that extending UI benefit durations lowers search ef-
fort and raises reservation wages (Mortensen, 1977). Both behavioral margins – a job seekers’
search effort and his reservation wage choice – tend to prolong non-employment duration.
A large empirical literature analyzed the effects of UI generosity on unemployment dura-
tion and the finding that increased UI generosity prolongs non-employment duration is one
of the most robust results in labor economics (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004; Tatsiramos and
Van Ours, 2014). However, there is an ongoing discussion about whether extending UI gen-
erosity has beneficial effects on job match quality or whether it only subsidizes unproductive
search. In order to contribute to this discussion, separating the two behavioral margins is
essential. So far only relatively little is known about the relative importance of search effort
and reservation wages and how they shape labor market transitions in response to UI changes.
Analyzing the relative importance of these two margins is difficult in practice, because reserva-
tion wages and search effort are rarely directly observed. Knowing more about these channels
is nevertheless important from a policy perspective: On the one hand, if reduced search effort
is the main driving force for prolonged non-employment spells, changes in UI could be coupled
with stricter search requirement to curtail unwanted disincentive and moral hazard effects.
On the other hand, increasing UI benefit duration could be welfare improving, if prolonged
non-employment spells are mainly driven by reservation wage effects and allow job seekers to
accept better job-matches.
This paper sheds light on the relative importance of the two behavioral margins of job
search. I propose a new approach which allows to infer the relevance of the reservation wage
choice for non-employment duration without actually observing reservation wages directly.
Overall effects of extended UI benefit durations on non-employment duration and survival
probabilities can be decomposed into contributions from exits to wage-improving ("winning")
jobs and exits to wage-declining ("losing") jobs. Wage-improving exits are exits to jobs with
reemployment wages that exceed pre-unemployment wages. Wage-declining exits are exits to
jobs that are worse paid relative to a job seekers’ previous job. I show that the likelihood of
exits to wage-declining jobs is jointly affected by search effort and reservation wages, while the
likelihood of exits to wage-improving jobs is solely determined by search effort. While reser-
vation wages for exits to wage-improving jobs should not be binding, they may be binding for
exits to wage-declining jobs. Thus, decomposing the overall effect of extending benefit dura-
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tions into its contributions from winning and losing job exits allows to shed light on the relative
importance of the reservation wage channel for the duration of non-employment. If reservation
wages matter for job search, we would expect benefit extensions to primarily affect exits to
wage-declining jobs.1
The empirical analysis relies on quasi-experimental variation in benefit duration that al-
lows to identify the causal effect of extended benefit duration on non-employment duration
and survivor functions. The paper exploits a sharp discontinuity in potential benefit duration
(PBD) from 30 to 39 weeks around the age of 40 in Austria to analyze the effects of prolonged
benefit duration. Overall, increasing PBD by 9 weeks prolongs non-employment duration by
around 0.6 weeks. Consistent with search theory, the largest contributions to the prolonged
non-employment duration are observed between 30 and 39 weeks, which corresponds to the
period between the two benefit exhaustion dates. By decomposing the overall effects on non-
employment and survival probabilities into contributions from exits to wage-improving and
wage-declining jobs, I show that mainly exits to wage-declining jobs are affected. Exits to
wage-declining jobs contribute account for virtually all of the total effect on non-employment,
with its largest contributions in the time period from 30 to 39 weeks. These findings support
the view that reservation wages play an important role for job search behavior.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. First, a large body of empirical stud-
ies analyzes the impact of UI policy changes on unemployment or non-employment durations,
wages and other job characteristics. These studies confirmed the finding that extending UI
generosity unambiguously prolongs unemployment duration. Starting from the observation
that European countries with relatively generous UI systems have suffered much larger and
much more persistent increases in unemployment in the 1980’s than the United States, Katz
and Meyer (1990) identify the potential unemployment benefit duration as a key driver of these
cross-country differences and investigate the effect of potential benefit duration on unemploy-
ment duration. A number of studies, including Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985),
and Grossman (1989) find significantly negative incentive effects. Winter-Ebmer (1998) uses
Austrian data and finds significant benefit duration effects for males but not for females. In
more a recent work, Lalive et al. (2006) use changes in the Austrian UI law as a natural exper-
iment to examine the impact of the policy changes on the unemployment duration. They find
that both an increase in the earnings replacement rate and a prolonged benefit duration lead
to longer unemployment duration. Lalive (2008) studies the causal effects of a unique regional
benefit extension on the unemployment duration in Austria and finds positive effects of the ex-
tension on unemployment duration for both men and women. Schmieder et al. (2012b) discuss
the effects of extended PBD for benefit duration and non-employment duration over the busi-
ness cycle in Germany. Moreover, a number of papers shows that the effects of unemployment
benefit changes on the unemployment duration is not homogeneous over the unemployment
spell. Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990) or Addison and Portugal (2004) find spikes in the
1This holds under the assumptions that job seekers set reservation wages strictly below their pre-unemployment
wage and that search is not directed towards higher paying jobs. Both assumptions will be discussed in section 2.2.
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unemployment exit rates just before benefit exhaustion. van Ours and Vodopivec (2006b) study
the effects of PBD reductions in Slovenia and find both strong effects on the unemployment
exit hazards and also substantial spikes around benefit exhaustion. Roed and Zhang (2003)
find for Norwegian job seekers that the exit rate out of unemployment increases sharply close
to benefit exhaustion and that the effects are stronger for females than for males.
Job search theory provides less guidance regarding the effects of prolonged benefit dura-
tions on reemployment wages and other job characteristics. On the one hand, more generous
unemployment insurance policies such as longer benefit durations allow liquidity constrained
unemployed to be more selective and to wait for better job offers. This is likely to improve
reemployment wages. Also, job match quality can be improved and subsequent jobs should
last longer. On the other hand, prolonging benefit durations can have negative effects on reem-
ployment wages if the wage offer distribution is declining over the spell. Human capital and
skill depreciation (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998) or stigmatization (Blanchard and Diamond,
1994) are possible causes for that. Empirical findings are mixed: Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976)
are the first to look at the effect of unemployment insurance on post-unemployment outcomes
and find positive effects of unemployment benefits on post-unemployment wages for different
age groups and gender. A number of more recent studies also find positive effects of increased
unemployment insurance generosity on post-unemployment wages (e.g. Addison and Black-
burn (2000) and Centeno and Novo (2006) for the US, Centeno and Novo (2009) for Portugal,
or Caliendo et al. (2013b) for Germany). Other studies, among them van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) for a Slovenian context or Card et al. (2007a) and Lalive (2007) for Austria, find either
small or no effects on wages and/or job-stability.
A second strand of related literature is concerned with the role of reservation wages for
labor market transitions. Most of this literature is based on survey evidence on self-reported
reservation wages. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) find a relatively large elasticity of reservation
wages with respect to unemployment benefit levels and conclude that reducing net unemploy-
ment insurance benefits could significantly lower the average unemployment duration through
the reservation wage channel. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) find that the self-reported
reservation wage is positively correlated with a dummy for benefit receipt and is an important
predictor for the actual reemployment wage. They conclude that reservation wages reflect an
important aspect of job search behavior. Krueger and Mueller (2013) use high-frequency longi-
tudinal survey data about self-reported reservation wages to provide evidence on the behavior
of reservation wages over the spell of unemployment. They find – in accordance with the the-
oretical predictions of a non-stationary job search model – that reservation wages decline over
the duration of the spell, though only at a modest rate. Moreover they find that the reservation
wage have more predictive power than pre-displacement wages, suggesting that reservation
wages contain useful information about workers’ future decisions and thus play an important
role for job search.
A small literature uses quasi-experimental variation in unemployment benefit eligibility to
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analyze the effects of increased PBD on reemployment wages and provide indirect evidence on
reservation wages. Schmieder et al. (2013) analyze the causal effect of unemployment duration
on reemployment wages in Germany. They decompose the effect of increased PBD into a
component which is due to reservation wages and into a component which is due to shifts in
the wage offer distribution over the duration of the spell. They find a negative and significant
overall effect on reemployment wages and argue that this effect can be solely attributed to a
declining wage offer distribution over the spell and not to reservation wages. Similar evidence
is also found by Lalive et al. (2013) for Austria in the context of the regional benefit extension
program which increased unemployment benefit duration drastically for a subset of workers
in selected regions. Nekoei and Weber (2013) also analyze reemployment wages in Austria
using a similar approach. They argue that the UI effect on expected wages is determined
by two counteracting effects: On the one hand, UI increases reservation wages and tends to
raise subsequent wages. On the other hand, job opportunities decrease due to the prolonged
time spent in unemployment, which tends to decrease subsequent wages. Which of the two
effects prevails depends on the importance of the agent’s job seeking effort relative to the
job selectiveness. They also exploit discontinuity around the age of 40 in Austria and find a
statistically significant and positive effect of extended benefit duration on reemployment wages.
Their finding suggests that job selectiveness (through the setting of a minimum acceptable
target wage) plays an important role for job search behavior.
This paper complements the existing literature on the effects of UI changes on unemploy-
ment in several respects. First, I propose a novel approach how to study the role of the reser-
vation wage channel for job search behavior. I show in a simple job search framework how
the exit rate to jobs can be decomposed into contributions from exits to wage-improving jobs
and exits to wage-declining jobs. Under two assumptions – job seekers set reservation wages
below previous wages and do not direct search towards higher paying jobs – this decomposi-
tion is informative on the relevance of reservation wages for the duration of non-employment.
Second, exploiting a sharp age discontinuity in unemployment benefit eligibility together with
information on previous wages and reemployment wages, I show that reservation wages are
an important factor of a worker’s job search behavior. In doing so, this paper contributes to
a small but growing literature which indirectly infers about reservation wages using only in-
formation about previous wages, reemployment wages and a quasi-experimental variation in
benefit duration. Finally, the paper serves as a middle ground between the reduced form liter-
ature that analyzes the effects of UI changes on non-employment without inferring about the
behavioral margins of job search and the structural literature which explicitly models reserva-
tion wages and search intensity from a job search model, but relies on untestable distributional
assumptions in order to estimate the model parameters.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses how and under
what assumptions the overall effects of extended benefit durations on non-employment and
survival probabilities can be decomposed in order to be informative on the reservation wage
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channel. Section 2.3 describes the institutional background and the data and section 2.4 dis-
cusses the econometric framework. In section 2.5, I present the main results of how extending
benefit duration affects non-employment duration and survival probabilities. Moreover, these
findings are decomposed into its contributions from exits to wage-improving jobs and exits to
wage-declining jobs. I also check the robustness of the findings in a number of sensitivity
analyses. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual framework
Partial-equilibrium, non-stationary job search models with endogenous search and stochastic
wage offers2 predict that UI extensions affect non-employment through reservation wages ρt
and through search effort st (van den Berg, 1990b; Schmieder et al., 2013). These models
predict that reservation wages decline and search effort increases over the duration of the spell
until benefit exhaustion P and stay constant thereafter. The exit rate from non-employment is
given by θt = stPr(wt ≥ ρt) = st(1−F (ρt; t)) and is increasing until benefit exhaustion and stays
flat thereafter.
Extending unemployment benefit durations increases the value of being non-employed prior
to benefit exhaustion. Because the prolonged period of unemployment benefits bt allows job
seekers to maintain a higher consumption level for a longer time and reduces the pressure to
find a new job quickly, job seekers lower their search effort, and maintain higher reservation
wages and, consequently, exit later to jobs. Moreover, note that there is a direct relation-
ship between the non-employment hazard rate θt, survivor functions S(t) and the expected
unemployment duration T : S(t) = exp(− ∫ t
0
θs ds) and E(T ) =
∫∞
0
S(u) du. The negative effect on
non-employment exit rates thus directly translates into higher survival probabilities and longer
expected non-employment durations.
Overall changes in the observed non-employment duration and survival probabilities, how-
ever, cannot be directly mapped into changes due to search effort and/or reservation wages.
In order to decompose the overall effects of extended benefit durations in a way which is infor-
mative on the two behavioral margins of job search – reservation wages and search effort – it is
helpful to rewrite the non-employment exit rate as
θt = st
[(
1− F (w0; t)
)
+
(
F (w0; t)− F (ρt; t)
)]
(2.1)
= st
(
1− F (w0; t)
)
+ st
(
F (w0; t)− F (ρt; t)
)
= θWt + θ
L
t .
The first term inside the square brackets of equation (2.1) denotes the probability that the
reemployment wage is above the previous wage, that is wt ≥ w0, and the second term denotes
2Wage offers are assumed to be drawn from a i.i.d. distribution F (w; t) that is allowed to decline over the duration
of the spell for example due to stigmatization or skill depreciation.
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the probability that the reemployment wage is below the previous wage but still acceptable,
that is w0 > wt ≥ ρt. Thus, we can learn about the importance of the reservation wage channel
by decomposing the non-employment hazard into ”winning” and ”losing” job exit destinations.
A ”winning” exit destination, θWt , is defined as an exit to a wage-improving job and a ”losing”
exit destination, θLt , is an exit to a wage-declining job. Wage-improving jobs are accepted wage
offers that pay wages above previous wages w0 and wage-declining jobs are accepted wage
offers that pay wages which are below previous wages w0. The exit rate to wage-declining jobs
is determined by the job seeker’s search effort st and his reservation wage choice ρt, whereas
exits to wage-improving jobs are influenced by the job seekers choice of search effort st only.
This decomposition is informative on the relevance of reservation wages for the unemploy-
ment duration and survivor functions under two assumptions: First, job seekers set reservation
wages below previous wages. This assumption can be justified both from a theoretical and an
empirical perspective: There are a number of theoretical reasons why one should expect wage
reductions after an involuntary job loss: Loss of job-specific human capital, a deterioration of
the value of an employee or incomplete information about the skills of a new employee (Feld-
stein and Poterba, 1984). Empirical evidence suggests that job seekers who lost their jobs
involuntarily anchor reservation wages to previous wages and reduce reservation wages with
increasing time spent in unemployment (Krueger and Mueller, 2013).3 The second assumption
is, that search is undirected. In order to separate the exit hazard into ”winning” and ”losing”
exit destinations, we have to assume that search is not directed towards higher paying jobs,
that is sWt = s
L
t = st. This assumption is justified if there is no wage posting. In Austria, wage
posting is compulsory only from March 2011. Prior to this date, wages were not posted in job
ads which makes the assumption of undirected search realistic for the empirical analysis.4
Clearly, if the wage offer distribution F (w; t) is declining, the probability of exits to wage-
improving jobs mechanically declines and the probability of exits to wage-declining jobs me-
chanically increases over the duration of the unemployment spell. However, assuming that an
exogenous change in PBD does not have a direct effect on the wage offer distribution, i.e. that
∂F (w;t)
∂P = 0, observed changes in unemployment duration and survivor functions have to be
either due to search effort and/or reservation wages and the decomposition into ”winning” and
”losing” exit destinations is informative on the reservation wage channel. Formally, the exit
3However, the variability across workers is substantial: Feldstein and Poterba (1984) examine reservation wage
choices of a large sample of unemployed job seekers in the United States in 1976 and find that a non-negligible
fraction of job seekers sets reservation wages above previous wages. If a subset of workers who exit to wage-improving
destinations set reservation wages above previous wages, decomposing overall effects becomes less informative on
reservation wages: for the subset of workers who exit to wage-improving jobs and set reservation wages above previous
wages their reservation wages choice might also have been binding. This issue will be further discussed in section
2.5.4.
4Krueger and Mueller (2011a) provide some evidence that a subset of workers is engaged in directed search. If
search was directed towards high paying jobs, we would expect the search effort to wage-improving jobs to exceed the
search effort for exits to wage-declining jobs, that is sWt ≥ sLt . Noting that ψ(.) is a convex and twice differentiable
function, it holds that ψ′′(sWt ) ≥ ψ′′(sLt ) and thus ∂s
L
t
∂bP
≤ ∂s
W
t
∂bP
< 0. Thus, with directed search and wage posting,
the exit hazard response of wage-declining exit destinations would be even more negative compared to wage-improving
exit destinations. Consequently, if a subset of job seekers was engaged in directed search, the differential impact
on unemployment exit hazards between winning and losing exit destinations could not be fully attributed to the
reservation wage channel, but part of the difference would come through the search intensity channel.
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hazard to wage-improving jobs is given by log θWt = log st + log(1 − F (w0)). A marginal increase
in PBD on the log hazard rate to wage-improving jobs is characterized by
∂ log θWt
∂bP
=
∂ log st
∂bP
,
and allows for a direct mapping from changes in the hazard rate into changes in search inten-
sity. The log hazard rate to wage-declining jobs is given by log θLt = log st + log(F (w0) − F (ρLt ))
and a marginal increase in PBD is calculated as
∂ log θLt
∂bP
=
∂ log st
∂bP
− f(ρ
L
t )
F (w0)− F (ρlt)
∂ρLt
∂bP
.
The exit rate to wage-declining jobs is a product of changes in search intensity and changes in
reservation wages. If reservation wages play a role, we would expect a stronger response to an
increase in PBD for exits to wage-declining jobs, that is:
∂ log θLt
∂bP
<
∂ log θWt
∂bP
< 0 .
Due to the direct relationship between hazard rates and survivor functions we would expect
that benefit extensions affect survival probabilities of wage-declining jobs more than wage-
improving jobs. What is more, if reservation wages matter, the major contribution to the overall
effect of PBD on average non-employment duration should come from exits to wage-declining
jobs.
2.3 Institutions and data
Subsection 2.3.1 discusses the relevant institutional details and subsection 2.3.2 describes
the data and the sampling procedure.
2.3.1 Institutional background
The empirical analysis uses administrative records for the universe of job seekers from Austria.
Although virtually all private sector jobs are covered by collective bargaining agreements at the
region and industry level, the Austrian labor market is relatively flexible and is characterized
by a low unemployment rate (Card et al., 2007c; EIROnline, 2013). Over the period from 1993
to 2005, the average unemployment rate was around 4.2 %.
Job seekers in Austria are entitled to a limited period in which they can draw regular un-
employment benefits. Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct are subject to
a four-week waiting period. UB recipients must be employable and willing to work. Recipients
are expected to search actively for a new job that should be within the scope of the claimant’s
qualifications.
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Eligibility for unemployment benefits depends on prior unemployment insurance contribu-
tions and on age. In terms of UI generosity, Austria is comparable to the US: The replacement
rate in Austria is rather low and replaces around 55 % of previous after-tax earnings. Job
seekers qualify for unemployment benefits if they have worked at least for 52 weeks in the 2
years prior to their unemployment spell.5 Job seekers who have worked fewer than 156 weeks
in the past 5 years before the start of their unemployment spell can claim up to 20 weeks of
unemployment benefits. Individuals with more than 36 months of unemployment insurance
contributions in the past 5 years are eligible for 30 weeks of benefits. Since August 1989,
the potential benefit duration also depends on age: Job seekers above 40 years old with more
than 156 weeks within 5 years and more than 312 weeks within 10 years of work experience
can claim benefits for 39 weeks and individuals aged 50 or more with at least 468 weeks of
employment in the last 15 years before the start of the unemployment spell are eligible for a
maximum benefit duration of 52 weeks.
Moreover, employees are protected by a firing regulation which obliges firms to pay a lump-
sum severance pay equal to 2 months of salary for individuals who were laid off after at least
three years of service. After exhaustion of their regular unemployment benefits, job seekers
can claim unemployment assistance (”Notstandshilfe”), which is a means-tested, infinite sec-
ondary benefit. Because unemployment assistance benefits are reduced euro for euro by any
other source of family income, Card et al. (2007a) calculate that the average unemployment
assistance is around 38 % of the unemployment benefit level in the population.
2.3.2 Data description
I use data from two different sources to analyze the effects of extended UI benefit duration on
the duration of non-employment. The first data source is the Austrian social security database
(ASSD), which contains detailed information about individuals labor market histories from
1972 to 2010 for the private sector employees and the unemployed.6 The database contains
daily labor market states, yearly earnings and a limited set of demographic variables, such as
month and year of birth, gender, state of origin, and some information about the employers,
such as industry affiliation or geographical location of the firm. The second data source is the
Austrian unemployment register (AMS) which is available from 1987 to 1998. From this data I
extract education and marital status of the last recorded unemployment spell. For individuals,
whose only unemployment spell started after 1998, these variables are missing.7
The main outcome is non-employment duration. It is measured as time elapsed between
the end of the last job to the start of a new job.8 Non-employment duration is right-censored
5For job seekers below the age of 25 at registration, the minimum work requirements prior to unemployment are 26
weeks within one year.
6The database does not include self employed and civil servants. Card et al. (2007c) report that around 10 % of the
labor force were self employed and around 7 % were civil servants in 1996, so that the ASSD contains labor market
histories of roughly 85 % of the total workforce.
7By using the information of the last recorded unemployment spell, I can still assign around 75 % of the information
for spells that started after 1998.
8Using registered unemployment as main outcome – a measure that is based on the time elapsed between the
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at two years. Less than 5 % of observations are censored. From the universe of individuals
in ASSD, I only consider layoffs that ended in non-employment between August 1993 and
December 2005. Focusing on this inflow window ensures that estimations are not affected by
the regional extended benefits program (REBP) which was abolished in August 1993. Also,
during that period there were no major reforms in the UI system which could bias estimates. I
further focus on individuals aged between 30 and 50 years at the date of their unemployment
registration. Moreover, I focus on job seekers with a continuous work history to ensure that
individuals are eligible for at least 30 weeks of benefits: Only individuals with at least one year
(52 weeks) of work experience out of 2 years prior to the start of the non-employment spell, with
3 (156 weeks) out of the last 5 years, and with at least 6 (312 weeks) out of the last 10 years
prior to the start of the non-employment spell are retained in the sample. The sample may
contain multiple spells per job seekers, but excludes spells with less than 7 days of length.
Finally, in order to minimize the influence of seasonal workers in the sample, I exclude job
seekers from the construction and tourism sector and also drop recalls to the previous firm.
More than 40 % of all job seekers belong to the construction and tourism sector and around
27 % of the remaining individuals are recalled. The final sample counts 183,001 individuals
and 258,337 spells.
2.4 Econometric framework
Subsection 2.4.1 presents the empirical specifications used to identify the causal effects of ex-
tended PBD on non-employment duration and survivor functions. Subsection 2.4.2 discusses
the validity of the RD approach.
2.4.1 Empirical specification
Estimating the effect of extended UI duration on non-employment. As discussed above,
the Austrian legislature for unemployment benefits contains sharp discontinuities with re-
spect to age, which can be exploited to analyze how extending benefit duration affects non-
employment. As described in section 2.3.1, benefit entitlement discontinuously changes around
the threshold of 40 years. Job seekers below 40 years old are entitled to 30 weeks of benefits
whereas job seekers above 40 years old are entitled to 39 weeks. The regression discontinuity
approach allows to identify causal effects around this cut-off age.
Following Hahn et al. (2001), let Di ∈ 0, 1 denote a binary treatment variable, indicating
whether an individual is above the cut-off c of 40 years (Di = 1) or below (Di = 0). Because of
exact knowledge of treatment assignment, Di is a deterministic function of the forcing variable
registration and de-registration at the unemployment office – would be misleading and could lead to purely mechanical
effects of changes in potential benefit duration, if job seekers de-register from the unemployment office once benefits
are exhausted irrespectively of whether they found a job or not. Results using unemployment duration as outcome are
available upon request.
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age, Ai, that is:
Di = 1(Ai ≥ c)
Furthermore, let Ti1 denote the outcome that occurs under treatment, and Ti0 the outcome if
not exposed to the treatment. The observed outcome Ti can be written as Ti = Ti0 +Di(Ti1−Ti0).
Under some continuity assumptions, i.e. if E[Ti0|Ai = a] and E[(Ti1−Yi0)|Ai = a] are continuous
in a at c and under a weak conditional independence assumption, the average treatment effect
at the cut-off c can be written as
E[Ti1 − Ti0 | Ai = c] = lim
ε↓0
E[Ti | Ai = c+ ε]− lim
ε↑0
E[Ti | Ai = c+ ε]
Under the above assumptions, the average treatment effect for the job seekers at the cut-off
can be obtained by estimating the discontinuity at the cut-off using the following empirical
regression function:
Ti = α+ βDi + f
−(Ai − c) + f+(Ai − c) + ηXi + εi .
The parameter β identifies the average causal effect of increasing PBD by 9 weeks on non-
employment duration Ti at the threshold. f−(Ai − c) and f+(Ai − c) capture a possibly non-
linear trend relationship between age and the duration of non-employment, which is allowed
to differ on both sides of the age threshold. Xi is a set of control variables, such as year
and month fixed effects, state and industry fixed effects, and a number of sociodemographic
characteristics. Including control covariates is not needed for identification but might improve
the precision of the estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010b). A crucial issue in a RD framework
is the correct specification of the trend relationship between the outcome Yi and the forcing
variable Ai. Falsely assuming a linear relationship between non-employment and age might
lead to the identification of discontinuities where there are none. Another relevant issue is the
choice of the bandwidth: In a RD framework, there is an inherent trade-off between precision
and bias. The main estimates are estimated using the data-driven asymptotically optimal
bandwidth as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). I perform a number of sensitivity
tests in section 2.5.4 in order to test the sensitivity of results to the bandwidth choice and the
order of the polynomial in age.
The main dependent variable is non-employment duration Ti, measured as the time elapsed
between the end of the previous job until the start of the new job. I use this definition of
non-employment rather than registered unemployment, because changes in PBD may affect
registered unemployment duration in a purely mechanical way, if job seekers de-register from
unemployment as soon as benefits exhaust irrespective of whether they found a job or not
(Card et al., 2007c). Another potential issue with analyzing non-employment duration is the
following: Analyzing average non-employment duration might be misleading if a lot of spells
are right-censored. Right-censoring is however not an issue in this study, because less than 5
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% of non-employment spells are right-censored.
Estimating the effect of extended UI duration on survivor functions. In a second part of
the empirical analysis, I decompose the overall effect on non-employment into contributions to
its change as a function of duration. In order to study the effects of UI changes on labor market
transitions, it is useful to decompose the total effect of extended PBD on non-employment
duration in the following way: The expected non-employment duration is defined as E(T ) =∫
S(u)du, where S(t) = exp(− ∫ θ(s)ds) is the survivor function and θ(.) is the non-employment
exit hazard. Thus, analyzing treatment effects on survivor functions allows to study how the
total non-employment effect is decomposed over the duration. For the analysis of the survivor
functions, I calculate the probability that an non-employment spell lasts longer than t, that is
Pr(T > t), and estimate treatment effects on survivor functions period by period, that is
Pr(Ti > t) = α+ βDi + f
−(Ai − c) + f+(Ai − c) + ηXi + εi
for each period t ∈ {0, . . . , 102}.
Winning versus losing: decomposition of overall effects. In order to learn about reserva-
tion wages, I additively decompose the overall effects on non-employment and survivor func-
tions into its contributions from exits to wage-improving jobs and exits to wage-declining jobs.
Let Wi = 1(wt > w0) be an indicator for an exit to a wage-improving job and Li = 1−Wi = 1(wt ≤
w0) an indicator for an exit to a wage-declining job. Non-employment duration (and survival
probabilities respectively) can thus be additively decomposed into Ti = Wi × Ti + (1−Wi)× Ti =
Wi × Ti + Li × Ti. Then, I can estimate the contributions from the winning and the losing
exits separately using Wi × Ti and Li × Ti as dependent variables. The overall effect on non-
employment then additively decomposes into contributions from exits to winning and exits
to losing jobs. In the same way, the survival probabilities Pr(Ti > t) are decomposed into
Pr(Ti > t)×Wi + Pr(Ti > t)× Li and estimated separately for the two components.
2.4.2 Validity of the RD approach
Identification in a RD framework mainly rests on the assumption of continuity of the potential
outcomes around the cut-off with respect to age. In other words, the RD approach is suitable
if treatment is as good as randomly assigned around the threshold. This assumption could
be violated if individuals are able to influence treatment assignment. Treatment assignment
depends on age and prior work experience. Work experience as well as age at registration can be
influenced by job seekers to some extent, because job seekers could wait with unemployment
registration until they reach a certain age threshold or work experience requirement. The
extent to which job seekers can manipulate the start date of unemployment is however limited,
because employers or job seekers have to announce their unemployment spell at the latest the
58
day after the end of the job in order to avoid cuts in benefit payments.
As a test of such strategic behavior I examine the density of the running variable around
the threshold. If individuals sort themselves into treatment, then one should observe bunching
around the threshold. In other words, in an appropriate RD design the marginal density of age
over the population should be continuous. McCrary (2008) proposes a formal test for manipu-
lation of the running variable. Figure 2.1a shows the inflows into unemployment as a function
of age. The vertical line at the age of 40 indicates the threshold above which job seekers can
claim 39 instead of 30 weeks of benefits. The figure does not show any evidence that job
seekers manipulate their age at unemployment entry. Figure 2.1b shows an undersmoothed
histogram together with the local linear density estimates proposed by McCrary (2008). There
is no discontinuity in the density around the age threshold. A formal test of continuity around
the cut-off value fails to reject the null hypothesis of continuity with a t-value of 0.44.
Figure 2.1: Density around cut-off
(a) Inflows around age threshold
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(b) Local linear density around age threshold
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Notes: Figure 2.1 shows the density of the running variable around the threshold value of 40 years. The x axis shows age
at registration. A window of 5 years around the threshold is shown. Subfigure 2.1a shows the inflows into unemployment
around the cutoff value, and subfigure 2.1b shows an undersmoothed histogram together with the local linear density
estimates proposed by McCrary (2008).
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
A second analysis for the validity of the identification assumption is a test of continuity of
observable characteristics. Discontinuous variation of the observables around the threshold
would be a strong indication for a failure of the identifying assumption. In figure 2.B1 I examine
a range of characteristics above and below the threshold. Individuals are very similar above
and below the threshold and none of the characteristics exhibit a jump at the threshold. Table
2.1 shows a formal discontinuity test for all covariates. The formal test confirms the graphical
evidence: Most of the characteristics do not vary statistically significantly around the threshold.
Although we reject continuity of covariates in a few cases, such as the occurrence of past non-
employment spells, university degree and region, the differences are economically very small.
Overall, the analysis of the covariates around the threshold suggests that the assumption of as
good as random assignment around the threshold fails to be rejected.
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Table 2.1: Covariates discontinuity test
Overall Winning Losing
A. Labor market history
Mean past earnings 4.596 -4.527 9.123
(6.271) (7.671) (8.132)
Mean past wage 0.155 -0.133 0.288
(0.191) (0.261) (0.272)
Past unemployment spell -0.002 0.002 -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Work exp. in past 15 years (in weeks) -1.331 -4.355* 3.024
(0.815) (2.558) (2.786)
Tenure (in weeks) 1.949 0.310 1.640
(1.489) (0.932) (1.635)
Severance pay -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
B. Worker Characteristics
Female 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Austrian 0.001 -0.007* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Married -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education
Less than elementary school 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elementary school -0.001 -0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Apprenticeship/High School -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
University -0.002* 0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other 0.005** 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Previous industry
Manufacture -0.000 -0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Financial, insurance activities, extraterritorial bodies -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Transportation 0.002 -0.001 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Health and social activities 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Other -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Region
Vienna -0.007* -0.008*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Lower Austria 0.007*** 0.002 0.005**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Upper Austria -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 2.1 – continued
Overall Winning Losing
Burgenland -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carinthia 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Salzburg 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Styria 0.002 -0.001 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tyrol 0.000 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Vorarlberg -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unknown 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: This table presents first-order polynomial RDD estimates for the covariate controls with a bandwidth of 5 years.
Standard errors clustered by age in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
2.5 Results
This section discusses the empirical results. Subsection 2.5.1 presents descriptive evidence
for the movements of reservation wages over the non-employment spell. Subsection 2.5.2
shows the causal effects of extending benefits on non-employment duration and survivor func-
tions. Subsection 2.5.3 decomposes the overall effects into its contributions from exits to wage-
improving and wage-declining jobs, and subsection 2.5.4 discusses some sensitivity analyses.
2.5.1 Descriptive evidence
In subsection 2.2 I showed how exit hazards to jobs are separable into exits to wage-improving
jobs and exits to wage-declining jobs. By decomposing the exit rate in this way I can isolate
the reservation wage channel from the search intensity channel and learn about reservation
wage movements over the non-employment spell. The underlying idea is that reservation wage
choices directly affect the likelihood of exits to wage-declining jobs, but not the likelihood of
exits to wage-improving jobs, whereas a job seekers choice of search effort affects both exit
destinations likewise.
In a non-stationary job search model, wage offers are drawn from a random wage offer
distribution F (w; t) and thus - by chance - generate wage offers which are above previous
wages for some workers and below previous wages for other workers. Figure 2.2 shows the
distribution of reemployment wages relative to previous wages. Around 56 % of the spells are
exits to wage-declining jobs. A relatively large proportion of job seekers accepted wage offers
which are relatively close to their previous wages. Only around 25 % of job seekers have a
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ratio of reemployment to previous wages below 0.8. Even though recalls were excluded from
the sample, around 10 % of job seekers gain exactly the same reemployment wage as they had
prior to their unemployment spell. A possible explanation for this could be that these wages
were bargained by unions. Only relatively few job seekers have a ratio of reemployment to
previous wage considerably above 1. The ratio of reemployment to pre-unemployment wages is
1.01 or below for more than 75 % of job seekers, and equal to or below 1.23 for around 90 %
of job seekers.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of reemployment wages relative to previous wages
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the ratio of reemployment wages
relative to previous wages.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
One major prediction of the non-stationary job search model is that reservation wages fall
over the duration of the spell until benefit exhaustion and stay constant thereafter and that
search effort is increasing over the spell until benefit exhaustion and is flat thereafter. A
simple test to see whether the decomposition into the two exit destinations is informative on
reservation wage choices is to look at the ratio of the hazard rates θ
L
t
θWt
over the spell duration:
θLt
θWt
=
stPr(w0 > wt ≥ ρt)
stPr(wt ≥ w0) =
F (w0; t)− F (ρt; t)
1− F (w0; t)
Assume for the moment that the wage offer distribution is constant over the spell: Because
search is assumed to be undirected, search effort st cancels out of the ratio of the hazard rates.
Movements of the hazard ratio are then informative of reservation wage movements over the
spell duration. If reservation wages matter for exits to wage-declining jobs, the ratio of the
hazard rates should be increasing until benefit exhaustion P and be constant thereafter.
Figure 2.3 shows the smoothed hazard rates for exits to wage-improving and wage-declining
jobs destinations. Subfigure 2.3a shows hazard rates for job seekers with 30 weeks of benefit
62
entitlement and subfigure 2.3b for job seekers with 39 weeks of benefits respectively. Subfig-
ures 2.3c and 2.3d depict the corresponding hazard ratios. Under both benefit regimes, hazard
rates to wage-declining jobs are relatively flat or increasing prior to benefit exhaustion. After
benefit exhaustion hazard rates decline. In contrast, hazard rates of wage-improving job des-
tinations are declining over the whole spell duration. Comparing winning and losing exit rates
thus highlights a diverging pattern of winning and losing hazards prior to benefit exhaustion,
which becomes parallel after benefit exhaustion.
The observed pattern aligns well with the theoretical predictions: In a non-stationary job
search model we would expect hazard rates to increase until benefit exhaustion and to be
flat after benefits ran out. Because exits to wage-improving job destinations are affected by
search effort only and exits to wage-declining job destinations are affected by search effort and
reservation wages, we would expect a steeper slope for the exit hazard to wage-declining jobs
prior to benefit exhaustion and parallel movements after benefit exhaustion.9
Subfigures 2.3c and 2.3d highlight the differential evolution of the hazard ratios before and
after benefit exhaustion. The hazard ratio for job seekers with 30 weeks of benefits increases
until week 30. At week 30 there is a kink and the ratio is increasing at a much lower rate
thereafter. The same pattern is observed for the hazard ratio of job seekers with 39 weeks of
benefits, but the kink is now observed around week 39. This pattern is consistent with the
predictions of the non-stationary job search model. Because reservation wages decrease over
the duration of unemployment, the numerator of the hazard ratio, F (w0; t) − F (ρt; t) increases
with the duration of unemployment. After benefit exhaustion, the environment becomes sta-
tionary and the slope in the hazard ratio becomes much flatter. The observation that the ratio
of the hazard rates is not completely flat after benefit exhaustion, might be due to the fact
that the wage offer distribution is not constant over the duration of unemployment, but rather
declining.
Clearly, if the wage offer distribution is declining over the spell, then θ
L
t
θWt
increases mechan-
ically over the spell duration. A key insight, however, is that there is no reason why the wage
offer distribution should become stationary at benefit exhaustion - rather one would expect the
wage offer distribution do decrease continuously around benefit exhaustion. Therefore, with
a declining wage offer distribution, we would expect θ
L
t
θWt
to be increasing after benefit exhaus-
tion P . If reservation wages however matter, we would expect to see a steeper slope prior to
benefit exhaustion. What is more, we would expect to find a kink in the slope of θ
L
t
θWt
at benefit
exhaustion, because the reservation wage path becomes constant after that.
9The fact that the hazard rates are not flat after benefit exhaustion but rather decreasing could stem from a declining
wage offer distribution: If [1 − F (w0)] is decreasing with increasing time spent out of employment, then the overall
hazard rate can be decreasing.
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Figure 2.3: Hazard ratios for winning and losing job exits
(a) Exit hazards with 30 weeks of benefits
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(b) Exit hazards with 39 weeks of benefits
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(c) Ratio of hazard rates
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Notes: This figure shows the exit hazards (subfigures 2.3a and 2.3b) and the ratio of the hazard rates of wage-declining
exits to wage-improving exits over the duration of non-employment (subfigures 2.3c and 2.3d) for job seekers with 30 or
39 weeks of benefit entitlement respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
While the divergent patterns in the hazard ratio prior and after benefit exhaustion and
the kink at benefit exhaustion in figure 2.3 provide a first descriptive evidence on the role of
reservation wage choices for job search behavior, it is still difficult to disentangle reservation
wage effect from effects due to a declining wage offer distribution.10
10Figures 2.B2 and 2.B3 in the appendix provide additional evidence for a declining wage offer distribution over
the duration of non-employment. First note, that with a declining wage offer distribution over the spell, receiving a
wage-improving offer gets less and less likely the more time spent non-employed. This leads to a mechanical increase
in the likelihood of exits to wage-declining jobs over the duration of the spell. Figure 2.B2 shows how the probability
of exit to wage-declining jobs given exit evolves over the first 78 weeks of the spell. Early in the spell, up to 6 weeks
since the start of the non-employment spell, the probability of exiting to wage-declining jobs is below 50 % - thus it is
more probable to exit to a wage-improving job than to a wage-declining job. Then, with increasing spell duration, the
probability of exit to wage-declining jobs is increasing to over 65 %. After around 52 weeks, the curve eventually starts
to level off at around 70 %. Exits to wage-declining jobs thus get more and more probable with increasing time spent
unemployed. Figure 2.B3 provides another indication for a declining wage offer distribution over the duration of the
spell. The figure plots average previous wages over the duration of the spell. With a declining wage offer distribution,
the likelihood of exits to wage-improving jobs mechanically declines over the duration of the spell. Because it is getting
increasingly difficult to exit to wage-improving jobs with relatively well paid previous jobs, we should consequently
observe a decline in average previous wages for exits to wage-improving jobs, but not for exits to wage-declining jobs.
The figure shows that average previous wages indeed fall over the spell duration for exits to wage-improving jobs. For
exits to wage-declining jobs, average previous wages first also decline somewhat in the first around 50 weeks of the
spell, but much less. Both figures thus point towards a declining wage offer distribution over the duration of the spell.
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However, assuming that there is no direct effect of an exogenous increase in UI benefit
duration on the wage offer distribution, observed changes in non-employment duration and
survivor functions have to be either due to so search effort and / or reservation wage consider-
ations. If reservation wages matter, extending UI benefit durations should affect the likelihood
of exits to wage-declining jobs more than the likelihood of exits to wage-improving jobs. The
major contribution to the prolonged non-employment duration should then come from exits
to wage-declining jobs. We can exploit a quasi-experimental variation in UI benefit eligibility
around the age of 40 in Austria to empirically investigate these theoretical predictions.
2.5.2 The effects of extended benefit duration
Overall effects on non-employment duration. I start by estimating the overall effects of
extended UI durations on non-employment duration. In doing so I replicate the well-known
finding that increasing UI duration prolongs non-employment. Figure 2.4 shows observed
non-employment duration (in weeks) as a function of age at unemployment registration. The
vertical line at the age of 40 years indicates the cut-off value, above which job seekers can
claim 39 weeks of benefits. To the left of the threshold job seekers are eligible for 30 weeks of
benefits. Each dot represents average unemployment duration for job seekers in age bins of
one month. The fit of a linear regression which allows for a discontinuity at the age threshold
and for different age trends on both sides of the cut-off is superimposed together with the 95
% confidence interval.
Average non-employment duration is roughly 25 weeks below the threshold, and around 28
weeks above the age threshold and increases with age. A discontinuity at the threshold can
be interpreted as a first descriptive evidence of a causal effect of extended PBD, as long as the
assumption of continuity of potential outcomes around the cut-off is satisfied. The observed
discontinuity at the threshold shows that increasing benefit entitlement by 9 weeks increases
average non-employment duration by around half a week. Because I use elapsed time to the
new job rather than time to unemployment de-registration as main outcome, the jump around
the age threshold reflect pure behavioral changes due to the extension of UI duration.11
11Using registered unemployment rather than time to new job as outcome variable shows larger jumps around the
age threshold. These effects may, however, be partly mechanical, if job seekers de-register from the unemployment
insurance system at benefit exhaustion irrespective of whether they found a job or not. Graphs based on registered
unemployment are available upon request.
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Figure 2.4: Duration of non-employment around the age threshold
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Notes: Figure 2.4 shows non-employment duration (measured in weeks) as a function of age at regis-
tration. Each dot corresponds to a bin size of one month. A window of 5 years around the threshold
is shown. The vertical line indicates the threshold value at 40 years old.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
Table 2.2 shows the treatment effect of increasing PBD by 9 weeks on non-employment
durations. The regressions were estimated without control covariates and were obtained using
a linear specification in age and the asymptotically optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). The optimal bandwidth is 3.456 years. A large number of robustness
analyses testing the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to variations in the econometric
specification will be discussed in section 2.5.4.
The causal effect of extending UI benefits on non-employment is 0.614 and is estimated
at the 5 % significance level. Extending UI benefits by 9 weeks prolongs non-employment by
roughly 4.5 days. One additional month of UI benefits thus prolongs non-employment by 0.27
weeks.
How do these findings fit into the existing literature? One caveat of the regression disconti-
nuity approach is external validity. This analysis is based on a sample of prime-wage workers
with long and stable labor market histories. Displaced workers with a stable labor attachment
might however react differently to benefit extensions than younger job seekers with relatively
little work experience. Also, the benefit extension analyzed in this paper is relatively modest
and it is not clear a priori how results would change if benefit extensions would be more im-
portant. However, I find that the estimates fit very well in the existing literature. Schmieder
et al. (2013) find around 0.3 additional months of unemployment per month of increased UI
duration and 0.15 months of additional non-employment - magnitudes that are slightly larger
than the ones found in this paper. With 0.12 weeks of non-employment per additional month
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of UI the effect sizes are slightly smaller in Nekoei and Weber (2013).
Table 2.2: RD estimates
Di 0.614**
(0.243)
(Ai − c) 0.316***
(0.068)
Di(Ai − c) 0.193
(0.117)
Bandwidth 3.456
Observations 177,821
R-squared 0.002
Notes: This table presents RDD
estimates for non-employment du-
ration (in weeks) Standard errors
clustered by age in parentheses.
*** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based
on ASSD.
Overall effects on survivor functions. In a second step I decompose the overall effects on
non-employment into its contributions over the spell by estimating the effect of an extended
UI duration on survival probabilities in each period of a spell. Clearly, extending UI durations
increases survival in non-employment. Figure 2.5 shows descriptive evidence on the survivor
functions for the group of job seekers with 30 weeks of benefits (dashed line) and for the group
of job seekers with 39 weeks of benefits (solid line). Both control and treated job seekers exit
non-employment relatively fast: Around 50 % of the job seekers found a job after 15 weeks.
After 30 weeks, roughly 75 % of job seekers found a job, and after 52 weeks, only less than 20
% are still non-employed. Treated job seekers with 30 weeks of benefits, however, leave non-
employment earlier than their counterparts with 39 weeks of benefits. The survivor functions of
treated and controls start to differ immediately, but the gap between the two functions widens
with increasing duration. The maximum difference is observed in the time period between 30
and 39 weeks. After that, the difference between the two survivor functions shrinks back.
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Figure 2.5: Survivor functions
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Notes: This figure shows survivor functions for non-employment for job seekers aged between 35 and
40 years old at registration (eligible for 30 weeks of benefits) and job seekers aged between 40 and 45
years old (eligible for 39 weeks of benefits) respectively. Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
Figure 2.6 shows the estimated treatment effects on the survivor functions for non-employment
estimating the period by period effects of extended UI duration on the survival probability, that
is on P (Ti > t) for each t ∈ {0, . . . , 104}. The difference between the two survivor functions
is not significantly different from 0 in the first 26 weeks of the spell. The survival probabil-
ities of job seekers with an extended benefit duration of 39 weeks starts to differ from those
of job seekers with only 30 weeks of benefits after 26 weeks. The difference between survival
probabilities peaks in the time period between 30 and 39 weeks. Extending the benefit dura-
tion by 9 week has a maximum contribution of around 1.5 percentage points during the peak
period and shrinks back close to zero thereafter. The maximum contribution to the overall
non-employment effect therefore comes from the period between the two exhaustion dates at
30 and 39 weeks respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated effects for survivors
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Notes: Figure 2.6 shows estimated treatment effects on survivors functions for non-employment.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
2.5.3 Decomposition of overall effects by exit destination
Table 2.3 shows how the overall effect of extended UI durations on total non-employment du-
ration decomposes into its contributions from job seekers who exit to wage-improving jobs and
job seekers who exit to wage-declining jobs respectively. Table 2.3 presents the estimation
results. Column 1 replicates the overall treatment effect, columns 2 and 3 show the contribu-
tions of the two exit destinations respectively. Calculations are based on a linear specification
in age and uses the asymptotically optimal bandwidth of 3.456 years. The estimates suggest
that mainly exits to wage-declining jobs are affected by extended benefit durations: The overall
non-employment effect of around 0.614 weeks splits up into a contribution of around 0.597
weeks due to exits to wage-declining jobs and 0.018 weeks due to exits to wage-improving jobs.
Thus, losing exits account for more than 95 % of the overall non-employment effect, whereas
the contribution of job seekers who exit to wage-improving jobs is small and not statistically
significant. For non-employment, almost over 95 % of the overall effect is accounted for by exits
to wage-declining jobs. Absent a direct effect of UI extensions on the wage offer distribution,
these estimates suggest an important role for reservation wages in the job search behavior of
displaced workers.
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Table 2.3: RD estimates decomposed by exit destination
Overall Winning Losing
Di 0.614** 0.018 0.597**
(0.243) (0.149) (0.285)
Bandwidth 3.456 3.456 3.456
Observations 177,821 177,821 177,821
Notes: This table presents decomposed RD estimates into exits
to wage-improving (winning) jobs and exits to wage-declining
(losing) jobs. Standard errors clustered by age in parentheses.
*** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
Figure 2.7 decomposes the overall effects on survivor functions into contributions from
winning and losing exits respectively. The dashed red line displays the period-per-period effects
of extended UI durations on the survival probabilities of exits to wage-improving jobs, i.e.
P (Ti > t)×Wi, and the solid blue line depicts the period-per-period effects for losing exits, that
is P (Ti > t)× Li. The thin gray line replicates the overall effects of figure 2.6. The figure shows
that the major contribution to the positive treatment effects on the survivor functions comes
from the exits to wage-declining jobs. Even early in the spell the most important contribution
comes from job seekers who exit to wage-declining jobs. In the period from 30 to 39 weeks,
the contribution from exit to wage-declining jobs is around two thirds. In the later periods,
especially after 52 weeks, overall contributions to the total non-employment duration decrease.
However, virtually all of the remaining effect is accounted for by losing exits.
Figure 2.7: Estimated effects on survivor functions for winning and losing exits
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
Su
rv
ivo
r(3
9 w
ee
ks
) −
 S
urv
ivo
r(3
0 w
ee
ks
)
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99102
Non−employment duration  (in weeks)
Overall Winning Losing
Notes: This figure shows the decomposition of the estimated treatment effects on non-employment
hazard rates and on survivors functions for wage-improving and wage-declining exits.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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2.5.4 Sensitivity analyses
Robustness of RD estimates. In this section a number of model variations are discussed.
A first set of robustness regressions is concerned with the sensitivity of the results to the
econometric specification. Table 2.4 presents a number of regressions which test the sensitivity
of the estimates with respect to the bandwidth choice and the order of the polynomial in age.
Misspecification of the trend relationship between non-employment and age might result in
detecting discontinuities where there are none. Estimates using quadratic (cubic) terms in (Ai−
c) are presented in the second (third) row. The estimates from a local linear regression which
uses Epanechnikov weights is displayed in the fourth row. Columns 2 to 4 use bandwidths
of 2, 5, and 7 years respectively and provide sensitivity tests to the data-driven bandwidth in
column 1.
The estimation results are quite robust to changes in the econometric specification. Most
estimates range between 0.413 and 0.737 and are very close to the baseline estimates for
most specifications. The optimal order of the polynomial is 1 for all specifications according to
Akaike’s information criterion.
In order to investigate how sensitive the estimations are to the inclusion of additional control
covariates, I re-estimated the baseline specification of table 2.2 including a range of individ-
ual characteristics such as sex, marital status, nationality, education, previous industry and
geographical region. Furthermore, I include a number of covariates that pick up job seekers
previous labor market histories, such as past earnings and wages, past unemployment inci-
dence, past work experience, tenure, and an indicator of whether a job seeker is eligible for
severance pay. Moreover, dummies for the registration years and months are included to pick
up seasonal variations and variations over the business cycle. Adding observed characteristics
should not affect the identification of the treatment effects, but might pick up some random
variation and improve precision of the estimates. Table 2.C1 shows that including control
covariates does not change the point estimates in an important way, but improves precision
somewhat.
Estimating the effect of extended UI duration on hazard rates. Previous analyses dis-
cussed effects of extended PBD on non-employment duration and survivor functions. The
most direct test of the theoretical predictions, however, would be to analyze hazard rates. Ap-
pendix 2.A provides a graphical evidence of the effects of extended UI duration on job finding
hazards.
One difficulty that arises when analyzing hazard rates, however, is that there might be dy-
namic selection over the course of the non-employment spell (Ham and LaLonde, 1996). As
good as random assignment to treatment at unemployment registration does not guarantee
that treatment incidence is independent of unobservables in later periods of the spell. If there
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Table 2.4: RD estimates with different bandwidth and polynomial order
Opt B. B=2 B= 5 B=7
p=1 0.614** 0.825*** 0.586*** 0.584***
(0.243) (0.295) (0.201) (0.170)
p=2 0.664** 0.413 0.696** 0.623**
(0.324) (0.392) (0.292) (0.250)
p=3 0.629 -0.108 0.609* 0.666**
(0.432) (0.528) (0.343) (0.320)
LLR 0.631** 0.737** 0.620*** 0.595***
(0.252) (0.295) (0.212) (0.181)
Order of p 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 3.456 2.000 5.000 7.000
Observations 177,821 100,587 254,100 354,157
Notes: This table presents RDD estimates for non-employment duration (in
weeks) for different orders of the polynomial p and different bandwidth choices
B. LLR are estimates from a local linear regression using Epanechnikov kernel
weights. Standard errors clustered by age in parentheses. *** P<0.01 **
P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
is dynamic selection, the pool of workers on both sides of the threshold may no longer be
comparable in later periods of the spell even though it was at the start of the spell. Analyz-
ing effects of extended UI durations on hazard rates thus remain suggestive and cannot be
identified without making additional assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
For the analysis of the transitions out of unemployment, I estimate a piecewise-constant
exponential model with unobserved heterogeneity which is assumed to follow a gamma distri-
bution G(ν):
θ(t | Di, Ai, Xi) = exp
(
5∑
k=1
λkI(τk−1 < t < τk)
)
ν , (2.2)
with λk = αk + βkDi + γk(Ai − c) + δkDi(Ai − c) + ηXi for k = 1, . . . , 5. τk−1 and τk define the
cut-points of the different intervals. Within each interval the baseline hazard is restricted to be
constant. The cut-points are set at 15, 28, 31, 37 and 40 weeks in order to capture differences
in behavior early in the spell, differences around the benefit exhaustion dates, as well as
differences in later periods in the spell. The βk coefficients identify the average treatment effect
around the age threshold under the assumption that the hazard rates of the two groups would
be continuous in age at each duration interval. This duration-dependent specification allows
to identify treatment effects at different lengths of non-employment.
Table 2.5 shows estimates from a piecewise-constant exponential, Gamma distributed shared
frailty model as presented in equation 2.2. The estimates are consistent with the graphical
evidence in appendix 2.A. Consider first the overall effect of extended UI duration on non-
employment hazards. The ratio of the hazard rates is close to one and not statistically signifi-
cantly different from one in the first 28 weeks. The largest effects in terms of hazard ratios is
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estimated in the period from 29 to 31 weeks: The hazard ratio drops to 0.876, meaning that the
hazard rate of the treated is on average around 12 % lower than the one of the untreated during
that period. This results shows that job seekers with 30 weeks of benefits exit non-employment
significantly more than their counterparts with 39 weeks of benefits in the period from 16 to
28 weeks and even more so in the period from 29 to 31 weeks. The strong negative effect in
the period from 29 to 31 weeks captures the spike at benefit exhaustion for job seekers with
30 weeks of benefits. The ratio of the hazard rates is also around 0.87 in the period between
32 and 37 weeks, and around 1.05 in the period between 38 and 40 weeks. This positive effect
captures the spike around the benefit exhaustion for job seekers with 39 weeks of benefits.
After 40 weeks, the ratio of the hazard rates is again close to one and not significant.
Considering the decomposition of effects into exits to wage-improving and wage-declining
jobs (columns 2 and 3), which are modeled as independent competing risks, the theoretical
predictions of section 2.2 are supported: There are no large differences between the hazard
rate responses of the two exit destinations in the first interval from 0 to 15 weeks. The ratio of
the hazard rates for losing job seekers slightly exceeds that of the winning job seekers in the
period from 16 to 28 weeks, but differences are small. In the period between 29 and 31 weeks,
the ratio of the hazard rates of losing job seekers amounts to 0.875, whereas the ratio of the
hazard rates of winning job seekers is around 0.893. Thus, the exit hazard to wage-declining
jobs with 39 weeks of unemployment benefits is only around 87 % of the exit rate of their
counterparts with 30 weeks of benefits during the period from 29 to 31 weeks. For exits to
wage-improving jobs, the corresponding measure amounts to around 89 %. The differences in
hazard ratios of the two exit destinations disappear in the later periods. These findings suggest
that - especially in the ”treatment” period from 29 to 31 weeks - exits to wage-declining jobs
are somewhat stronger affected by the UI extension in terms of hazard rates.12
Thus, also when looking directly at exit rates, the theoretical hypothesis in section 2.2 is
supported: Theory predicts stronger effects for exits to wage-declining jobs, because the exit
rate to wage-declining jobs is composed of both a search effort component and a reservation
wage component, whereas the hazard rate to wage-improving jobs is determined only by the
search effort channel. Although the differences between exits to wage-declining and wage-
improving jobs are not large and significantly different from each other in terms of hazard
rates, these differences aggregate up to considerable effects for survivor functions and average
non-employment, as documented in section 2.5.3.
12Results are more pronounced for registered unemployment hazards and are available upon request.
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Table 2.5: Job exit hazard ratio estimates
Overall Winning Losing
Treatment effect in the interval from . . .
. . . 0 to 15 weeks 0.986 0.994 0.989
(0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
. . . 16 to 28 weeks 0.989 0.992 0.998
(0.023) (0.037) (0.030)
. . . 29 to 31 weeks 0.876** 0.893 0.875**
(0.045) (0.078) (0.057)
. . . 32 to 37 weeks 0.876*** 0.868* 0.890**
(0.039) (0.064) (0.050)
. . . 38 to 40 weeks 1.056 1.040 1.073
(0.067) (0.112) (0.086)
. . . 41 weeks and more 0.974 0.994 0.979
(0.032) (0.056) (0.039)
Obs. 461,162 461,162 461,162
Individuals 132,134 132,134 132,134
Notes: This table presents RD estimates of the job exit hazard ratios. Treat-
ment effects are estimated for different intervals and account for unob-
served heterogeneity using a gamma distributed shared-frailty model. Esti-
mates are calculated using a linear specification in age and include a set of
control characteristics. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
Relaxing the underlying assumptions. A last sensitivity check is concerned with the the-
oretical assumption that job seekers set reservation wages strictly below their previous wage.
Even though there are several theoretical reasons why one should expect wage reductions after
an involuntary job loss, existing empirical evidence suggests that a subset of job seekers set
reservation wages above previous wages. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) examine the ratio of
reservation wage to previous wage by duration of non-employment and find that the ratio is
slightly above 1 in the first 25 weeks of the spell. Using a large set of self-reported reservation
wages of unemployed job seekers, Krueger and Mueller (2011b) provide empirical evidence that
on average reservation wages are essentially the same as previous wages. However, they report
a substantial variability across workers: The 25th percentile reservation wage ratio is 0.7, the
median is around 0.91, and the 75th percentile is 1.17. The theoretical implication is, that for
the subset of job seekers who set reservation wages above previous wage, the optimal response
to extended UI durations might be determined - like for exits to wage-declining jobs - by both
the reservation wage and the search effort channel even if they exit to wage-improving jobs.
In order to account for the variability in reservation wage choices, the assumption that
ρt < w0 for all job seekers is relaxed by multiplying the previous wage by a scaling factor
α, so that w∗0 = αw0. By varying the scaling factor α, the probability that job seekers set
reservation wages above previous wages can be controlled. Increasing α reduces P (ρt ≥ w∗0)
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and the subset of job seekers setting reservation wages above w∗0 decreases. By doing so, exits
to wage-improving jobs should be influenced less and less by job seekers whose reservation
wage choices are potentially binding.
Table 2.6 presents RD estimates for different scaling factors. Columns 1 and 2 present
estimates using a scaling factor of 0.85, columns 3 and 4 replicate the estimates from table 2.3
using a scaling factor of α = 1, and columns 5 and 6 use a scaling factor of α = 1.15. A scaling
factor of 1.15 for example means that only job seekers with reemployment wages above 1.15
times previous wages are classified as exits to wage-improving jobs. Thus only job seekers who
exit to jobs with considerable wage improvements relatively to their previous jobs are classified
as winning job seekers and reservation wages are unlikely to have played an important role
for them. Accordingly, a scaling factor of 0.85 means that for a relatively large fraction of job
seekers who are classified as exiting to wage-improving jobs, reservation wage choices might
have been played a role. The estimates in table 2.6 support these hypotheses: In columns 1
and 2, for a scaling factor of α = 0.85 exits to wage-improving and exits to wage-declining jobs
contribute both in the same order of magnitude to the overall non-employment effect. This
can be explained by the fact that both wage-declining and wage-improving exits are similarly
affected by both reservation wage and search effort considerations. In line with the theoretical
predictions, columns 5 and 6 show that by lowering the share of job seekers who exit to
wage-improving jobs the decomposition between winning and losing exits becomes even more
clear cut and virtually all of the effect on non-employment comes from exits to wage-declining
jobs. Thus, for increasing values of α the gap between wage-declining and wage-improving
non-employment estimates tends to widen and confirms the theoretical hypothesis.
At the same time, the set of job seekers who exit to wage-improving jobs is decreasing in α.
So there is a inevitable trade-off with this kind of sensitivity test: On the one hand, increasing
α helps to get an empirical specification which is closer to the theoretical predictions in section
2.2. On the other hand that specification is estimated with less and less observations in the
group of winning exits. If α is set to one (the baseline case), around 44 % of the job seekers
exit to wage-improving jobs (see figure 2.2). If α is set to 1.15, only around 15 % of spells are
classified as exits to wage-improving jobs, and if α is set to 0.85 around 70 % of spells are
classified as exits to wage-improving jobs. Nevertheless, this sensitivity analysis provides a
valuable test which highlights once more the importance of the reservation wage channel for
the job search behavior.
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Table 2.6: RD estimates using threshold scaling
Winning Losing Winning Losing Winning Losing
α = 0.85 α = 0.85 α = 1 α = 1 α = 1.15 α = 1.15
Di 0.304* 0.311 0.018 0.597** -0.039 0.653**
(0.177) (0.230) (0.149) (0.285) (0.130) (0.261)
Bandwidth 3.456 3.456 3.456 3.456 3.456 3.456
Observations 177,821 177,821 177,821 177,821 177,821 177,821
Notes: This table presents decomposed RD estimates into exits to wage-improving (winning) jobs and
exits to wage-declining (losing) jobs for different sacling factors α. Standard errors clustered by age in
parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
2.6 Conclusion
Reservation wages and search effort are the key drivers of job search behavior. The finding that
extended UI generosity prolongs non-employment duration is one of the most robust results in
labor economics. However, there is an ongoing discussion about whether extending UI benefits
has beneficial effects in terms of job match quality or whether it only subsidizes unproductive
search. To contribute to this discussion, separating the two behavioral margins of job search
is essential.
This paper developed a novel approach which allows to make inference about the relative
importance of reservation wages for job search without actually observing reservation wages
directly. I show that the exit hazard to jobs can be decomposed into two exit destinations
- a component due to exits to wage-improving jobs and a component due to exits to wage-
declining jobs. This decomposition allows to isolate the reservation wage channel from the
search effort channel, because reservation wages should not affect the likelihood of exits to
wage-improving exits, whereas search effort affects wage-improving and wage-declining exits
likewise. If reservation wages matter, extended benefit durations should affect exits to wage-
declining jobs more than exits to wage-improving jobs.
The empirical analysis relies on a quasi-experimental variation in benefit duration in Aus-
tria that allows to identify causal effects of extended benefit duration on non-employment du-
ration and survivor functions. Overall, extending PBD by 9 weeks prolongs non-employment
by around 0.6 weeks. Analyzing the effect of increases PBD on survivor functions reveals that
the maximum contributions to the prolonged non-employment duration are observed between
30 and 39 weeks, the period between the two benefit exhaustion dates. The decomposition
of the overall effects into contributions from exits to wage-improving and wage-declining jobs
shows that the major contributions come from exits to wage-declining jobs. Exits to wage-
declining jobs contribute to virtually all of the total effect on non-employment, with its largest
effects in the time period from 30 to 39 weeks. Investigating job finding hazards directly while
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controlling for unobserved heterogeneity points in the same direction: I find larger responses
in terms of exit hazards to wage-declining jobs. Absent a direct effect of extended PBD on the
wage offer distribution, the differential effects between exits to wage-improving and exits to
wage-declining jobs are likely to be driven by the reservation wage choices of job seekers who
exit to wage-declining jobs.
The empirical results show that reservation wages play an important role for job search
behavior. This has potentially important implications for the optimal provision of UI and for
the analysis of welfare. In an influential paper, Shimer and Werning (2007) showed that a
worker’s after-tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information about his welfare.
Extending benefits can be beneficial for aggregate welfare if pre-tax reservation wages are very
responsive to unemployment benefits. Moreover, if reservation wage considerations play a role
for job search, policies that help job seekers to form realistic beliefs about expected wage offers
could help them to make informed reservation wage choices. This could reduce average non-
employment duration and potentially leads to positive effects on total welfare.
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2.A The effect of extended UI duration on unemployment
and job finding hazards
Figure 2.A1 provides first descriptive evidence of the effect of extended UI duration on unem-
ployment hazards and job finding hazards for the first 78 weeks of the unemployment spell.
The figure shows the empirical unemployment hazard rates and the job finding hazards for a
group of job seekers with 30 weeks of benefits (dashed red line) and for a group of job seekers
with 39 weeks of benefits (solid blue line) respectively. For the exit rates from unemployment,
clear spikes around benefit exhaustion are discernible. But analyzing job finding rates rather
than unemployment exit rates shows that spikes nearly disappear. This suggests that a con-
siderable part of the spikes around benefit exhaustion is due to mechanical de-registration
from UI after benefit exhaustion rather than from exits to jobs. Card et al. (2007c) discuss this
issue in more detail.
Figure 2.A2 shows the regression-discontinuity estimates of extended UI duration on (dis-
crete) unemployment hazard rates. The unemployment hazard rate is estimated as the proba-
bility of exiting unemployment in period t given that unemployment lasted until period t. The
effect of extending UI duration by 9 weeks is estimated for each period t ∈ {0, . . . , 78}. Subfigure
2.A2a reports the estimated difference between the unemployment hazard rates of the treated
and the untreated. Extending benefit duration does not affect hazard rates significantly in the
first 26 weeks. After that, the difference in the hazard rates starts to drop below zero reaching
a trough in week 30. The RD estimates highlight that job seekers with 39 weeks of benefits exit
unemployment significantly less than their counterparts with 30 weeks. The trough in period
30 corresponds to the spike around benefit exhaustion for those job seekers with a maximum
of 30 weeks of benefits. The estimated difference stays significantly below zero in the period
from 30 to 38 weeks and switches to a significantly positive effect in the periods 39 and 40.
The peak in period 39 captures the spike around benefit exhaustion for job seekers with 39
weeks of benefits. For durations beyond 40 weeks, the difference between the hazard rates
fluctuates around zero. Because later periods contain less and less observations, estimates
are less and less precisely estimated with increasing duration. Estimating effects rather for
job finding rates (subfigure 2.A2b) instead of unemployment exit rates shows that the peaks
around benefit exhaustion mostly disappear.
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Figure 2.A1: Empirical hazard rates
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Notes: Figure 2.A1 shows unemployment exit and job finding hazards for job
seekers aged between 35 and 40 years old at registration (eligible for 30 weeks of
benefits) and job seekers aged between 40 and 45 years old (eligible for 39 weeks
of benefits).
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Figure 2.A2: Estimated effects for hazard rates
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2.B Additional figures
Figure 2.B1: Covariates around the age threshold
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Figure 2.B1: Covariates around the age threshold (Continued)
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Notes: Figure 2.B1 shows the distribution of covariates as a function of age. The x axis shows age at the start of the
unemployment spell. Each dot corresponds to a bin size of one quarter. A window of 5 years around the threshold is
shown. The vertical line indicates the threshold value at 40 years old. Job seekers to the left of the threshold are entitled
to 30 weeks of unemployment benefits, and job seekers to the right of the threshold are entitled to 39 weeks of benefits.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Figure 2.B2: Probability of exit to wage-declining jobs over spell duration
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Notes: This figure shows how the proability of exiting to a wage-declining job conditional on exiting
evolves over the duration of the spell.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
Figure 2.B3: Average previous wages over the duration of the spell
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Notes: This figure shows average previous wages as a function of the duration of the spell for exits to
wage-improving jobs and exits to wage-declining jobs separately.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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2.C Additional tables
Table 2.C1: RD estimates with controls
Di 0.660***
(0.232)
(Xi − c) 0.282***
(0.065)
Di(Xi − c) 0.223**
(0.111)
Mean past earnings 0.010***
(0.001)
Mean past wage -0.322***
(0.030)
Past unemployment spell 0.050
(0.227)
Work exp. in past 15 years (in weeks) -0.008***
(0.001)
Tenure (in weeks) 0.008***
(0.001)
Severance pay 2.475***
(0.251)
Female 2.490***
(0.175)
Austrian 0.501***
(0.184)
Married -3.161***
(0.142)
Education (reference group is elementary school)
Less than elementary school 3.033***
(0.470)
Apprenticeship/High School -0.769***
(0.134)
University 2.022***
(0.538)
Other -3.515***
(0.217)
Industry (reference group is manufacturing)
Wholesale and retail trade -2.017***
(0.168)
Financial, insurance activities, extraterritorial bodies -1.414***
(0.170)
Transportation -4.633***
(0.266)
Health and social activities -2.126***
(0.256)
Other -2.138***
(0.249)
Industry (reference group is Vienna)
Lower Austria -3.928***
(0.207)
Upper Austria -6.074***
(0.166)
Burgenland -4.681***
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Table 2.C1 – continued
(0.464)
Carinthia -6.613***
(0.267)
Salzburg -8.668***
(0.233)
Styria -3.629***
(0.258)
Tyrol -10.998***
(0.257)
Vorarlberg -3.867***
(0.393)
Unknown -8.409***
(0.409)
Constant 37.477***
(0.719)
Bandwidth 3.456
Obs. 177,800
Clusters 83
Notes: This table shows the RD estimates for non-employment duration including all
control variables. Estimates are calculated using a polynomial p of order 1 and the
optimal bandwidth B. Standard errors clustered by age in parentheses. *** P<0.01 **
P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Chapter 3
How Can Consumers Use Electricity More
Efficiently? Exploring the Role of Information∗
Abstract
This paper describes the results of a randomized field experiment which analyzes the electricity saving potentials
of information. We consider three types of information: (i) real-time feedback on one’s own electricity consumption
using smart metering technology, (ii) personalized electricity savings tips through expert advice, and (iii) social
information about one’s own and a peer households’ electricity consumption. Real-time feedback through smart
meters reduces electricity consumption by 3 to 5 % of daily electricity consumption. Effects are detected shortly
after installation of the in-home displays and persist over the study period. Moreover, we find that the largest
savings are realized in peak hours. At the same time, households substitute part of their electricity consumption
towards low-tariff hours. Social information reduces electricity consumption by around 1.5 % of daily consump-
tion as long as feedback is frequent enough. Expert advice improves the perception of how easy it would be to
improve energy-efficient behavior, but fails to translate into electricity savings. Utility is unaffected by the treat-
ments indicating that the social benefits of improved information may be offset by negative social pressure effects
or the costs of behavioral changes.
JEL Classification: Q48, Q4, C93
Keywords: electricity consumption, field experiment, smart metering, social comparison
∗This chapter is jointly written with Lorenz Goette and Rafael Lalive. Contribution: Research design (jointly with
Lorenz Goette and Rafael Lalive), data preparation, empirical analysis, writing. I would like to thank the steering
committee and the project team of ewz for the implementation and coordination of the field study and for numerous
helpful comments. Financial support from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) project SI/500475-01 is gratefully
acknowledged.
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3.1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the most important economic policy challenges of the 21st century.
Negative environmental externalities of energy consumption such as greenhouse gas emissions
and the risks of nuclear energy - which have been forcefully demonstrated at the nuclear
incident of Fukushima in 2011 - reinforced the need of policies that foster energy conserva-
tion. Exploitation of existing and development of new energy efficiency potentials have recently
become top priorities on the agenda of many OECD countries. Major new energy efficiency
programs are being implemented or discussed, such as the Energy Efficiency Directive in the
European Union, the Clean Energy Future package to exploit the remaining energy efficiency
potential in Australia, or tightened appliance standards in the United States (IEA, 2013). In the
Swiss context, reducing CO2 emissions and phase-out of nuclear power in the medium run are
identified as main challenges in the Energy Strategy 2050. To ensure a secure energy supply,
the Swiss government commits to concentrate on renewable energy sources and hydroelectric
power and to foster energy-efficiency.
Researchers and policymakers have mainly focused on relative prices as main driving force
of energy use. However, pricing instruments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often
been found to be short-lived and difficult to enforce politically (Costa and Kahn, 2013; Cragg
et al., 2013). What is more, pecuniary incentives can completely undo the intended effect of
an intervention if they distort the intrinsic motivation to save energy.1 This is why recently
the focus of energy conservation programs has shifted towards behavioral approaches - such
as the provision of information or social norm feedback. These are potentially effective and
relatively cheap tools to increase energy efficiency (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Gardner
and Stern, 2008; Griskevicius et al., 2008). The recent focus on information as a policy tool
to conserve energy is also reflected in the Energy Efficiency Directive of the European Union:
the directive comprises a commitment for easy and free-of-charge access to data on current
and past energy consumption through individual metering, empowering consumers to better
manage their energy consumption (European Commission, 2012).
This paper describes the results of a randomized controlled field experiment that was de-
signed to evaluate the electricity saving potentials of different types of information. A first group
of participants - the smart metering group - received detailed real-time feedback about their own
electricity consumption using smart metering technology. Each household in this group got
an in-home display that provided real time feedback about current and past electricity con-
sumption. A second group of households - the expert advice group - got an invitation to receive
personalized electricity savings tips through an energy expert. In an about one-hour consulta-
tion at the service center of Zurich’s energy supplier ewz, households could learn about how to
improve energy efficiency in their own households. A third group of households - the social com-
petition group - received social information about one’s own and a peer household’s electricity
1For evidence from other contexts see for example Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997); Mellström and Johannesson
(2008); Ariely et al. (2009); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
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consumption. Household pairs were matched based on pre-treatment electricity consumption.
Both members of each matched pair periodically received electricity statements with their own
and their peer household’s average per-day consumption over the last period and they were
encouraged to use less electricity than their peer household over the whole treatment period of
one year. A fourth group of participants - the social comparison group - also received periodical
statements about their own and their peer household’s electricity consumption with the goal
to consume less electricity than their peer household by the end of the treatment period. The
only difference between social competition and social comparison is that in the latter peers
were drawn from the control group, who did not receive the statements nor did they know that
their electricity consumption was disclosed to the other household.
The empirical analysis provides an impact evaluation of these different types of informa-
tion on short- and medium run electricity consumption. Impacts vary substantially across
treatments and over treatment periods. Detailed real-time feedback through in-home displays
triggers the largest electricity savings with effects varying from 1.5 to over 4 % of daily con-
sumption over the treatment period. An in-depth analysis of the smart metering treatment
shows that electricity conservation starts already shortly after installation of the in-home dis-
plays and persists over the whole treatment period. Breaking the effects down to the hourly
level highlights that while there is some electricity conservation over the whole day, the bulk
of the reductions is realized in peak hours. What is more, households increasingly substi-
tute electricity consumption from high-tariff to low-tariff hours. Social competition generates
savings on the order of 1.5 % of daily consumption. Effects are however only significant as
long as feedback is frequent enough. The social comparison treatment generates effects which
are roughly half of the social competition effects and not significant. However, we find highly
asymmetric effects when splitting the pairs into households who used more than their peers
and households who used less than their peers. Households who cumulatively used more elec-
tricity than their peers in the previous periods reduce their electricity consumption by up to
4 % in the medium-run, whereas the ”better” household stops saving electricity after the first
quarter. Expert advice does not affect electricity savings, but improves the perception of how
easy it would be to improve energy-efficient behavior.
This paper is related to an early literature in environmental psychology which focuses on
behavioral interventions aimed at household energy conservation. Various interventions such
as commitment, goal setting, information or consumption feedback are evaluated and findings
are mixed. Information tends to have positive effect on knowledge levels but does not necessar-
ily change behavior, whereas rewards have effectively encouraged energy savings but only in
the short run. Feedback triggers energy conserving behavior especially when given frequently.
Many of these studies are however based on small samples and solely focus on short-run ef-
fects. Moreover it remains often unclear how the interventions impact onto actual energy use.
Nevertheless they do show proof of concept that feedback about one’s own or other people’s
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behavior could be a potentially efficient and cheap way to foster energy-efficiency.2
A strand of related behavioral economic literature is interested in the power of social norm
information on residential energy conservation. The power of social norm information on one’s
own behavior has been documented in various contexts, such as charitable giving (Frey and
Meier, 2004), voting (Gerber and Rogers, 2009), retirement savings (Duflo and Saez, 2003),
curbside recycling (Schultz, 1999), the reuse of towels in hotels (Goldstein et al., 2008) or the
diffusion of solar panels (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). Ferraro and Price (2013) examined
a large-scale program aimed at reducing residential water demand. They show that social
comparison messages had a greater influence on behavior than simple pro-social messages or
technical information. However, the effectiveness of the messages waned over time.
A number of recent studies evaluate large scale randomized policy programs in the United
States aimed at residential energy conservation. At the core of these policy programs is the
distribution of social norm information through Home Energy Report letters that compare a
household’s energy use with that of similar neighbors. Typically, these letters were augmented
with personalized energy savings tips. Allcott (2011) evaluates a series of these programs and
finds that the average program reduces residential energy consumption by 2 %. To combat
”boomerang” effects, i.e. to avoid households who have been overestimating their energy con-
sumption to increase the unwanted behavior, the Home Energy Reports not only included
descriptive norms about a similar neighbor’s energy use, but were augmented with injunctive
norms, such as smiley emoticons, which convey that energy conservation is pro-social. Despite
the use of injunctive norms in the Home Energy Reports, Ayres et al. (2013) find some evidence
for the ”boomerang” effect in their analysis of two large-scale randomized field experiments.
Allcott and Rogers (forthcoming) evaluate the short-run and the long-run effects of behav-
ioral interventions. They document almost immediate responses after sending out the initial
few Home Energy Reports, which however decay rapidly in the months between the reports.
This cyclical pattern of action and backsliding however attenuates after the first few reports
and what is left is a durable treatment effect. Repeated interventions help individuals to build
up a new capital stock, such as exchanging traditional light bulbs for energy-efficient ones, or
to change their energy use habits, which makes the effect persistent.
Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) examine a natural field experiments in the United Kingdom aimed
at separating the impact of social norms from an information component. Complementing
social norms with information about energy savings possibilities has large positive effects in
the short-run. Over the long run however, the social norms only treatment was equally effective
than the social norms with information treatment. In a second field experiment Dolan and
Metcalfe (2013) investigate the use of online versus offline methods as a way of conveying
information and find that sending social norm information through email is less effective than
through letters. This reflects the importance of how salient a message is to the consumer, which
has been shown in other contexts such as taxation (Chetty et al., 2009), financial markets
2See Abrahamse et al. (2005) for a survey of this early literature.
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(Barber et al., 2005), or up-front appliance costs vs. subsequent electricity costs (Hausman
and Joskow, 1982). See DellaVigna (2009) for a detailed review of that literature.
This field experiment complements the existing literature on the role of feedback for elec-
tricity conservation in several ways: First, our study design distinguishes between different
types of information. Most existing programs study interventions which encompass a mixture
of different types of feedback - typically coupling some form of social norm information with
personalized energy savings tips. Understanding the role of information on electricity con-
sumption however requires a clear distinction between different types of information. Second,
exploiting high-frequency smart meter data allows us to evaluate for the smart metering group
how intensively the in-home display is used, at what time of the day the reductions are typically
realized, and how these patterns of reductions evolve over time. Third, we can link the data
on electricity consumption to very detailed information on participant’s demographics, per-
sonality traits and attitudes which we surveyed before, during and after the treatment period.
Fourth, we provide a measure for consumer welfare using different dimensions of satisfaction
as proxies for the utility of a consumer. Impact evaluations which are solely based on the
administrative cost effectiveness of interventions are incomplete if they fail to account for the
social welfare effects. Finally, observing treatments at different feedback frequencies allows us
to learn about to what extent the feedback frequency plays a role.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 gives an overview of the
experiment. It discusses the possible mechanisms through which the interventions could act,
presents the experimental design, and describes the data. Section 3.3 provides selective de-
scriptive statistics and section 3.4 presents an empirical analysis of the four treatments based
on periodical electricity readings. Section 3.5 discusses the smart metering treatment more
in detail using high frequency smart meter data. Section 3.6 discusses cost effectiveness and
social welfare implications of the interventions and section 3.7 provides summary and implica-
tions of our findings and discusses avenues for future research.
3.2 How does information affect electricity usage?
Subsection 3.2.1 illustrates in a simple conceptual framework the potential mechanisms through
which the information could affect electricity consumption. Subsection 3.2.2 presents the ex-
perimental design and subsection 3.2.3 discusses the data.
3.2.1 Conceptual framework
To understand through which mechanisms the treatments could act, we consider a simple
conceptual framework in the spirit of Levitt and List (2007). Consider an agent with a util-
ity function that is additively separable over two terms: a positive consumption utility from
electricity services ci and a moral cost component Mi, which formalizes the non-pecuniary
costs of electricity use. Electricity services can represent for example warmth or the electric
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power needed to cook or to watch television. The moral costs reflect the negative environmental
externalities of electricity consumption, such as greenhouse gas emissions for example.
The consumption utility from electricity services is an increasing and concave function of
an agent’s electricity input ei and a set of personal characteristics ϕi, that is ci = ci(ei;ϕi).
The moral cost component of an agent is given by Mi = Mi(eˆi, e˜;ϕi) and is a function of his
perceived electricity input, eˆi, a norm electricity use, e˜, and a set of personal characteristics
ϕi. Due to the public goods nature of electricity use, the moral costs component is assumed to
be increasing and convex in the perceived electricity input eˆi and decreasing in e˜. The utility
function of an agent i is specified as
Ui = ci(ei;ϕi)−Mi(eˆi, e˜;ϕi)
The moral cost component M(.) captures the non-pecuniary impact associated with an agent’s
electricity choice and can either reflect the intrinsic motives of an agent to conserve electricity
or the social-reputational motives such as self-image concerns or the perceived social pressure
to adhere to social norms.
What is more, due to limited attention agents fail to observe the true relationship between
electricity input ei and the consumption level of electricity services ci.3 Instead, agents only
imperfectly observe the relationship between electricity input and consumption of electricity
services: As electricity usage is not fully transparent, observing the true electricity input re-
quires attention and knowledge which is limited and the electricity use of the chosen level of
electricity services consumption is thus perceived as eˆi = c−1i (θci;ϕi), with θ ∈ [0, 1]. Whereas
part of residential electricity consumption is immediately visible or perceivable, for example
warmth, electric light or the electric power for the cooking stove, other components of elec-
tricity usage are less visible and more costly to observe, such as hidden stand-by electricity
use. θ reflects the degree of knowledge and attention which is directed towards observing the
true electricity usage. The larger θ, the closer the perceived electricity usage to the true elec-
tricity usage. However, if θ < 1, then agents underestimate the electricity used to produce the
electricity services, which leads to an over-consumption of electricity services.
In this simple framework we can identify different margins through which information could
affect behavior. First, information raises attention towards the usage of electricity resources
and improves knowledge about the less visible components of electricity usage. Feedback
makes the electricity usage more salient and shifts the weight in the utility function more
towards the moral cost component, making previous levels of electricity consumption no longer
desirable. Second, the provision of information could affect electricity usage through social
pressure. Social pressure increases the disutility of any prior consumption level and household
reduce electricity consumption to offset the increased moral costs of electricity usage. Finally,
3Sallee (2013) presents a model of rational inattention for energy efficiency decisions. He argues that energy ef-
ficiency might rationally be ignored by agents for some categories of durable goods, such as automobiles or home
appliances, because the costs of being fully informed may be substantial.
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information could be a helpful tool to illustrate how energy efficiency could be improved at low
cost and without reducing the privately optimal electricity consumption level.
The different mechanisms can have different implications for consumer welfare. On the one
hand, interventions can increase individuals’ utility if they positively resonate with an intrinsic
motivation to save electricity.4 Making one’s own electricity usage salient may facilitate a
utility-improving readjustment of one’s privately optimal electricity consumption level. On the
other hand, welfare gains may be completely undone if the behavioral changes have been
coerced by social pressure. An intervention can then decrease utility and its desirability can
be limited. In the context of charitable giving DellaVigna et al. (2012) showed that the welfare
implication can be negative if an intervention affects behavior mainly through social pressure.
3.2.2 Experimental design
Study population and roll-out. The field experiment took place in Switzerland’s largest city,
Zurich, and was implemented and coordinated by Zurich’s publicly owned energy supplier ewz.
In total, 85,955 households were contacted and invited to participate in the study. Interested
households were asked to register at the study web page and to give their consent to a data
protection statement. After two weeks, households were reminded once about the study, which
doubled the initial response rate. The overall response rate was 8.73 %. At the beginning of
the treatment phase, the study population comprised 5,919 private households living in rented
apartments or owner-occupied dwellings.
Over a total period of 30 months, the study was rolled-out weekly in 26 cohorts of 250
households each. Some meters were not accessible to meter readers and those participants
had to be excluded already at the onset of the study. In the first 12 cohorts we lose a relatively
large number of participants because of that: we observe only between 183 and 201 partici-
pants per cohort at the first reading. For the remaining 14 cohorts, households were already
excluded from the potential study population before they were selected for participation if their
meter was not freely accessible. For these cohorts, we observe between 234 and 247 partic-
ipants per cohort at the first reading. The staggered roll-out of the interventions has several
practical advantages. First, a sequential roll-out is less prone to implementation and coordina-
tion problems. Second, it avoids congestion and interference with ewz’s day-to-day business.
Finally, the sequential roll-out also smooths out seasonal effects, such as vacation periods or
Christmas holidays for example. Each household remained in the study phase for 16 months,
and the additional 14 months are due to the sequential roll-out. The implementation of the
study was tested with a pilot cohort which started in June 2010. The recruitment process for
the first of the 26 actual study cohorts started in January 2011 and the last cohort terminated
the study in December 2012.
4Note that we do not necessarily assume that households are intrinsically motivated to save electricity. If they aren’t,
their utility gain from saving electricity would simply be zero. In the context of our specific sample of participating
households – a selection of households which voluntarily opted into the study – assuming intrinsic motivation to save
electricity is however not unrealistic.
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Treatment groups. The experiment consisted of one control group and four treatment groups.
The control group (G0) serves to identify time effects over the study period. Except for the peri-
odical surveys which have been sent to all study participants, there was no intervention in this
group. The four treatment groups are the following:
G1 Smart metering: This group of households received detailed and continuous feedback on
their electricity consumption using smart metering technology. Households received in-
home displays which allowed them to observe real-time and historical electricity usage,
to measure electricity consumption in a specific measurement period and to set weekly
consumption goals. Figure 3.C2 illustrates the different features of the in-home display.
G2 Expert advice: This group of households received a one-time invitation for expert advice.
Households were invited to ewz’s service center where they were provided with targeted
and personalized recommendations on how to conserve electricity in the household.
G3 Social competition: Each member in this group was matched to another member based
on similar pre-treatment electricity consumption. The two members of each pair received
feedback on the other’s electricity consumption during the past month or quarter. Im-
portantly, the feedback was bi-directional: both sides knew that the other would also see
one’s own consumption. Households were encouraged to compare and compete with the
peer household and to use less electricity over the whole treatment period. Figure 3.C3
shows an example of the information given to a G3 household.
G4 Social comparison: Each member was matched with a household from G0 and could ob-
serve one’s own and the peer household’s electricity consumption during the last month
or quarter. Like in the social competition treatment, households were encouraged to com-
pare and compete with the peer household. However, the feedback was one-directional:
the households in G0 did not know that their consumption was shown to someone else,
and did not see the other’s consumption. Figure 3.C4 shows an example of the informa-
tion given to a G4 household.
Timing of the study. Figure 3.1 shows the timing of the implementation for one cohort. The
timing is defined relative to the last meter reading before the intervention start (T ). The main
intervention steps were the following: Upon invitation around 17 weeks prior to intervention
start (T − 17), interested participants could register on the study homepage. From the pool of
registered households, we randomly selected each week around 250 households for participa-
tion in the study. Around 15 weeks before treatment start (T − 15), households were randomly
assigned to the smart metering group. The traditional meters of these participants were ex-
changed with smart meters that immediately started to record electricity consumption at a
15-minutes frequency. The remaining households were only informed about their participa-
tion in the study at this stage. One week before the start of the intervention (T ), the remaining
participants were assigned to one of the remaining treatment groups or the control group.
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The treatment period started in week T + 1. For the smart metering (G1) treatment, in-home
displays were distributed which enabled households to continuously monitor their electricity
use and to set weekly goals. The G2 group received a one-time invitation for an expert advice
at the service center of ewz aimed at providing them with targeted recommendations on how
to cut down on electricity usage in their households. The social treatment groups G3 and G4
received a first email informing them on their own and their peer households electricity con-
sumption in the pre-treatment period. Over the course of the treatment phase, households in
G3 and G4 received updated information about their own and their peer household’s electricity
consumption monthly during the first quarter, and then quarterly for the rest of the treatment
period.
During the treatment period, ewz read electricity meters first at monthly frequency in the
first quarter after intervention start, then at quarterly frequency for the rest of the treatment
period, allowing us to observe the evolution of treatment effects over the one-year treatment
period. What is more, we sent out comprehensive web surveys to all treatment groups and
the control group prior to, during, and after the treatment period in order to assess whether
treatments affected behavior, attitudes or knowledge of energy-relevant issues. Additionally,
these surveys were used to collect a number of household, socio-demographic and personality
characteristics of the participating individuals.
Figure 3.1: Timing of interventions
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Notes: This figure shows the timing of the most important intervention steps of the study over the implementation phase.
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Randomization and matching procedure. The randomized treatment assignment is based
on a two-step procedure. In the first step, around 15 weeks prior to treatment start, we
assigned households to the smart metering group. Specifically, within each cohort, participants
were sorted according to their electricity consumption in 2009 and assigned to groups of five
participants each. Within each of these groups of five, one household was randomly attributed
to the smart metering group. This mechanism makes sure that the variance in electricity
consumption between the groups is minimized but assignment to treatment is random within
the groups of five. The remaining households were only informed about their participation in
the study at this stage. In the second step of the randomization procedure - one week prior
to treatment start - the remaining around 200 participants per cohort were assigned to the
remaining treatment groups and the control group. Treatment assignment in this second stage
is based on a minimization of the between-group variance of baseline electricity consumption
in the quarter prior to treatment start. The remaining around 200 households per cohort were
sorted in ascending order according to their average pre-treatment electricity consumption
and grouped into brackets of four households each. Within each bracket, households were
randomly selected into one of the remaining treatment groups G2, G3 or G4 or the control
group G0.
Finally, based on a similar pre-treatment consumption in the quarter prior to the inter-
vention start, households in group G3 were matched with a peer household from G3 and
households in group G4 with a peer household from the control group G0. The rationale for
using pre-treatment electricity consumption to match pairs is the following: Electricity usage
depends on a number of observable household characteristics, such as apartment surface,
heating system, number of household members, household income, or the type and number
of appliances in the household, and a number of unobservable characteristics, such as the
household-specific taste for electricity consumption. Matching pairs with respect to baseline
electricity consumption is a simple way of summarizing observed and unobserved characteris-
tics into one single dimension. The drawback of this type of matching is that two households
with similar baseline electricity usage could nevertheless differ substantially in terms of other
observables. If for example a large but extremely energy-conscious household is matched with
a small but energy-wasting household, electricity usage could be comparable, but a compar-
ison between the two members of the pair could be perceived as ”unfair”, because the former
has exhausted all savings potentials already while the latter could easily conserve electricity.
However, because participation was voluntarily, participating households are expected to be
relatively homogeneous with respect to their energy-conscientiousness so that extreme exam-
ples as the above should be relatively rare. Figure 3.2 graphically shows match quality of the
pairs in terms of baseline electricity consumption. On average, match quality is very good. The
mean difference between a household’s and its peer household’s baseline electricity consump-
tion amounts to 0.124 standard deviations. Because pairs had to be matched in cohorts of
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relatively small size, there is however also quite some variability in match quality.5
Figure 3.2: Match quality of household pairs
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Notes: This figure shows the mean of the difference between a household and its peer house-
hold’s baseline electricity consumption normalized by the standard deviation of baseline con-
sumption.
3.2.3 Data
Periodical electricity readings. In addition to the yearly readings, electricity meters of the
participants were read eight times during the 16 months lasting study period. The additional
meter readings were integrated in the usual readings schedule of the meter readers. The
meters were read off for the first time around 13 weeks prior to and for the second time around
one week before the intervention start. Based on these two readings, we calculated average
baseline consumption prior to treatment. After intervention start, meters were read off at a
monthly rhythm - i.e. around 5, 9 and 13 weeks after treatment start - during the first quarter
of the treatment period, and at a quarterly rhythm - i.e. around 26, 39 and 52 weeks after
treatment start - for the remaining study period.
Due to congestion with the daily business of the meter readers, some readings - in particular
for cohorts 8, 12, 16 and 20 - had to be advanced by up to three weeks. In order to guaran-
tee comparability of the meter readings across households, we calculated average electricity
5In terms of other observable household characteristics, the match quality is ambiguous. The mean difference
between household and peer household normalized by the standard deviation is 0.95 for apartment surface, 0.82 for
the number of adult household members and 0.68 for the number of children in the household - differences that
appear rather high. Because these statistics are based on categorical variables, we might classify households as
relatively unequal in terms of the categorical variable, which might not necessarily be true for the underlying variable.
A household with an apartment size of 65 m2 would classify in category 3. If it is matched to a household with
apartment size of 66 m2, then the difference between the two households is relatively large in terms of the categorical
variable, even though differences in the underlying variable are negligible.
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consumption per day (kWh per day) between two different readings t and t− 1 as follows:
Electricity consumption (kWh) per day =
reading (t) - reading (t-1)
number of hours btw. t and t-1
∗ 24
Besides the cumulative electricity level measure in kWh, the raw data contains time stamps
with the exact date and time of the reading, tariff type, tariff class and the anonymous house-
hold identification number, which enables us to link the electricity data with the rich survey
data. The tariff type defines a participant’s power mix, which can contain different shares of
clean energy sources. Households can either opt for one or for a mixture of different tariff
types. Tariff class refers to the off-peak and the peak-hour tariff schemes. Peak-hours are
from Monday through Saturday from 6 am to 10 pm. The remaining hours are off-peak hours
with a more favorable pricing scheme. In order to calculate total electricity use, electricity
consumption is aggregated across tariff types and tariff classes.
The quality of the raw data is very good. Less than 4 % of observations are non-standard and
could potentially lead to measurement error. These non-standard readings mostly occurred
when a meter was either defective, had to be changed or was untraceable. Those readings
usually displayed an aggregate electricity level of 0 and we replaced them with missing values.
In some cases per day electricity consumption was zero or even negative for other reasons
such as meter changes or misreadings.6 We replaced negative values with missing values.
Zero consumption levels were checked case-by-case and replaced by missing values if the zero
consumption was most likely coming from defective meters.7 Finally, from the total number of
readings around 3.4 % had to be discarded because the anonymous household identifier was
missing.
High frequency smart meter records. In addition to the periodical electricity readings, we
observe high-frequency electricity records for households in the smart metering treatment. Due
to delivery delays, most in-home displays could not be installed at the scheduled time. Figure
3.3 illustrates the cumulative number of installations of the in-home displays over the study
period. Only around 8 % of household received the in-home display in the first month after
treatment start. Two months after scheduled intervention start, around one third of house-
holds had an installed smart meter device. After one quarter, around 80 % of households were
equipped with a display. The remaining 20 % of in-home displays were mostly installed by the
end of the second quarter. This shifting of the actual treatment start has important implica-
tions for the short-run analysis of the smart meter treatment using the periodical electricity
readings.
For each household with an installed in-home display, we observe meter readings at a 15-
6In general, the level of the old meters were read off before the change and the level of the new meter was read
off just after the installation. For some records, the old reading was however missing which resulted in a negative
electricity consumption per day.
7Some of the misreadings could be corrected manually, if a confusion of digits was probable. This was the case for
the digits 3 and 8, or 2 and 7 for example. Moreover, some negative consumption levels could be corrected manually,
if the time stamp of the meter reading was not in the correct order.
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Figure 3.3: Installation of in-home displays
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative number of installations of the in-home displays over
the study period.
minute frequency for both high- and low-tariff hours. Because the smart meters already started
to record electricity data around 60 days before the installation of the in-home display, before-
after comparisons within the smart metering group allow us to estimate short-run effects of
smart meters and to analyze where savings come from over the day load profile. 3.5 % of
the observations are recorded prior to the exchange of the traditional meter with the smart
meter and were discarded. For 18 households, the installation date of the in-home displays
was not recorded, but could be reconstructed from the log data of the display. Moreover, the
smart meters failed to record the electricity data properly for nine households and had to be
discarded.
In addition to the electricity records, we also recorded each activity with the in-home display,
so that frequency and use of the display can be linked to the electricity records. We also observe
whether G1 households have set weekly target levels (in kWh per week) and whether these
targets were met.
Survey data. The survey data is based upon six web based questionnaires. The first web
survey was sent to all participants two weeks before treatment start. It contains a broad range
of socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, nationality, education, income, the
number of adults and children in the same household or whether participants are property
owners or renting. Furthermore, a number of household characteristics such as apartment
surface, type of heating and water heating system, as well as existence and use of electricity
intensive appliances are assessed. Participants are also asked to what extent they already
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implemented electricity conserving measures in their household, such as the share of energy
efficient light bulbs and the use of stand-by modes in appliances.
An important part of the surveys captures a wide range of personality measures, attitudes
towards environmental issues, and energy-relevant knowledge.8 Participants were also asked
to give their best estimate for the electricity use of different appliances and the savings potential
of different measures such as drying clothes on a clothes line instead of using the dryer for one
load of laundry for example. A range of questions related to attitudes and energy-relevant
knowledge are borrowed from the Swiss Environmental Survey 2007 (Diekmann et al., 2009)
and a U.S. study that assesses public perceptions of energy consumption and savings (Attari
et al., 2010). The personality measures are based on the 60-item version of the HEXACO
(Ashton and Lee, 2009) and the short version of the big five inventory (Gosling et al., 2003). In
a number of questions we assessed different measures of satisfaction in general, satisfaction
with ewz, and satisfaction with the study.9
Participants were asked to repeatedly answer the same questions about attitudes, energy-
relevant knowledge, use of appliances, and satisfaction over the course of the study period,
which allows us to identify behavioral changes due to the treatments. The response rate of the
pre-treatment survey was around 85 % and slightly decreased to roughly 75 % in the second
and third survey, and to around 68 to 70 % in the fourth to sixth survey.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics. Table 3.1 summarizes baseline electricity per-day electricity consump-
tion, a number of selected socio-demographic characteristics, and pre-treatment knowledge
about energy-relevant topics.10 Columns 1 to 5 show averages for each treatment group, col-
umn 6 depicts the overall average and column 7 contains p-values of a test of equal means
across the groups for each characteristic.
Panel A of the table shows that baseline electricity consumption is well balanced between
control and treatment groups and varies between 5.9 and 6.2 kWh per day across groups.
For context, one kilowatt-hour is enough to run a standard 60-watt light bulb for 17 hours
or to watch television for around seven hours for example. Most cohorts stated the treatment
phase between May and September and therefore experience the high-electricity season in
their second or third quarter of the treatment. Table 3.B1 in the appendix shows that average
electricity consumption peaked in the second quarter. Average annual electricity consumption
is around 2,300 kWh and lies around 300 kWh below average electricity consumption in Zurich
(see Appendix B in Degen et al. (2013)) and much below the US average of 11,280 kWh (Allcott
8Three surveys also contained choice experiments, which we can use to elicit social preferences, participant’s ten-
dency to overestimate themselves and time preferences. See subsection 3.A for details about the choice experiments.
9The full list of the questions of all six web surveys (in German) can be found in Degen et al. (2013).
10Tables 3.B4 to 3.B6 present descriptive statistics for a more exhaustive number of household and individual
characteristics. These tables confirm that the randomization of treatment assignment has worked very well with
respect to a large number of characteristics.
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and Rogers, forthcoming). A possible explanation for this could be that participation in the
study was voluntary and might predominantly have attracted energy-conscious households.
Panel B summarizes a selection of socio-demographic variables: Participants are on average
in their late 30ties and around 37 % of participants are female. The study participants are on
average well educated and high-earners: Around 44 % of participants have a university degree
and net household income is on average between 7,000 and 9,000 Swiss francs per month. The
average household has around 2 members with an apartment size of around 80 m2. Because
single family house owners were excluded from the study, it is not surprising that almost 90
% of participants are renting an apartment and only 10 % are living in their own dwelling. The
sociodemographic items are well balanced across treatment groups.
Panel C shows average attitudes and knowledge about energy-relevant topics. Mean at-
titudes is an average over ten items that cover participants’ attitudes about environmental
issues. Higher values indicate more energy-oriented values and attitudes. The average of all
ten attitude dimensions is almost 3.8, indicating that participants have on average an environ-
mental friendly attitude. Mean risk perception is the average perception of six dimensions of
risk, such as the risks of nuclear power or genetic engineering for example. High values are as-
sociated with large perceived risks. With an overall average of around 3.5, participants perceive
the six dimensions as relatively large risks. Mean energy-efficiency potential measures the av-
erage potential to change energy-efficient behavior in the household, such as drying clothes on
a clothes line instead of using the dryer or increasing the temperature of the fridge by 1◦ C.
Low values indicate that households can easily change their energy efficient behavior or already
did it. High values indicate that changes are difficult or not possible. The average potential
to change energy efficient behavior is 1.8. Participants thus perceive it as relatively easy to
change their energy efficient behavior in the household already before the interventions. More-
over, participants answered on average 3.4 out of 7 questions related to electricity consumption
of different appliances, and 1.1 out of 4 questions related to electricity conservation correctly,
which is above what we would expect had they randomly ticked one of the answer options. The
test of equality of means is rejected at the 1 % level for the mean energy-efficiency potential.
Households in the expert advice group perceive it slightly more difficult and households in the
social competition group slightly less difficult to change energy-efficient behavior. Further-
more, households in the smart metering group are slightly more environmentally friendly than
their counterparts. Absolute differences are however small.
Finally, panel D summarizes a selection of satisfaction dimensions. High values stand for
high satisfaction levels. Participants are very satisfied with their life and their quality of life
and think that the study addresses an interesting topic. Satisfaction with the environment and
the electricity prices of ewz is a bit lower but still at a relatively high level. Treatment groups
are well balanced with respect to their satisfaction levels.
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Table 3.1: Selected descriptive statistics
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
A. Baseline electricity usage
Baseline electricity usage (kWh
per day)
6.107 5.990 6.220 5.879 5.953 6.031 0.239
B. Individual and household characteristics
Agea 3.840 3.918 3.935 3.867 3.848 3.882 0.306
Female 0.361 0.365 0.386 0.368 0.383 0.372 0.726
Tertiary education 0.442 0.459 0.425 0.441 0.421 0.437 0.369
Household incomeb 6.574 6.389 6.311 6.179 6.374 6.366 0.098
Household size 2.128 2.064 2.073 2.082 2.080 2.086 0.732
Apartment surfacec 4.332 4.323 4.289 4.272 4.248 4.293 0.512
Renting 0.888 0.890 0.900 0.905 0.906 0.898 0.581
C. Attitudes and knowledge
Mean attitudesd 3.802 3.862 3.777 3.792 3.815 3.81 0.012
Mean risk perceptione 3.474 3.508 3.471 3.492 3.496 3.488 0.614
Mean energy-efficiency potentialf 1.806 1.803 1.852 1.773 1.801 1.807 0.005
Knowledge (consumption)g 3.424 3.445 3.344 3.401 3.377 3.398 0.479
Knowledge (conservation)h 1.069 1.114 1.115 1.194 1.074 1.113 0.091
D. Satisfactioni
. . . with life 4.204 4.194 4.206 4.179 4.208 4.198 0.869
. . . with environment 3.502 3.484 3.519 3.523 3.485 3.503 0.741
. . . with life quality 4.230 4.232 4.214 4.204 4.211 4.219 0.893
. . . with ewz’s electricity prices 3.936 3.952 3.981 3.963 3.924 3.951 0.617
. . . with study: interesting topic 4.619 4.661 4.625 4.580 4.613 4.620 0.122
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 show averages of the items for groups G0 to G4. Column 6 shows the average across all groups and
column 7 displays the p-values of an F-test of inequality of means across groups.
a 1 = 0-19 years; 2 = 20-29 years; 3 = 30-39 years; 4 = 40-49 years; 5 = 50-64 years; 6 = 65+ years
b 1 = < CHF 3,000; 2 = CHF 3,000-3,999; 3 = CHF 4,000-4,999; 4 = CHF 5,000-5,999; 5 = CHF 6,000-6,999; 6 = CHF 7,000-7,999;
7 = CHF 8,000-8,999; 8 = CHF 9,000-9,999; 9 = CHF 10,000-11,999; 10 = CHF 12,000-14,999; 11 = ≥ CHF 15,000
c 1 = < 15m2; 2 = 15-40m2; 3 = 41-65m2; 4 = 66-80m2; 5 = 81-115m2; 6 = > 115m2
d 1 = ”Do not agree” and 5 = ”Agree”
e 1 = ”No risk” and 5 = ”Large risk”
f 1 = "Do it already"; 2 = "Easy"; 3 = "Rather difficult"; 4 = "Very difficult"; 5 = "Not possible"
g Maximum score is 7
h Maximum score is 4
i 1 = "Not satisfied" and 5 = "Very satisfied"
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
Attrition and representativeness of the sample. We observe electricity consumption for
5,919 households at the beginning of the treatment phase. Table 3.B2 in the appendix shows
the number of participating households across treatment groups and periods. In the pre-
treatment period (Pre), we observe between 1,166 and 1,207 households per group. The num-
ber of observations drops to between 1,009 and 1,082 observations per group by the end of
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the intervention period (Q4). Attrition is slightly higher in G1 (14 %), G3 (13 %) and G4 (14 %)
than in G0 (11 %) or G2 (10 %). Attrition can have different sources: The three most prominent
sources of attrition are moving, technical problems with the meter readings and opting-out due
to lost interest. Naturally, the two former sources of attrition are not caused by the treatment,
whereas the latter possibly is. Unfortunately, the source of the attrition was recorded only
for around a quarter of all drop-outs. Among these, around two thirds of drop outs are due
to relocation, around 18 % were due to lost interest and 15 % had do be dropped because of
technical problems with the meters, including households which had to be dropped because
their meter was not freely accessible.
Table 3.2 compares the means of a number of selected characteristics for households who
stayed in the study until the end of the treatment phase and for households who dropped out of
the study at some point earlier. Panel A highlights that stayers had on average a higher baseline
consumption than drop-outs. Clearly, households with higher baseline usage might also have
larger savings potentials. If participants with lower per-day consumption dropped from the
study because they believed their electricity conservation potential already to be exhausted
and thus were no longer interested in participating in the study. Selection of this kind could
positively bias our estimates.
Panel B shows how stayers and drop-outs differ with respect to a number of individual and
household characteristics. Stayers are on average older than drop-outs, are more less to have
a university degree, live in larger apartments, and are more likely to own their dwelling instead
of renting it. These are all attributes which decrease mobility. In line with this pattern, All-
cott (2011) found that moving households had smaller electricity consumption, were younger,
lived in smaller homes, were more likely to rent and had lower incomes, whereas households
who opted out had on average higher baseline electricity consumptions and were older. The
observed difference in baseline electricity consumption between stayers and drop-outs is pre-
sumably driven to a large extend by differential characteristics of movers versus stayers. Selec-
tive drop-out of households who lost their interest in participating should therefore play only a
second order role.
Panel C shows that stayers and drop-outs do not differ with respect to their attitudes and
their knowledge. Drop-outs however perceive it on average slightly easier to change their
energy-efficient behavior. This could indicate that on average, drop-outs are already more
energy-efficient and lose the interest to participate in the study because they do not feel that
they would acquire new information which could help them to conserve electricity. Absolute
differences are however too small to bias the estimates.
Finally, panel D shows differences in satisfaction. Stayers and drop-outs do not differ with
respect to their general satisfaction with life, the environment and the quality of life. Also, they
do not differ with respect to their interest in the study. They do however differ slightly with
respect to their satisfaction with ewz’s electricity prices. Drop-outs are less satisfied with the
electricity prices than stayers, but again, absolute differences are small.
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Table 3.B3 provides further evidence that selective drop-outs are not a first order issue.
The table shows mean baseline electricity consumption for stayers and for drop-outs for all
groups. If drop-out was selective due to the treatment, then we would not expect differences
in baseline electricity consumption in the control group. We however observe differences in
the same order of magnitude for the control group as for the treatment groups, which speaks
against the presence of important selection effects.
Table 3.2: Attrition bias
Characteristics
Drop-
outs
Stayers Total
p-
value
A. Baseline electricity usage
Baseline electricity usage (kWh per day) 5.678 6.082 6.031 0.008
B. Individual and household characteristics
Age 3.4 3.947 3.882 0.000
Female 0.388 0.37 0.372 0.409
Tertiary education 0.467 0.433 0.437 0.080
Household income 6.335 6.37 6.366 0.796
Household size 2.035 2.093 2.086 0.234
Apartment surface 4.012 4.331 4.293 0.000
Renting 0.952 0.89 0.898 0.000
C. Attitudes and knowledge
Mean attitudes 3.816 3.809 3.81 0.772
Mean risk perception 3.455 3.493 3.488 0.153
Mean energy-efficiency potential 1.762 1.813 1.807 0.011
Knowledge (consumption) 3.387 3.4 3.398 0.825
Knowledge (conservation) 1.101 1.115 1.113 0.758
D. Satisfaction
. . . with life 4.216 4.196 4.198 0.496
. . . with environment 3.46 3.508 3.503 0.169
. . . with life quality 4.193 4.222 4.219 0.386
. . . with ewz’s electricity prices 3.885 3.96 3.951 0.069
. . . with study: interesting topic 4.592 4.624 4.62 0.309
Notes: This table shows means of a number of individual and household characteristics across groups for
stayers, drop-outs and overall. Stayers are participants who stayed in the study until the end. Drop-outs
are participants who dropped out of the study at some point prior to study end.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity meter readings.
Table 3.3 analyzes the representativeness of the study population with respect to the pop-
ulation in the city of Zurich, the average of the six largest Swiss cities11 and Switzerland as a
11The largest Swiss cities are Basel, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Winterthur and Zurich.
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whole. Females are clearly underrepresented in the study population. Only around 37 % of the
study participants are female compared to 51 % in Zurich, the largest Swiss cities and Switzer-
land. The study population is not representative of Zurich with respect to the age structure
neither. Young persons from 0 to 19 years and the 65 years and older are underrepresented.
The relative lack of young persons in the study might be due to individuals below 19 mostly
still living at their parent’s home. The relative lack of elderly participants might be explained by
the fact that we required participants to have access to the Internet regularly, which might be
less true for elderly persons. Consequently, the 30 to 39 years old, the 40 to 49 years old and
the 50 to 64 years old are overrepresented among the study population. Because German was
the only language of correspondence, language barriers might explain why Swiss and German
citizens were overrepresented, whereas other nations were underrepresented.
Table 3.3: Representativeness of the study population
Study
population
Zurich
Largest
Swiss cities
Switzerland
Gender (in %)
Female 37.44 50. 71 51.61 50. 73
Male 62.56 49. 29 48.39 49. 27
Age (in %)
0-19 0.18 16.20 17.19 20.87
20-29 13.78 14.54 14.80 12.79
30-39 29.89 20.60 18.38 13.90
40-49 23.08 15.72 15.43 16.33
50-64 21.19 16.18 16.99 19.22
65+ 11.88 16.76 17.20 16.90
Nationality (in %)
Swiss 81.65 69.50 67.17 77.6
German 10.94 7.78 5.06 3.35
Italian 1.45 3.49 4.10 3.65
Portuguese 0.15 2.16 3.27 2.7
Serbian 0.15 1.60 1.52 1.55
Other 5.66 15.47 18.87 11.16
Notes: This table shows averages of a number of socio-demographic characteristics for the study
population, the population of Zurich, the average population of Switzerland’s largest cities and
Switzerland as a whole
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
3.4 Analysis of the electricity readings
In this section we discuss the empirical results of the different treatments. Subsection 3.4.1
discusses identification and the empirical specification. Subsection 3.4.2 presents the short-
run causal effects of the interventions and subsection 3.4.3 the medium-run effects. Subsec-
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tion 3.4.4 discusses the issue of heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to a number of
observed characteristics.
3.4.1 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis is based on a randomized difference-in-differences design with four
treatment groups and one control group. In order to discuss estimation and identification, let
Y1i be the electricity consumption of a treated individual after the start of the intervention, and
Y0i the electricity consumption of an untreated individual after the intervention. Di is a dummy
which equals one if an household was treated and zero otherwise. The observed outcome after
treatment can be written as Yi = DiY1i + (1−Di)Y0i. The average treatment effect on the treated
is given by
E(Y1i − Y0i | Di = 1) = E(Y1i | Di = 1)− E(Y0i | Di = 1)
Under the assumption of parallel time trends of treatment and control groups in absence of
the treatment, the average treatment effect on the treated can be estimated in a difference-in-
differences framework. Because selection into the treatment groups was random, there is no
reason why this identification assumption should be violated. In table 3.1 and tables 3.B4 to
3.B6 we provided evidence that the randomization procedure worked well and that treatment
and control groups are very similar with respect to a large number of characteristics and traits.
From the above considerations, we develop the following primary empirical specification:
∆eit = β0 + γ
′Ti + β′1(ei0 ×Qi) + ωw(t) + εit (3.1)
where ∆eit = eit − ei0 denotes the change in electricity consumption of household i at mea-
surement t relative to the baseline measurement prior to treatment. By considering changes
in electricity consumption rather than levels we eliminate household-specific differences in the
electricity level which improves estimation precision a lot. Ti is a vector of the four treatment
dummies, which takes the value of one for the treatment groups only in the after treatment
period. ei0 is the baseline electricity consumption of individual i, Qi is a set of dummies for
each quarter after treatment start, and ωw(t) capture calendar week fixed effects. These week
fixed effects take the value one if a week falls within a given measurement period t and zero
otherwise.The inclusion of week fixed effects is not necessary for identification, because the
staggered roll-out of the cohorts over time should already eliminate seasonal and other time ef-
fects which affect all treatment groups and the control group equally. However, including them
can increase precision of the estimation results. β0 measures the average change in electricity
consumption in the control group, and β′1 estimates how electricity consumption grows as a
function of baseline consumption ei0. By interacting baseline consumption with a set of quarter
dummies, we allow baseline consumption to affect electricity consumption growth differently
over the different treatment periods. Again, the inclusion of baseline electricity consumption
is not needed for identification, but can improve estimation precision somewhat. Finally, γ′
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measures the average treatment effect on the treated. The treatment effects are estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) and we take into account potential heteroskedasticity and clus-
tering on the household level by using cluster-robust standard errors.
3.4.2 Short-run analysis
We begin by estimating the average treatment effects on the treated in the first quarter of the
treatment period. Table 3.4 shows the estimation results. Column 1 and 2 show average elec-
tricity consumption in kWh per day in the baseline period and the first quarter respectively for
all treatment groups and the control group. Columns 3 and 4 show across and within differ-
ences in electricity consumption, that is the difference between the consumption level in the
first quarter (Q1) and the baseline consumption (Pre). Across differences are calculated as the
simple difference of the two averages in columns 1 and 2, whereas within differences are cal-
culated as the averaged differences between Q1 and baseline electricity consumption for each
household. By considering within instead of across differences, the precision of the estimates
is improved by a factor of around 3.5. Column 5 shows the difference-in-differences estimate
based on differencing the within differences of treatment and control group. Column 6 presents
the difference-in-differences estimates based on the estimation which additionally controls for
weekly effects and column 7 controls for baseline electricity consumption in addition to the
weekly fixed effects and represents the specification of equation 3.1.12
The smart metering group (G1) reduced electricity consumption on average by 0.101 kWh
per day in the first quarter after the scheduled treatment start. This effect is at the margin of
being statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.58. The non-significance of the short-run
effect for the smart metering group is however not surprising: As discussed in subsection 3.2.3
many in-home displays were installed with a delay of three months or more due to logistic
problems. Many households thus have not been actually treated in the first two to three
months after the scheduled treatment start, which makes a short-run analysis of the smart
metering group based on the periodical electricity records a challenge. The short run effects
of the smart meters can however be identified using the high-frequency smart meter data.
Estimates based on smart meter data will be discussed in section 3.5.
Expert advice (G2) did not change electricity savings in the short run. The point estimate is
even slightly positive but far from being statistically significant. Rather than interpreting the
effect as average treatment effects on treated, the estimates could be taken as intent-to-treat-
effects, because around two thirds of participants did not make use of the invitation. Figure
3.C1 shows the cumulative take-up rate of expert advice which tops out at around one third.
Sending out electricity statements with one’s own and a peer household’s electricity con-
sumption triggered electricity savings on the order of 0.105 kWh per day for the social competi-
12Controlling for seasonal effects changes point estimates quite substantially for the smart metering group. Because
in-home displays were mostly distributed with a delay of three months or more, the actual treatment did not start in
the first month after the scheduled treatment start for most households in the smart metering group, which makes a
seasonal correction important.
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tion group (G3). A reduction of this magnitude corresponds to roughly 1.7 % of daily consump-
tion or is equivalent to turning off a 60-watt light bulb for 1 hour and 45 minutes per day.
Social comparison (G4) generated small but statistically non-significant savings. The social
competition and social comparison treatment only differ from each other in how information
is disclosed to the peer households: whereas in the social competition treatment households
knew that their electricity consumption was disclosed to their peer households and vice versa,
households in the social comparison treatment knew that their electricity consumption was not
shown to their peer households. Knowing that one’s own electricity consumption is shown to
their peers could have provoked a feeling of competition among the two households or increased
social pressure.
Table 3.4: Short-run difference-in-differences estimates
Pre Q1 ∆across ∆within ∆∆within ∆∆within ∆∆within
G1: Smart metering 5.99 6.227 0.237 0.26 -0.059 -0.101 -0.101
(0.117) (0.117) (0.166) (0.05 ) (0.068) (0.064) (0.064)
[N=1176] [N=3387]
G2: Expert advice 6.22 6.572 0.352 0.346 0.027 0.017 0.019
(0.126) (0.137) (0.186) (0.044) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061)
[N=1207] [N=3600]
G3: Social competition 5.879 6.108 0.229 0.222 -0.097 -0.104 -0.105
(0.1) (0.106) (0.145) (0.042) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059)
[N=1166] [N=3430]
G4: Social comparison 5.953 6.261 0.308 0.29 -0.029 -0.026 -0.027
(0.1) (0.112) (0.15 ) (0.042) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059)
[N=1173] [N=3444]
G0: Control group 6.107 6.426 0.319 0.319
(0.112) (0.123) (0.167) (0.046)
[N=1197] [N=3539]
Weekly FE - - - - No Yes Yes
Baseline consumption - - - - No No Yes
Notes: This table shows average electricity consumption (kWh per day) for the pre-treatment period (column 1) and the first
quarter after treatment start (column 2) for all treatment groups. Columns 3 and 4 show the across and within differences
for each treatment group. Columns 5 to 7 displays diff-in-diff estimates with and without weekly fixed effects and baseline
consumption as additional controls. Standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
3.4.3 Medium-run analysis
We now turn to a discussion of the medium-run effects of the treatments. Figures 3.4 to 3.6
show the evolution of the treatment effect over the whole treatment period. The point estimates
at the different measurement periods are based on the econometric specification discussed in
equation 3.1 and are shown together with the 90 and 95 % confidence intervals.
Figure 3.4 confirms, that electricity savings are not significant in the first quarter for the
households in the smart metering treatment. However, as soon as almost all in-home displays
were rolled out, we start to detect effects on the order of -0.25 kWh per day. A reduction
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of this order corresponds to a reduction of around 4 % of average daily consumption (2,351
kWh per year divided by 365.25). An effect of this magnitude compares to each household
turning off four light bulbs for an hour or turning off television for 1 hour and 45 minutes
per day. The effect size is very comparable to those found in existing studies. Based on an
evaluation of existing pilot studies with comparable study populations, Baeriswyl et al. (2012)
evaluate the savings potential of smart metering between 1.2 and 3.7 % depending on the type
of feedback. Moreover, observing the treatment effects over a longer period highlights that the
savings effects persist over time and no sign of fading out is observed.
Figure 3.4: Main effects for smart metering group
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Notes: The figure show the average treatment effect on the treated together with
the 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
Figure 3.5 shows the medium-run effects of inviting participants for an expert advice ses-
sion at ewz’s service center. Expert advice did not induce households to save electricity neither
in the short-run nor in the medium-run. Treatment effects are close to zero or even positive
and not statistically significant in all periods. Finding no effects for this treatment can have
different reasons: First, take-up was relatively low. Only one third of participants chose to fol-
low the invitation. Take-up could possibly have been increased if electricity advice would have
been offered at the homes of participants instead asking participants to come to the service
center. Second, expert advice might have increased knowledge without necessarily translating
into electricity savings. Table 3.B8 in the appendix shows that expert advice improved house-
holds perception of how easy they could change energy-efficient behavior in the household.
Households with the expert advice treatment - unlike the other treatment groups - perceive it
as easier to exchange most of the traditional light bulbs for energy-saving light bulbs or to dry
clothes on a clothes line instead of using a dryer. However, households failed to translate the
improved knowledge into concrete actions. An effective intervention should help households
to bridge the gap from knowledge to behavior, possibly by combining expert advice with other
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types of feedback.
Figure 3.5: Main effects for expert advice group
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Notes: The figure show the average treatment effect on the treated together with
the 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
The medium-run effects of the social information treatments are assessed in figure 3.6.
Subfigure 3.6a shows the average effects for social competition. The marginally significant
short-run electricity savings of the social competition group level off in the medium-run with a
point estimate virtually reaching zero after three quarters. In the fourth quarter, however, we
observe again savings on the order of 1.5 % of daily consumption significant at the 10 % level.
This backsliding of the savings effects until the third quarter and the reinforcement in the
last quarter can have different explanations. First, it underlines the importance of feedback
frequency. Electricity savings are significantly negative in the social competition group as
long as feedback is given at a monthly frequency, but leveled out when the feedback rhythm
changed to a quarterly frequency. Second, this cyclical pattern of action and backsliding might
be explained by the competitive element of this intervention: households might have reinforced
their savings effort towards the end of the treatment period in a last attempt to ”win” the
competition.
Subfigure 3.6b illustrate average treatment effects for the social comparison group. Point
estimates are negative but small and never statistically significant over the whole treatment
period. Finding no average savings effects for the social comparison group can have different
reasons. On the one hand, the treatment was maybe not strong enough, that is receiving so-
cial norm information might just not have induced households enough to achieve significant
electricity savings. On the other hand, averaging effects over the whole group might mask
asymmetric effects within pairs. Clearly, the response to the treatments can be asymmetric
depending on whether one’s own consumption was above or below the peer’s electricity con-
sumption in the previous periods. Households who used cumulatively less electricity in the
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previous periods than their peers do not have strong incentives to reduce their electricity con-
sumption even more.13 Households, however, who used cumulatively more electricity in the
previous periods might react more to the treatments due to social pressure or because they
want to turn around the result and ”win” the competition.
Figure 3.6: Main effects of social information groups
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(a) Social competition
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Notes: The figure show the average treatment effect on the treated together with the 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
Figure 3.7 shows the medium-run treatment effects split by the cumulative previous elec-
tricity consumption. Cumulative previous electricity consumption is the sum of the average
per day consumptions until the period prior to the one under study. The blue solid line shows
treatment effects for households with higher cumulative electricity together with the 90 % and
95 % confidence intervals. The dashed yellow line depicts treatment effects for households
who cumulatively used less electricity consumption than their peer household.14 In the social
competition group (subfigure 3.7a), both households with higher and households with lower
cumulative electricity consumption react similarly to the social information letters. The reac-
tion of the high users is however more pronounced than the low users’ reaction in the first
quarter and the fourth quarter. However, in the social comparison treatment (subfigure 3.7b),
clear differential medium-run trends can be identified: while households with lower cumula-
tive consumption save more electricity in the first quarter, households with higher cumulative
consumption start to react to the treatment predominantly in the third and fourth quarter.
Savings in the third and fourth quarter are significant and on the order of -0.25 kWh per day
or 4 % of daily usage for households with a higher cumulative electricity consumption up until
the period prior to the one under study.
13Apart from the color in which the cumulative percentage difference between one’s own and the peer’s electricity
consumption was displayed– switching from green if one household was using less electricity than the other to red
if one household was using more electricity than the other – the social information letters did not contain injunctive
norms appealing to the pro-sociality of electricity conservation.
14Averaging over the higher and lower group does not exactly yield the average effects we showed in figure 3.6
because the latter is based on the totality of observations whereas here we discarded 3.5 % of observations where
partner consumption was missing. Partner consumption might be missing if one of the two households in a pair
dropped from the study.
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These asymmetric effects are interesting in two aspects: First, we do find tendencies of a
”boomerang” effect especially in the social comparison group: the ”better” households stop sav-
ing electricity in the medium-run or even consume more. To some degree but less pronounced
this behavior is also observed in the social competition group. Second, the differential effects
across households with higher versus households with lower cumulative electricity consump-
tion suggests that social pressure and self-reputational motives could have played a vital role
and that the treatment increased the perceived pressure to reduce electricity among house-
holds who used more than their peers and coerced them into behavioral changes.
Figure 3.7: Effects by relative position within matched pair: higher versus lower
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(a) Social competition
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(b) Social comparison
Notes: The figure show the average treatment effect on the treated together with the 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals.
The treatment effects are split by cumulative previous electricity consumption
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity of treatment effects
While the empirical focus has been on average treatment effects on the treated so far, the
conceptual framework suggests that treatment effects could vary across households as a func-
tion of personal and household characteristics. Table 3.5 shows how treatment effects vary
by a number of observed characteristics. In contrast to the analysis in subsection 3.4.3 the
medium-run treatment effects are averaged over the second to fourth quarter of the treatment
phase. The heterogeneity estimates are based on the following augmented specification:
∆eit = β0 + γ
′
0Ti + γ
′
1(Ti × (xi − x¯)) + β1(xi − x¯) + β′2(ei0 ×Qi) + ωw(t) + εit , (3.2)
where (xi − x¯) represents a given observed trait which is centered to the mean. γ′0 now
measures the average response of the treatment and γ′1 measures how the response of the
treatment varies with trait xi. Finally, β1 measures how electricity consumption changes as a
function of trait xi
Column 1 in table 3.5 presents the main estimates. In accordance with the graphical rep-
resentation of the medium-run estimates above, estimates are significant only for the social
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competition treatment in the first quarter. In the second to fourth quarter, the average ef-
fect of the in-home displays amounts to -0.244 kWh per day, whereas the effects of the other
treatments are not significant.
A first source of potential heterogeneity is baseline electricity consumption. Households
with high baseline electricity consumption could have larger savings potentials and reduce
their consumption at lower cost. Also, social information could have differential effects for
households in different parts of the pre-treatment electricity usage distribution. Social pres-
sure could affect households in the upper part of the distribution more than households in the
lower part of the distribution. Estimates show that households with larger baseline electricity
consumption react more to the smart metering treatment only in the first quarter. For the
other treatments no clear relationship is discernible. While higher baseline consumption tends
to strengthen electricity conservation in the social competition group, effects are positive but
negligible for the social comparison and the expert advice groups.
Treatment response could also vary by age. The theoretical predictions are however ambigu-
ous: On the one side, one could expect older participants to react less to treatments, because
they are less used to modern technologies and therefore might use the in-home displays less
frequently or check their email less frequently and are more likely to miss the social informa-
tion email. On the other side, older participants - in particular participants above retirement
age - might have more free time to devote to the interventions which could reinforce electricity
conservation. The empirical findings are mixed. While older participants tend to react more
to the in-home display both in the short- and the medium-run, age reduces electricity conser-
vation for the social competition treatment in the first quarter. Treatment effects do not differ
with respect to gender, education and household income.
In summary, treatment effects are surprisingly homogeneous over the population. Espe-
cially in the medium-run, we do not find much evidence that treatment effects vary substan-
tially with respect to different observables. If anything, higher baseline consumption and age
tend to reinforce electricity conservation especially early in the treatment phase. Interestingly,
the main effects become larger once we include interactions with age, female, education and
household income. This points towards some selection effects with respect to households who
responded to the questionnaires and those who did not. Households who responded to the
surveys are potentially more interested in the study and thus might have reacted more to the
interventions.
112
Table 3.5: Difference-in-differences estimates for electricity consumption (kWh per day)
Main Baselinecons. Age Female
Tertiary
education
Household
income
Quarter 1
Smart metering (G1) -0.101 -0.106* -0.100 -0.105 -0.099 -0.073
(0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
Expert advice (G2) 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.029 0.026 -0.017
(0.061) (0.059) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.066)
Social competition (G3) -0.105* -0.108* -0.099 -0.099 -0.099 -0.094
(0.059) (0.060) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.067)
Social comparison (G4) -0.027 -0.022 -0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.076
(0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066)
G1 × Trait -0.113* -0.108** -0.023 0.201 0.008
(0.068) (0.044) (0.145) (0.125) (0.023)
G2 × Trait 0.008 0.035 -0.071 -0.007 0.018
(0.039) (0.042) (0.110) (0.111) (0.022)
G3 × Trait -0.050 0.071* 0.043 0.093 -0.009
(0.048) (0.042) (0.113) (0.109) (0.023)
G4 × Trait 0.016 0.047 -0.051 0.044 -0.013
(0.040) (0.042) (0.110) (0.108) (0.022)
Quarters 2 to 4
Smart metering (G1) -0.244*** -0.245*** -0.305*** -0.311*** -0.307*** -0.272***
(0.059) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Expert advice (G2) 0.028 0.026 0.004 0.010 0.007 -0.037
(0.060) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
Social competition (G3) -0.056 -0.054 -0.074 -0.076 -0.073 -0.046
(0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069)
Social comparison (G4) -0.062 -0.059 -0.112* -0.111* -0.112* -0.139**
(0.055) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.060)
G1 × Trait -0.069 -0.091** 0.037 0.134 0.015
(0.047) (0.042) (0.122) (0.115) (0.020)
G2 × Trait 0.000 0.006 -0.101 0.109 0.028
(0.037) (0.043) (0.121) (0.114) (0.021)
G3 × Trait -0.012 -0.001 -0.080 0.080 -0.001
(0.046) (0.047) (0.120) (0.118) (0.024)
G4 × Trait 0.018 -0.019 -0.113 0.046 0.016
(0.028) (0.038) (0.109) (0.105) (0.019)
Observations 33,398 33,398 28,308 28,072 28,290 25,378
Clusters 5,876 5,876 4,962 4,920 4,959 4,446
R2 0.105 0.112 0.114 0.112 0.113 0.117
Notes: Standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1. This table shows average
difference-in-differences estimates in the first quarter and the second to fourth quarter respectively. Column 1 presents main
estimates and columns 2 to 6 shows estimates which are allowed to vary with respect to a number of observed characteristics.
All estimates include weekly FE and baseline consumption interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors clustered by
household in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
3.5 Analysis of the smart meter data
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This section discusses the effects of real-time feedback using only the high frequency smart
metering data to identify treatment effects. Subsection 3.5.1 discusses the empirical specifica-
tion, subsection 3.5.2 presents a descriptive analysis of the usage of the in-home displays and
subsection 3.5.3 discusses the aggregate effects of the smart metering treatment. Subsection
3.5.4 the overall effects are broken down to the hourly level.
3.5.1 Empirical strategy
The fact that the smart meters started to record electricity consumption at a high frequency
around 60 days before treatment start, i.e. before the in-home displays were installed, helps
us to identify the effects of the smart meters using only the smart metering data. A pure
before-after comparison of households would mix treatment effects with time effects. It is thus
critical that we can control for time effects using households as a control group whose in-
home displays were not installed yet, but whose smart meter was already recording electricity
consumption. This is possible because households were randomly attributed to the cohorts so
that the timing of the installation is random. Clearly we can identify treatment effects only in
periods where there is a fraction of households whose displays are not installed yet. As soon
as all displays are installed, it is no longer possible to disentangle treatment effects from pure
time effects. Figure 3.8 shows the share of households without installed display over time.
Because the households of the pilot cohort are included in the sample, the share proportion of
households without in-home display initially drops from 1 to almost zero and raises steadily
due to the weekly roll-out of the 26 remaining cohorts until mid July 2011. The installation of
the in-home displays was rolled-out mainly over the period from July 2011 to February 2012,
so that the proportion of households without in-home display steadily decreases after July
2011. The share of households without an installed display is above around 20 % in the period
from June 2011 to January 2012. During this period, we can identify the treatment effect of
providing continuous and real-time feedback via smart meters using only the high-frequency
records of the smart meters. For analyses beyond this time period, treatment effects have to
be identified using the periodical meter readings discussed above.
We estimate the causal effects of the in-home displays on electricity consumption per day
and on average hourly consumption over the daily profile. For the analysis of the effects on
daily electricity consumption, we employ the following empirical specification:
eit = αi + ωw(t) + βDit + εit , (3.3)
where eit is electricity consumption in kWh per day of household i at time t. Household-
specific differences in electricity consumption are absorbed in a household-specific constant
αi. Furthermore, we control for time effects using a weekly fixed effect ωw(t). Dit a dummy
which equals 1 if the in-home display of household i is installed at time t. The coefficient β
thus reflects the causal effect of installing the in-home display on daily electricity consumption.
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Figure 3.8: Proportion of households without in-home display
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
wi
th
ou
t d
isp
la
y
01jan2011 01jul2011 01jan2012 01jul2012 01jan2013
Date
Notes: This figure shows the proportion of housholds without installed in-home
display across time.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
The high frequency records of the smart metering data allow us to investigate how the in-
home displays affected electricity consumption over the daily profile. To estimate the hourly
effects of the in-home display over the day, we estimate the following estimation equation:
eith = αi + δh + ωw(t) +
24∑
h=1
βhDith + εith . (3.4)
The notation is the same as in equation 3.3 with the only difference that the unit of mea-
surement is hourly instead of daily. δh are hourly fixed effects. β1 to β24 are the causal effects
of the in-home display on electricity consumption (in kWh per hour) in a given hour of the day.
We account for potential heteroskedasticity and clustering on the household level by using
cluster-robust standard errors.
3.5.2 Usage of in-home displays
Households use the in-home display frequently, but not all features were used at the same
frequency. Figure 3.C2 shows the different features of the device. The main screen shows real-
time consumption and achievement of the weekly goals. The second screen allows to compare
electricity consumption across different measurement periods. On the third screen households
could measure current electricity consumption in the household over a specific period. In the
last screen households could fix the weekly goals. Figure 3.9 shows how usage of the different
features evolved over time. The figure shows the proportion of households who have used
the display at least once in a given week after installation. Clearly, this proportion is one in
the beginning of the treatment period, because the display has been turned on at least once
upon installation. Usage of the device diminishes relatively steeply to around 60 % after 4
115
weeks. Afterwards, usage decreases only slowly. Three months after installation of the device,
50 % of the households still use the device at least once in a given week, and after one year,
that proportion is still around 30 %.15 The real-time screen was used most often. This is not
surprising, because it was the starting screen after turning on the device. The frequency of
usage diminishes with the order of the features: the second screen was touched second most
often, and the last screen was used least often.
Figure 3.9: Proportion of households using the display
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Notes: This figure shows the average proportion using the different functionalities of the display at least once
per week across time since installation of the display.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
Despite the diminishing frequency of usage, time spent with the display is relatively stable
conditional on using it. Figure 3.10 shows average duration of usage of the displays in minutes
per day for frequent and infrequent users. Frequency of use is defined as the total number of
uses over the whole treatment period. Frequent users are households in the upper half of the
frequency distribution and infrequent users are households in the lower half of the distribution.
Frequent users do not only use the device more frequently than infrequent users, but they also
spend more time on the display. Conditional on using it, frequent users spend around 9
minutes per day with the display and infrequent users around 6 minutes.
15Part of this surprisingly high frequency of usage might be explained by the fact that households were asked to
switch on the device once every three weeks in order to ensure proper storage of the recorded data.
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Figure 3.10: Duration of usage per day
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Notes: This figure shows the average duration of usage of the in-home displays in minutes per day.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
3.5.3 Aggregate effects
Figure 3.11 provides graphical evidence how the displays affected normalized electricity con-
sumption over time. In order to control for household specific heterogeneity, we first normalize
electricity consumption with respect to the mean electricity consumption of each household.
To eliminate time effects, we then normalize electricity consumption with respect to the mean
electricity consumption of the control group in a specific time period. That is, we only take into
account observations before installation of the in-home displays in the second normalization
step. The figure shows the deviation from mean daily consumption (kWh per day) in the 7
weeks before and in the 26 weeks after installation of the in-home displays. A value of zero
thus means that on average a household with display uses as much electricity as a house-
hold without display and negative values imply that households with the display consume less
electricity than their counterparts without display in a given week.
Before installation of the in-home displays the deviation from mean daily consumption fluc-
tuates around zero. Within a few weeks after installation of the device we observe a pronounced
drop in electricity consumption relative to households without a display. Four weeks after in-
stallation of the display, households reduced electricity consumption by around 0.4 kWh. Over
the remaining period, electricity reductions fluctuate between 0.2 and 0.4 kWh per day or 3 to
6 % of daily consumption on average. The installation of the in-home displays thus triggered
fast and persistent reductions in electricity consumption.
Table 3.6 presents the supporting regression estimates for the average treatment effect on
electricity consumption (columns 1 and 2) and expenditures (columns 3 and 4). Treatment
effects in columns 1 and 3 are based on hourly effects which are aggregated up to the daily
level and include hourly and weekly fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 are based on daily data and
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Figure 3.11: Deviation from daily mean
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Notes: This figure shows the deviation from mean daily consumption (kWh per day) in the 7 weeks before
and 26 weeks after installation of the in-home display. Mean daily consumption is based on observation
before installation only. Week 0 denotes the week prior to installation.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
include weekly fixed effects only. All specification account for individual heterogeneity through
individual fixed effects.
Panel A presents estimates for the overall sample. Installing the in-home display reduces
electricity consumption on average by 0.23 kWh per day or 84 kWh per year. Estimates are
robust to the estimation method. Irrespective of whether we estimate hourly effects and ag-
gregate them up to the daily level (column 1) or whether we estimate daily effects (column 2),
estimates are on the same order of magnitude. The electricity savings translate into reductions
in electricity expenditures on the order of 4 cents per day or 14 Swiss francs per year. Despite
different identification strategies, estimates are very similar to the estimates which are based
on the periodical electricity readings.
Panel B and C display estimates for frequent and infrequent users of the display respec-
tively. Frequency of usage is defined as above, based on the total number of usages over the
whole treatment period. The table shows that frequent users thus not only use the display
more frequently and longer, but also conserve more electricity and save more in terms of elec-
tricity expenditures. Frequent users conserve around 0.28 kWh per day of electricity, whereas
infrequent users save on average around 0.19 kWh - a difference which is however not sta-
tistically significant. Nevertheless, observing larger effects for frequent users suggests that
behavioral changes are not triggered by the mere existence of the display in the household, but
rather by an active usage of the device. Understanding how the intervention affected behavior
would however need a more in-depth analysis of the underlying psychological mechanisms and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 3.6: Average treatment effects
Electricity consumption Electricity expenditures
kWh per day CHF per day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Total
Treatment effect -0.234*** -0.230*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.011) (0.011)
N 7,435,617 310,893 7,435,617 310,893
Clusters 1,003 1,003 1,003 1,003
B. Frequent users
Treatment effect -0.284*** -0.267*** -0.052*** -0.049***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.016) (0.016)
N 4,531,535 189,272 4,531,535 189,272
Clusters 506 506 506 506
C. Infrequent users
Treatment effect -0.194** -0.200** -0.027* -0.029**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.014) (0.014)
N 2,904,082 121,621 2,904,082 121,621
Clusters 497 497 497 497
Hourly FE Yes No Yes No
Weekly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows average treatment effects on treated for electricity consumption
(columns 1 and 2) and for electricity expenditures (columns 3 and 4). Panel A shows overall
effects, panel B displays effects for frequent users of the smart meter display, and panel
C for infrequent users respectively. Columns 1 and 3 are based on an aggregation of hourly
effects, and columns 2 and 4 are based on daily data. Standard errors clustered by household
in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
3.5.4 Disaggregation over the daily profile
The aggregate analysis showed that displays showed first effects relatively fast after installation
which persisted over time. An interesting question is whether these reductions were achieved
through adjustments at the extensive or at the intensive margin. Adjustments at the exten-
sive margin are reductions that are obtained through a readjustment of one’s privately optimal
electricity consumption level, for example through turning off the television, switching off light
bulbs or using the coffee machine less often. Adjustments at the intensive margin are attained
through a more efficient use of electricity without reducing the level of consumed electricity
services, for example through exchanging traditional light bulbs with energy-efficient ones or
consequently turn off standby switches of appliances which are not currently used. Adjust-
ments at the intensive margin should be visible as general reductions over the whole day load
profile, whereas adjustments at the extensive margin are expected to be more concentrated in
times that households spend at home such as evening hours for example.
Figure 3.12 shows the average day load profile of smart metering households before treat-
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ment start. Electricity consumption is relatively low during night hours, grows gradually over
the morning hours until it first peaks around midday, and stays relatively flat in the afternoon.
The bulk of the daily electricity is consumed in the evening hours between 4 and 11pm.
Figure 3.12: Day load profile before treatment
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Notes: This figure shows the average day load profile of smart metering households before treatment start.
In figure 3.13 we show deviations from the hourly average of control households in the
50 days before and after installation of the display. Clearly, deviations from hourly means
fluctuate around zero before installation of the display, because this is how we defined the
normalization. After installation of the smart meters the daily profile of the reductions changes
significantly. First, we observe a general reduction of electricity consumption over all times
of the day starting around 6am. Second, the bulk of the reduction is achieved in the hours
between 5 and 10pm. In peak hours between 8 and 9pm, the reduction amounts to around
0.035 kWh per hour or almost 8 % of electricity use in that period. Finally, we also observe
a substitution of electricity consumption away from high-tariff to low-tariff hours. Electricity
consumption slightly increases during the night hours between 1am and 5am.
The graphical evidence is confirmed in table 3.B7. The table contains causal estimates for
the reduction in electricity consumption (columns 1 to 3) and electricity expenditures (columns
4 to 6) after installation of the displays and is estimated for both the overall sample and for
frequent and infrequent users separately. In contrast to the graphical evidence of figure 3.13,
which covers the short-run effects in the 50 days after installation, the estimates in table
3.B7 represent average treatment effects over the whole treatment period. The overall picture
remains the same: Households reduce their electricity consumption significantly over all times
of the day. The largest reductions are observed around 6 and 7pm, and from 11pm to 4am
we observe a substitution from high-tariff to low-tariff consumption. Frequent users conserve
more electricity in the peak hours, but they also substitute more towards low-tariff hours than
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Figure 3.13: Deviation from hourly mean
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Notes: This figure shows the deviation from mean hourly consumption (kWh per hour) over the day load
profile in the 50 days before and after installation of the in-home display.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
infrequent users.
Figure 3.14 graphically confirms the tendency of household to increasingly substitute con-
sumption from high- to low-tariff hours. For the sake of visibility, confidence intervals are
only displayed for the pre-installation effects. The figure splits up the average treatment ef-
fects into three periods. Households start to reduce electricity consumption already in the first
three weeks after installation of the display. In the period from 4 to 6 weeks after installation,
the treatment becomes fully effective and large reductions are observed especially during the
evening peak hours. Also households start to substitute consumption towards low-tariff hours.
In the period from 7 to 26 weeks after installation, household continue to conserve electricity
over the whole time of the day, but at the same time substitute some of their consumption into
night hours.
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Figure 3.14: Deviation from hourly mean - over time
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Notes: This figure shows the deviation from mean hourly consumption (kWh per hour) over the day load
profile in the 50 days before and after installation of the in-home display in different time periods after
installation of the display.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
In summary, the analysis of the treatment effects over the daily profile highlights some inter-
esting observations: First, households react very fast to the treatment. Reductions are already
discernible in the first three weeks after treatment start. Second, while there is some reduc-
tion over the daytime, the largest savings are achieved during the peak hours in the evening.
This points towards adjustments at the extensive margin. Households predominantly tend to
reduce electricity consumption in the evening hours and reductions over the remaining day-
time play only a second order role. Finally, the observed substitution electricity consumption
from high-tariff to low-tariff hours also supports the view that reductions were predominantly
achieved through selected behavioral changes rather than an exchange of traditional for more
energy-efficient appliances.
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3.6 Welfare implications
Cost effectiveness. Especially when comparing different types of feedback, cost effectiveness
in terms of cents of costs per kilowatt-hour of electricity conserved is a measure of great prac-
tical interest. While the smart metering treatment is the most effective treatment in terms of
kilowatt-hours conserved, it may not be the most cost-effective one, because it requires in-
stallation of costly smart meter displays. In this section, we will give a stylized analysis of
in-sample cost effectiveness. In-sample means that we only account for the total electricity
savings between the beginning and the end of the treatment period and do not extrapolate
further in the future. The measure of cost effectiveness we use is the annualized costs of the
intervention divided by kilowatt-hours saved per year:
Cost effectiveness =
Cost per treatment per year
γˆj × 365 ,
where γˆj denotes the average electricity conservation in kWh per day of treatment j over the
whole treatment period.
On average, the smart metering treatment reduced electricity consumption by 0.23 kWh
per day or 84 kWh per year (see table 3.6). The main costs associated with the smart meter-
ing treatment are the investment and installation costs of the smart meters and the in-home
displays. Baeriswyl et al. (2012) estimate that investment costs of smart meters and in-home
displays are around 215 Swiss francs per household. The installation of the devices costs an-
other around 200 Swiss francs. We thus assume costs on the order of 415 Swiss francs per
household for the smart metering treatment.16 Assuming a durability of 10 years for smart
meters and in-home smart meter displays and no time discounting, the annualized cost of the
smart metering treatment is 41.5 Swiss francs per household. Based on these numbers, the
cost effectiveness of the smart metering treatment is around 50 cents per kilowatt-hour saved.
Neglecting the additional indirect costs of additional resources needed in the service center
of ewz due to the treatment, expert advice was virtually costless. At the same time it did
not not induce any electricity conservation, which makes a cost effectiveness analysis of that
treatment pointless.
Social information letters generated on average electricity conservations of 0.082 kWh per
day or 30 kWh per year for the social competition and insignificant 0.044 kWh per day or 16
kWh per year for the social comparison group. Allcott (2011) or Allcott and Rogers (forthcom-
ing) calculate the costs of the energy reports with one dollar per letter. Because in our field
experiment the social information letters were sent by email, distribution of the information
is virtually costless. However, the pairwise matching of the households and the exporting of
the information into the electricity statements incur additional costs. Neglecting fixed indirect
costs of adapting the data management system or implementation of a pairing algorithm, we
16The effective costs of the smart metering treatment were around 2250 Swiss francs per household. Basing cost
effectiveness on this number would highly overstate the cost side because the effective costs reflect in large parts the
R&D costs of developing an in-home display prototype.
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use a cost of one Swiss franc per social information e-mail. Additionally, the meters have to be
read-off more frequently. According to Baeriswyl et al. (2012) meter readings in an urban area
incurs costs of around four Swiss francs per reading. During the one-year treatment phase,
meters were read-off eight times. Neglecting fixed costs of program implementation, the total
costs of the social information treatment add up to around 39 Swiss francs per household per
year. Cost effectiveness is thus 1.3 Swiss franc per kilowatt-hour saved for social competition
and 2.45 Swiss francs per kilowatt-hour saved for the social comparison group.
Using annualized costs and disregarding time discounting, the smart metering treatment is
not only the most effective treatment with respect to electricity savings, but is also most cost
effective. Empirical evidence further suggests that savings were persistent only for the smart
metering group. Extrapolating into the future and making assumptions about persistence
would thus make even more of a difference. Given that the distribution of social information
through email is virtually costless, interventions which combine smart meters (instead of tradi-
tional meters which have to be read off manually) with social information could be a potentially
cost-effective way of reducing household electricity consumption.
Social welfare. Impact evaluations of interventions are highly incomplete if they only focus
on administrative cost effectiveness without accounting for social welfare effects. The different
mechanisms through which the interventions could act can have different implications for
consumer welfare. On the one hand, interventions can increase individual’s utility if they
positively resonate with their intrinsic motivation to save electricity. Interventions may facilitate
a utility-improving readjustment of one’s own privately optimal electricity consumption level if
they mainly act through an information improvement. On the other hand, welfare gains may
be completely undone if the behavioral changes have been coerced by social pressure.
Quantifying the social welfare benefits and costs of the interventions is difficult in prac-
tice, because the costs of changing usage behavior or changing the capital stock are usually
unobserved. Without appropriate measures for the welfare implications of the interventions,
such as lost leisure or cost constraints due to treatments, an analysis of social welfare remains
relatively limited and imprecise. Nevertheless – as a first step towards analyzing social welfare
– we can make use of the rich information from the surveys to find proxies for the overall utility
gains or losses due to the interventions. We use three different dimensions of satisfaction - sat-
isfaction with life, satisfaction with the environment and satisfaction with the quality of life -
as proxies for utility. These measures are assumed to incorporate monetary and non-monetary
gains and costs of the interventions.
Table 3.7 reports the average effects of the treatments on the three satisfaction measures.
None of the treatments has a significant impact on satisfaction with live, environment and
quality of life. Point estimates are small and vary in their sign. The interventions therefore
neither deteriorated nor improved participants’ utility. A zero overall effect could imply that
the social benefits of the information improvement are offset by the negative social pressure
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effects or the costs of changing the capital stock and/or the behavioral habits.
Table 3.7: Difference-in-differences estimates for satisfaction
Life Environment Quality oflife
Smart metering 0.019 0.001 0.022
(0.023) (0.031) (0.026)
Expert advice -0.017 -0.019 0.011
(0.024) (0.032) (0.027)
Social competition 0.040 -0.009 0.021
(0.026) (0.032) (0.028)
Social comparison -0.005 0.027 0.018
(0.025) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 14,839 14,775 14,726
Clusters 4,579 4,566 4,557
R2 0.007 0.005 0.006
Notes: Standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** P<0.01 **
P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ewz.
3.7 Conclusion
We analyze the electricity savings potentials of information in a randomized controlled field
experiment. The three types of information are (i) real-time and detailed feedback using smart
metering technology, (ii) personalized electricity savings tips through energy experts and (iii)
social information letters with monthly or quarterly electricity statements of one’s own and a
peer household’s electricity consumption.
Real-time feedback reduced electricity consumption on average by 3 to 5 % of daily con-
sumption. Households started to reduce electricity consumption shortly after receiving the
in-home display and the savings persisted over the whole treatment period. Breaking the ef-
fects down to the hourly level we find that the largest savings were realized during peak hours.
At the same time, household increasingly substituted electricity consumption from high-tariff
to low-tariff hours. Observing targeted reductions predominantly in evening hours suggests
that households react to the treatment with behavioral changes rather than with investing
in energy-efficient appliances, which would reduce electricity consumption uniformly over the
daily profile.
Personalized savings tips through energy experts improved the perception of how easy a
change in energy-efficient behavior would be, but did not translate into concrete actions. More-
over, because the treatment was a relatively weak one, the take-up rate was relatively low. In
summary, expert advice can be helpful to improve information, but fails to bridge the gap
from knowledge to behavioral changes. In combination with treatments that induce behavioral
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changes, expert advice could be a helpful complement to boost electricity conservation.
Social competition reduces electricity consumption by around 1.5 % of daily usage. Treat-
ment effects are significant only in the first quarter and the fourth quarter and disappear in
the between-period. This pattern underlines the importance of the feedback frequency. Elec-
tricity savings leveled out as soon as feedback frequency changed from once-per-month to
once-per-quarter. Moreover, this pattern of action and backsliding suggests that the compet-
itive element of this treatment could have played an important role: households might have
reinforced savings efforts towards the end of the treatment period in a last attempt to ”beat”
their peer household.
Surprisingly - given the conceptual similarity of the two social treatment groups - social
comparison did not significantly reduce electricity consumption on average. While point es-
timates are negative, they are too small to statistically distinguish them from zero. However
we find that the responses to the social comparison treatment are highly asymmetric. While
households with electricity consumption below their peers’ consumption tend to save in the
beginning of the treatment period but stop saving electricity in the later periods of the treat-
ment, households with higher electricity consumption save up to 0.25 kWh per day or around
4 % of daily usage in the third and fourth quarter of the treatment period. The findings are
interesting in two respects: First, we do find tendencies of a ”boomerang” effect: the ”better”
households stop saving electricity in the medium-run or even consume more. This is a defi-
ciency which could be corrected easily in a real application. Social information could be sent
out only to higher users or the social information could be supplemented with injunctive norms
that appeal to the pro-sociality of electricity consumption. Second, the asymmetric response
also shows that being above the other household might have increased the perceived pressure
to reduce electricity and coerced households into behavioral changes.
Analyzing the effects of the interventions on utility, we find neither positive nor negative
effects on various measures of satisfaction. This can imply that the social benefits of improved
information and knowledge are offset by the negative effects of social pressure or the mone-
tary and non-monetary costs of behavioral changes. The identification and separation of the
underlying mechanisms is thus crucial for an effective policy intervention, but studies which
can separate the underlying mechanisms are still scarce. Separation of positive welfare effects
of improved information from the negative social pressure effects is addressed in a follow-
up experiment on energy conservation during showering. Tiefenbeck et al. (2014) exploit the
abundance of personality measures from the surveys to disentangle the positive utility effects
of real-time feedback from the negative social pressure effects and find no evidence for social
pressure as underlying mechanism of the energy reductions .
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3.A Choice experiments
In addition to the personality measures collected in the surveys, we integrated three choice
experiments into the surveys to elicit social preferences, overconfidence and time preferences.
The first choice experiment is a public goods game. The set-up of the experiment closely
follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). In each cohort, participants were grouped into groups of ten.
Each subject received a budget of 100 units and could either keep these 100 units for herself or
invest a fraction gi into a group project. Each unit invested into the group project was doubled.
The total amount from the group project was equally shared among the ten group members
irrespective of their contribution. The individual payoff function was the following:
pii = 100− gi + 0.2
10∑
i=1
gi .
First, a number of examples were shown to the subjects in order to ensure that subjects under-
stood the mechanism of the game. Then, the subjects were asked to make two different types
of contribution decisions. In the first decision situation, subjects had to decide how much to
contribute to the group project without knowing how much the other nine participants con-
tributed. In the second decision situation, subjects could make their contribution dependent
on how much the others contributed to the group project. Participants had to decide how
much they were willing to contribute, knowing that the other nine participants contributed on
average between 0 and 20 units, between 21 to 40 units, and so on. In each cohort, one group
of ten participants was randomly chosen and paid off according to their choices. One unit was
directly translated into 1 Swiss franc. One of the 10 participants was randomly chosen to be
paid off according to the second decision situation and the nine other participants were paid
off according to their choice in the first decision situation.
Clearly this type of decision situation creates a conflict between the individual interest and
the group interest. The payoff could be maximized if all subjects would invest the full 100
units into the group project. In this case, all subjects would receive a payoff of 200 units. The
standard prediction, however, is complete free riding by all subjects: Investing one unit into
the group project costs one unit and generates two units for the group. The marginal payoff of
a contribution to the group project is however only 0.2 units. Thus, the size of the contribution
to the group project is a measure for a subjects social preferences. Distinguishing the two
decision situations allows us to understand different motives of cooperation. The first decision
situation measures unconditional cooperation and serves as a measure of altruism, whereas
the second decision situation captures conditional cooperation and allows us to get an estimate
for reciprocity.
The second choice experiment measures the tendency of participants to over- or underesti-
mate themselves. We asked the participants the following questions:17
17See Merkle and Weber (2011) for a similar approach.
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If you would be compared a 100 times with two randomly chosen participants of this
study:
• How often would your electricity consumption per month be larger than the elec-
tricity consumption of the two other households? In . . . out of 100 times.
• How often would your electricity consumption lie between the electricity consump-
tion of the two other households? In . . . out of 100 times.
• How often would your electricity consumption per month be smaller than the elec-
tricity consumption of the two other households? In . . . out of 100 times.
The questions were asked not only for electricity consumption, but also for income, knowledge
about electricity conservation and water usage. If subjects have realistic beliefs about their
performance, the average probability in each of the categories should be one third. Typically,
this is not what is observed, because individuals have a tendency to overestimate positive
attributes.
In the third choice experiment we measured time preferences. Epper et al. (2011) highlight
that the energy-efficiency gap in the market for energy-using durables could be attributed to
consumers undervaluing future cost savings due to their pure time preferences. Commonly the
literature focuses on two aspects of time preferences: First, how much weight do individuals
put on utility in the far future compared to the utility in the near future. Second, how important
is the bias towards the presence, i.e. how large is an individuals tendency to prefer immediate
utility over future utility. We measure both aspects by considering four different decision
situations. In each decision situation, subjects have to decide between a payoff A of 100 units
and a payoff of 110 units (or 120 units, depending on the decision situation) later than payoff A.
Participants had to answer the following question: How many weeks are you willing to wait for
the larger payoff B? Subjects could choose a number between 1 and 46 weeks. For each cohort,
5 subjects were chosen and paid off according to the following incentive-compatible scheme:
The lottery numbers of the week after the end of the survey determines the waiting time until
payoff. If a participant indicated a waiting period which was larger than the lottery number x,
then payoff B was paid off exactly x weeks later. If the indicated waiting period was smaller
or equal to the drawn lottery number x, then subjects receive payoff A. We distinguished four
different decision situations: In case 1 (2), participants had to decide between 100 units now
versus 110 (120) units x weeks later. In case 3 (4), participants had to decide between 100 units
in 4 weeks versus 110 (120) units in 4 + x weeks. Cases 3 and 4 measure long-term patience
and cases 1 and 2 measure the existence of a bias towards present payoffs. We account for
possible order effects by randomizing the ordering of the four different cases.
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3.B Additional Tables
Table 3.B1: Average daily consumption across treatment periods and groups
Treatment pe-
riod
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
Pre 6.107 5.990 6.220 5.879 5.953 6.031
(0.112) (0.117) (0.126) (0.100) (0.100) (0.050)
M1 6.276 6.166 6.459 5.998 6.155 6.213
(0.129) (0.121) (0.140) (0.108) (0.112) (0.055)
M2 6.400 6.181 6.538 6.077 6.223 6.287
(0.127) (0.119) (0.137) (0.111) (0.116) (0.055)
M3 6.604 6.333 6.721 6.251 6.410 6.467
(0.126) (0.129) (0.144) (0.112) (0.119) (0.057)
Q2 6.743 6.338 6.954 6.419 6.574 6.611
(0.127) (0.123) (0.145) (0.119) (0.118) (0.057)
Q3 6.421 6.047 6.560 6.127 6.228 6.282
(0.124) (0.119) (0.139) (0.119) (0.115) (0.055)
Q4 6.161 5.756 6.232 5.728 5.925 5.966
(0.121) (0.114) (0.130) (0.103) (0.109) (0.052)
Avg. annual
consumption
2,351 2,225 2,403 2,226 2,282 2,299
Notes: This table shows average electricity consumption (kWh per day) of participants across treatment periods and groups.
The last row shows average annual consumption for each treatment group.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
Table 3.B2: Readings across group and periods
Period Control Smart Expert Social Social
group meter advice competition comparison
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4
Pre 1,197 1,176 1,207 1,166 1,173
M1 1,192 1,128 1,206 1,155 1,163
M2 1,180 1,120 1,202 1,143 1,150
M3 1,167 1,139 1,192 1,132 1,131
Q2 1,129 1,097 1,158 1,086 1,073
Q3 1,099 1,052 1,125 1,049 1,041
Q4 1,064 1,009 1,082 1,017 1,013
Notes: This table shows how the number of observations varies across groups and periods.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity readings.
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Table 3.B3: Attrition: Baseline electricity consumption (kWh) per day
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Drop-outs 5.474 5.828 5.450 6.090 5.489 5.678
(0.277) (0.392) (0.312) (0.294) (0.272) (0.143)
[N=132] [N=170] [N=130] [N=148] [N=159] [N=739]
Stayers 6.185 6.018 6.313 5.849 6.026 6.082
(0.121 (0.119) (0.136) (0.106) (0.107) (0.053)
[N=1,065] [N=1,006] [N=1,077] [N=1,018] [N=1,014v [N=5,180]
Total 6.107 5.990 6.220 5.879 5.953 6.031
(0.112 (0.117) (0.126) (0.100) (0.100) (0.050)
[N=1,197] [N=1,176] [N=1,207] [N=1,166] [N=1,173] [N=5,919]
Notes: This table shows average baseline consumption across groups for stayers and drop-outs. Columns 1 to 5 show averages
for the control group and the treatment groups and column 6 shows the overall average.
Source: Own calculations based on electricity meter readings.
Table 3.B4: Household characteristics
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Heating system
Oil 0.398 0.413 0.414 0.418 0.414 0.412 0.920
Gas 0.207 0.213 0.210 0.229 0.242 0.220 0.286
Electric 0.053 0.029 0.040 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.040
Wood 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.020 0.021 0.018 0.664
Heat pump heating 0.059 0.060 0.057 0.050 0.047 0.055 0.653
Other 0.109 0.094 0.101 0.092 0.090 0.097 0.670
Don’t know 0.202 0.217 0.214 0.189 0.197 0.204 0.494
Water heating system
Electric 0.106 0.104 0.106 0.119 0.103 0.107 0.811
Partially electric 0.023 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.023 0.025 0.811
Heat pump 0.047 0.052 0.052 0.041 0.039 0.046 0.472
Oil 0.207 0.205 0.220 0.214 0.203 0.210 0.871
Gas 0.172 0.177 0.161 0.185 0.190 0.177 0.462
District heat 0.134 0.132 0.120 0.116 0.131 0.126 0.691
Wood 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.861
Other 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.041 0.040 0.036 0.519
Don’t know 0.333 0.337 0.331 0.321 0.330 0.330 0.956
Appliances
Washing machine 0.998 0.996 0.997 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.026
Dryer 0.830 0.837 0.832 0.824 0.844 0.833 0.820
Computer 0.991 0.993 0.990 0.991 0.997 0.992 0.199
Television 0.833 0.821 0.851 0.818 0.832 0.831 0.294
Dishwasher 0.735 0.750 0.733 0.743 0.754 0.743 0.731
Coffee machine 0.656 0.654 0.666 0.683 0.655 0.663 0.565
Microwave 0.367 0.364 0.374 0.356 0.355 0.363 0.884
Water boiler 0.672 0.676 0.693 0.689 0.670 0.680 0.745
Humidifier 0.176 0.157 0.178 0.158 0.168 0.167 0.562
Print/Copying machine 0.833 0.825 0.835 0.824 0.834 0.830 0.941
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Table 3.B4 – continued
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Internet modem 0.931 0.925 0.929 0.937 0.933 0.931 0.859
Telephone 0.588 0.593 0.581 0.585 0.576 0.585 0.959
Mobile phone 0.944 0.954 0.950 0.947 0.945 0.948 0.839
Radio 0.753 0.757 0.743 0.747 0.736 0.747 0.799
Electronic photo frame 0.039 0.036 0.040 0.048 0.037 0.040 0.722
Stereo equipment 0.761 0.758 0.753 0.754 0.773 0.759 0.843
Video player 0.385 0.422 0.407 0.392 0.397 0.401 0.493
Video game console 0.204 0.179 0.181 0.194 0.195 0.190 0.583
Electric heating 0.046 0.048 0.060 0.060 0.056 0.054 0.556
Aquarium 0.019 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.743
Sauna 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.991
Solarium 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.835
Use of appliances
Washing machinea 3.840 3.792 3.829 3.742 3.852 3.811 0.149
Dryerb 3.526 3.611 3.505 3.563 3.585 3.558 0.362
Computerc 2.761 2.908 2.829 2.902 2.745 2.829 0.028
Televisionc 2.595 2.705 2.700 2.706 2.678 2.677 0.330
Dishwasherd 1.938 1.937 1.976 1.896 1.894 1.929 0.194
Standby modee 2.111 2.100 2.065 2.058 2.102 2.087 0.553
Energy-saving bulbsf 2.928 2.930 2.953 3.008 2.989 2.961 0.454
Cooking
Gas 0.067 0.065 0.061 0.073 0.051 0.063 0.315
Electric 0.931 0.933 0.938 0.925 0.948 0.935 0.273
Other 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.937
Use of coversg 1.299 1.291 1.306 1.299 1.291 1.297 0.973
Lunch at homeh 2.265 2.216 2.266 2.214 2.174 2.227 0.327
Dinner at homeh 3.279 3.285 3.272 3.259 3.241 3.267 0.870
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 show averages of the items for groups G0 to G4. Column 6 shows the average across all groups and column
7 displays the p-values of an F-test of inequality of means across groups.
a 1 = Never; 2 = 1-2 times; 3 = 3-5 times; 4 = 6-9 times; 5 = 10-15 times; 6 = > 15 times (per week)
b 1 = Always; 2 = 75 % of times; 3 = 50 % of times; 4 = 25 % of times; 5 = Never
c 1 = 0-1 hours; 2 = 1-2 hours; 3 = 2-3 hours; 4 = 3-4 hours; 5 = > 4 hours
d 1 = 0-1 times per week; 2 = 2-3 times per week; 3 = > 3 times per week
e 1 = None; 2 = 1-3 appliances; 3 = 4-6 appliances; 4 = 7-9 appliances; 5 = 10 or more appliances
f 1 = None; 2 = 25 %; 3 = 50 %; 4 = 75 %; 5 = 100 %
g 1 = Mostly; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = Rarely; 4 = I don’t cook
h 1 = Never; 2 = 1-2 days per week; 3 = 3-4 days per week; 4 = 5-6 days per week; 5 = Always
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
Table 3.B5: Attitudes, knowledge, and energy conserving behavior
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Attitudes: 1 = ”Do not agree” and 5 = ”Agree”
Customization of environment 3.12 3.154 3.085 3.08 3.081 3.104 0.514
Environmental abuse 4.205 4.194 4.123 4.147 4.196 4.173 0.302
Co-existence of flora and fauna 4.182 4.240 4.232 4.227 4.256 4.227 0.688
Saturation limits reached 4.135 4.225 4.124 4.185 4.170 4.168 0.185
Ecological awareness 3.379 3.367 3.333 3.328 3.363 3.354 0.717
Ecological awareness of others 3.772 3.811 3.730 3.679 3.732 3.745 0.041
Political engagement 3.720 3.817 3.738 3.717 3.788 3.756 0.140
Environmental pollution 4.037 4.124 4.019 3.980 4.023 4.037 0.082
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Table 3.B5 – continued
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Climate warming 4.018 4.108 3.975 4.024 4.072 4.039 0.044
Conservation vs. job loss 3.462 3.580 3.410 3.565 3.473 3.498 0.001
Risks: 1 = ”No risk” und 5 = ”Large risk”
Genetic engineering 3.354 3.369 3.319 3.386 3.342 3.354 0.651
Nuclear power 4.129 4.209 4.140 4.120 4.118 4.144 0.201
Radio antennas 2.745 2.763 2.786 2.767 2.784 2.769 0.904
High voltage power lines 2.691 2.678 2.687 2.702 2.712 2.694 0.943
Climate warming 4.112 4.180 4.109 4.153 4.158 4.142 0.255
Automobile traffic 3.816 3.846 3.790 3.819 3.839 3.822 0.597
Electricity conserving behavior
% with past expert advice 0.024 0.024 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.032 0.078
Do you consider energy efficiency when buying . . .
. . . large appliances 0.975 0.977 0.974 0.970 0.971 0.973 0.898
. . . small appliances 0.672 0.671 0.653 0.677 0.661 0.667 0.803
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 show averages of the items for groups G0 to G4. Column 6 shows the average across all groups and column
7 displays the p-values of an F-test of inequality of means across groups.
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
Table 3.B6: Personality and choice experiments
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Personality: (based on the 60-item version of HEXACO)
Honesty 3.749 3.759 3.769 3.737 3.758 3.754 0.853
Emotionality 2.862 2.861 2.863 2.874 2.875 2.867 0.976
Extraversion 3.561 3.542 3.544 3.541 3.584 3.554 0.417
Agreeableness 3.227 3.219 3.239 3.238 3.248 3.233 0.796
Conscientiousness 3.724 3.699 3.704 3.715 3.671 3.703 0.328
Openness 3.696 3.677 3.652 3.674 3.661 3.672 0.612
Personality: (based on The Swiss Environmental Survey 2007)
Trust in others 3.366 3.362 3.331 3.326 3.314 3.34 0.630
Contact to neighbors 2.992 2.906 2.925 2.93 2.935 2.937 0.432
Watch others 3.607 3.492 3.521 3.533 3.466 3.524 0.037
Compare with others 2.737 2.777 2.738 2.698 2.683 2.727 0.260
Compare notes with others 4.101 4.097 4.095 4.132 4.097 4.104 0.849
Dependence 3.247 3.286 3.252 3.214 3.203 3.241 0.408
Measure with others 2.729 2.784 2.727 2.709 2.711 2.732 0.477
Measure own performance 3.908 3.816 3.858 3.782 3.806 3.834 0.020
Public goods game
Unconditional contribution 71.403 70.4 69.315 72.381 71.246 70.97 0.502
Conditional contribution: Contribution if others contribute . . .
. . . 0-20 units 25.232 26.139 26.117 26.323 24.913 25.739 0.873
. . . 21-40 units 38.965 39.334 39.933 40.227 38.519 39.375 0.762
. . . 41-60 units 54.32 54.282 54.803 54.888 53.339 54.315 0.794
. . . 61-80 units 68.957 67.891 68.538 68.691 67.413 68.291 0.839
. . . 81-100 units 82.916 80.344 81.979 81.901 80.354 81.483 0.487
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Table 3.B6 – continued
G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total
p-
value
Overconfidence18
Electricity consumption
% larger 25.522 25.053 25.15 29.179 29.389 26.797 0.000
% equal 35.317 31.363 32.188 33.526 34.412 33.337 0.000
% smaller 39.442 43.746 42.301 37.792 37.053 40.155 0.000
Knowledge of energy-relevant issues
% larger 40.577 41.021 42.657 43.455 42.684 42.03 0.035
% equal 37.125 35.412 35.528 35.187 36.066 35.869 0.204
% smaller 23.072 23.965 22.834 22.638 23.258 23.173 0.458
Household income
% larger 35.52 34.675 34.952 34.47 35.146 34.952 0.893
% equal 33.406 32.769 33.361 33.048 32.489 33.014 0.825
% smaller 30.952 32.655 32.255 33.172 32.648 32.327 0.315
Warm water consumption
% larger 27.256 25.327 26.661 27.24 26.733 26.612 0.293
% equal 34 34.81 34.014 33.267 34.279 34.094 0.665
% smaller 40.613 41.299 40.609 40.006 40.803 40.683 0.909
Time preferences (waiting period measured in weeks)
Decision between 100 units today or . . .
. . . 110 units in X weeks 22.523 21.931 22.352 21.627 21.777 22.043 0.824
. . . 120 units in X weeks 24.19 23.81 24.385 23.767 23.985 24.02 0.950
Decision between 100 units in 4 weeks or . . .
. . . 110 units in 4+X weeks 22.677 22.136 22.485 22.396 22.005 22.338 0.939
. . . 120 units in 4+X weeks 24.658 24.145 24.656 24.238 24.127 24.361 0.939
Time preferences (proportion with maximum waiting period of 46 weeks)
Decision between 100 units today or . . .
. . .110 units in X weeks 0.22 0.227 0.214 0.226 0.199 0.217 0.711
. . .120 units in X week 0.229 0.24 0.237 0.238 0.228 0.235 0.977
Decision between 100 units in 4 weeks or . . .
. . . 110 units in 4+X weeks 0.215 0.22 0.205 0.228 0.202 0.214 0.759
. . . 120 units in 4+X weeks 0.227 0.245 0.23 0.247 0.234 0.237 0.873
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 show averages of the items for groups G0 to G4. Column 6 shows the average across all groups and column
7 displays the p-values of an F-test of inequality of means across groups.
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
18This choice experiment was integrated into the Q2 online survey for the questions regarding electricity consump-
tion, knowlededge and household income. The question regarding warm water consumption was asked in the post-
treatment survey.
133
Table 3.B7: Hourly treatment effects
Electricity consumption Electricity expenditures
kWh per hour CHF per hour
Overall
Frequent
users
Infrequent
users
Overall
Frequent
users
Infrequent
users
0h00 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1h00 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2h00 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3h00 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4h00 0.010** 0.013** 0.007 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
5h00 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6h00 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7h00 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
8h00 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
9h00 -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
10h00 -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
11h00 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
12h00 -0.012*** -0.011** -0.013** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
13h00 -0.010*** -0.009* -0.011** -0.002** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
14h00 -0.010*** -0.010* -0.010** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
15h00 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
16h00 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.010** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
17h00 -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
18h00 -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
19h00 -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.032*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.006***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
20h00 -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.025*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.004***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
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Table 3.B7 – continued
Electricity consumption Electricity expenditures
kWh per hour CHF per hour
Overall
Frequent
users
Infrequent
users
Overall
Frequent
users
Infrequent
users
21h00 -0.028*** -0.041*** -0.015** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.003**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
22h00 -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.002 -0.002* -0.003** 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
23h00 0.016*** 0.015* 0.015** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 7,435,617 4,531,535 2,904,082 7,435,617 4,531,535 2,904,082
Clusters 1,003 506 497 1,003 506 497
Hourly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows deviations from hourly mean for electricity consumption (kWh per hour) and electricity expenditures
(CHF per hour). Means are based on observations before installation of the smart meter display. Columns 1 and 4 show overall
estimates, columns 2 and 5 show estimates for frequent users of the display and columns 3 and 6 for infrequent users respectively.
All estimates contain hourly and weekly FE. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on smart meter data.
Table 3.B8: Potential for changing energy-efficient behavior
Treatment group
Light
bulbs
Tele-
vision
Laundry Fridge
Turning-
off
Power
strips
Average
Smart metering 0.029 -0.063 0.049 -0.041 -0.012 -0.001 -0.008
(0.033) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.026) (0.030) (0.016)
Expert advice 0.096*** -0.029 0.070* 0.051 0.046 -0.009 0.037**
(0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.016)
Social competition 0.021 -0.052 -0.053 -0.039 -0.046* -0.020 -0.035**
(0.034) (0.046) (0.038) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031) (0.016)
Social comparison -0.001 -0.008 0.026 -0.040 -0.007 0.025 -0.002
(0.034) (0.046) (0.040) (0.035) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017)
Observations 14,861 14,643 14,878 14,785 14,806 14,835 14,959
R-squared 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.010
Notes: This table presents DiD estimates for the household’s potential to change their energy efficient behavior. These changes comprise
the ability to change most of the existing light bulbs with energy-efficient light bulbs (column 1), to watch television 2 hours less per week
(column 2), to dry clothes on a clothes line instead of using a dryer (column 3), to increase the temperature of the fridge by 1circ Celsius
(column 4), to turn off the power of appliances after using them (column 5), and to install power strips for appliances (column 6). Column
7 comprises an average over all six items. Standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
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3.C Additional Figures
Figure 3.C1: Cumulative take-up rate of expert advice
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
1,
00
0
Sh
ar
e 
of
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
wi
th
 e
xp
er
t a
dv
ice
 (c
um
ula
ted
)
Pre M1 M2 M3 Q2 Q3 Q4
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative take-up rate of expert advice over the study period.
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Figure 3.C2: Smart meter device
Notes: The top left screen shows the start screen of the device. It shows a household’s real-time electricity use. Also it allows households
to monitor their achievement of their weekly goal setting. The top right screen shows a screen which allowed households to observe their
historical electricity use at different measurement frequencies. On the bottom left screen households can set weekly goals and monitor
the achievement of their weekly goalsetting over time. The bottom right screen allows households to measure electricity consumption
in a given period.
Source: ewz Smart Metering field experiment
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Figure 3.C3: Sample letter for social competition treatment
Ihr Stromverbrauch im Vergleich.  
Sehr geehrter Herr Muster 
Hiermit senden wir Ihnen den <<ersten/nächsten>> Zwischenstand. Sie erhalten regelmässig Informationen zu 
Ihrem Stromverbrauch und zum Stromverbrauch ihres Vergleichshaushalts. Dieser erhält im Gegenzug die 
gleichen anonymisierten Informationen. Die Vergleichsgrafik zeigt Ihnen den prozentualen Unterschied Ihres 
Gesamtverbrauchs. Ist der Balken rot, dann verbrauchten Sie mehr Strom, ist der Balken grün, dann haben Sie 
weniger Strom als der Vergleichshaushalt konsumiert. 
 
Sie verbrauchen X% «mehr/weniger» Strom als ihr Vergleichshaushalt 
In der unten stehenden Grafik sehen Sie die Entwicklung Ihres Stromverbrauchs.  
 
Ihr durchschnittlicher Verbrauch pro Tag im letzten <<Quartal/Monat>> betrug <<x>> kWh/Tag. Ihr 
Vergleichshaushalt hat in derselben Zeitperiode <<x>> kWh/Tag konsumiert. Damit haben Sie im vergangenen 
Quartal <<x>>kWh/Tag  <<mehr/weniger>> verbraucht. 
In rund <<4 Wochen/3 Monaten>> werden wir Ihnen erneut einen Zwischenstand zusenden, der Sie darüber 
informiert, wo sie gegenüber dem anderen Haushalt stehen. 
 
-15-10-5051015
% Differenz im Energieverbrauch seit Studienbeginn  
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15
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25
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Sie Der andere Haushalt
Durchschnittsverbrauch 
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Figure 3.C4: Sample letter for social comparison treatment
Ihr Stromverbrauch im Vergleich.  
Sehr geehrter Herr Muster 
Hiermit senden wir Ihnen den <<ersten/nächsten>> Zwischenstand. Sie erhalten regelmässig Informationen zu 
Ihrem Stromverbrauch und zum Stromverbrauch ihres Vergleichshaushalts. Dieser erhält diese Informationen 
jedoch nicht.  
Die Vergleichsgrafik zeigt Ihnen den prozentualen Unterschied Ihres Gesamtverbrauchs. Ist der Balken rot, 
dann verbrauchten Sie mehr Strom, ist der Balken grün, dann haben Sie weniger Strom als der 
Vergleichshaushalt konsumiert. 
 
Sie verbrauchen X% «mehr/weniger» Strom als ihr Vergleichshaushalt 
In der unten stehenden Grafik sehen Sie die Entwicklung Ihres Stromverbrauchs.  
 
Ihr durchschnittlicher Verbrauch pro Tag im letzten <<Quartal/Monat>> betrug <<xy>> kWh/Tag. Ihr 
Vergleichshaushalt hat in derselben Zeitperiode <<xy>> kWh/Tag konsumiert. Damit haben Sie im vergangenen 
Quartal <<xy>>kWh/Tag  <<mehr/weniger>> verbraucht. 
In rund <<4 Wochen/3 Monaten>> werden wir Ihnen erneut einen Zwischenstand zusenden, der Sie darüber 
informiert, wo sie gegenüber dem anderen Haushalt stehen. 
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General Conclusion
Over thirty years ago, Leamer (1983) – among many others – expressed doubts about the quality
and usefulness of empirical analyses for the economic profession by stating that ”hardly anyone
takes data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s
data analyses seriously” (p.37). Improvements in data quality, more robust estimation methods
and the evolution of better research designs seem to make that assertion no longer justifiable
(see Angrist and Pischke (2010) for a recent response to Leamer’s essay). The economic profes-
sion and policy makers alike often rely on empirical evidence as a means to investigate policy
relevant questions. The approach of using scientifically rigorous and systematic evidence to
identify policies and programs that are capable of improving policy-relevant outcomes is known
under the increasingly popular notion of evidence-based policy.
Evidence-based economic policy often relies on randomized or quasi-natural experiments in
order to identify causal effects of policies. These can require relatively strong assumptions
or raise concerns of external validity. In the context of this thesis, potential concerns are for
example endogeneity of policy reforms with respect to the business cycle in the first chapter,
the trade-off between precision and bias in the regression-discontinuity setting in chapter 2 or
non-representativeness of the sample due to self-selection in chapter 3. While the identification
strategies are very useful to gain insights into the causal effects of specific policy questions,
transforming the evidence into concrete policy conclusions can be challenging. Policy develop-
ment should therefore rely on the systematic evidence of a whole body of research on a specific
policy question rather than on a single analysis. In this sense, this thesis cannot and should
not be viewed as a comprehensive analysis of specific policy issues but rather as a first step
towards a better understanding of certain aspects of a policy question.
The thesis applies new and innovative identification strategies to policy-relevant and topical
questions in the fields of labor economics and behavioral environmental economics. Each
chapter relies on a different identification strategy. In the first chapter, we employ a difference-
in-differences approach to exploit the quasi-experimental change in the entitlement of the max-
imum unemployment benefit duration to identify the medium-run effects of reduced benefit
durations on post-unemployment outcomes. Shortening benefit duration carries a double-
dividend: It generates fiscal benefits without deteriorating the quality of job-matches. On the
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contrary, shortened benefit durations improve medium-run earnings and employment possibly
through containing the negative effects of skill depreciation or stigmatization.
While the first chapter provides only indirect evidence on the underlying behavioral channels,
in the second chapter I develop a novel approach that allows to learn about the relative impor-
tance of the two key margins of job search – reservation wage choice and search effort. In the
framework of a standard non-stationary job search model, I show how the exit rate from un-
employment can be decomposed in a way that is informative on reservation wage movements
over the unemployment spell. The empirical analysis relies on a sharp discontinuity in unem-
ployment benefit entitlement, which can be exploited in a regression-discontinuity approach
to identify the effects of extended benefit durations on unemployment and survivor functions.
I find evidence that calls for an important role of reservation wage choices for job search be-
havior. This can have direct implications for the optimal design of unemployment insurance
policies.
The third chapter – while thematically detached from the other chapters – addresses one of the
major policy challenges of the 21st century: climate change and resource consumption. Many
governments have recently put energy efficiency on top of their agendas. While pricing instru-
ments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often been found to be short-lived and
difficult to enforce politically, the focus of energy conservation programs has shifted towards
behavioral approaches – such as provision of information or social norm feedback. The third
chapter describes a randomized controlled field experiment in which we discuss the effective-
ness of different types of feedback on residential electricity consumption. We find that detailed
and real-time feedback caused persistent electricity reductions on the order of 3 to 5 % of daily
electricity consumption. Also social norm information can generate substantial electricity sav-
ings when designed appropriately. The findings suggest that behavioral approaches constitute
effective and relatively cheap way of improving residential energy-efficiency.
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